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Abstract
The Internet plays a focal role in our social life, work, education, and entertainment.
The current Internet has been designed, over 50 years ago, for reliable host-to-host
communications. Today, however, the Internet is mainly used for content
distribution and retrieval.
To cope with this shift in the Internet usage, three technologies for efficient
content distribution were developed in the past years: Peer-to-Peer (P2P) systems,
Content Delivery Networks (CDNs), and Information-Centric Networking (ICN).
P2P systems and CDNs are widely used today, both constructing overlays atop
the current Internet. ICN, in contrast, is a promising research direction proposing
to redesign the Internet from scratch as a content-centric network.
We focus on P2P systems and ICN. Despite the wide deployment of P2P
systems and the promising features of ICN, several research problems in these
technologies are still awaiting for effective solutions. We address in this dissertation
three of them.
We first deal with Kademlia, the most popular P2P system. Improving and
giving guarantees on Kademlia’s performance and robustness is needed to achieve
a reliable and high quality service. This requires accurate understanding of
system-wide topological properties such as the degree distribution and graph
resilience, as well as properties of routing information. In spite of the importance
of these properties, they were analysed so far only through partial measurements
or oversimplified simulations. Instead, accurate results can be derived only from
graph snapshots of real systems. However, capturing such snapshots is challenging
since it requires to collect large amount of highly dynamic information, almost
instantly, which was not provided by previous measurements. Results of such
graph snapshots also can be used to develop accurate simulation models.
We address this challenge by KadSpider, a crawler that we develop to capture
highly representative graph snapshots of KAD (a popular implementation of
Kademlia). Exploiting KAD design, KadSpider downloads the target information
several times faster than prior Kademlia crawlers with lower signalling overhead.
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Analysing the captured snapshots and comparing them to synthetic graphs
generated by simulations, we provide important information about KAD. We also
show that, for certain properties, simulative results can significantly deviate from
the results of the real system. Most interestingly, the complete graph in the real
system, due to a greatly increased ratio of stale routing information, is much more
vulnerable to targeted attacks than in simulations. This observation holds even
when we simulate with a widely accepted churn model.
Using the captured graph snapshots, we analyse the diversity of node’s
neighbours over the corresponding identifier space sections. We also show that
the average routing hop count can be reduced when this diversity is maximized.
Consequently, we apply this strategy in a modified neighbour selection scheme.
The scheme is backward compatible with Kademlia and its derivatives, and incurs
only negligible computational overhead. We demonstrate the utility of the scheme
via theoretical model derivations, simulations of three notable Kademlia-type
systems, and measurements on KAD nodes.
After that, we shift our attention to Named-Data Networking (NDN), widely
considered a promising ICN architecture for the future Internet. In particular, we
address two salient problems in NDN: (i) cache management and (ii) defending
against an NDN-tailored DDoS attack called the Interest Flooding Attack (IFA).
We argue that both problems should be addressed in a coordinated way based
on timely and network-wide content access information and other system states,
which was not achieved in the past. The distributed nature of the Internet, in
addition to the huge volumes and high dynamics of coordination information,
however, make realizing such coordination challenging.
We address this challenge by CoMon, a novel framework for Coordination in
NDN that is based on (i) lightweight Monitoring of content access and resource
usage and (ii) bounded advertisement of relevant information. CoMon assigns
monitoring tasks to a small number of monitoring nodes selected such that the
entire network traffic passes, or is enforced to pass, through them at an early
stage. The monitoring nodes, in cooperation with a centralized controller, are
also responsible for re-routing user requests towards in-network caches as well as
for defending against IFAs. Our evaluations, based on extensive simulations, show
that CoMon incurs negligible signalling overhead. They also show that CoMon
enables to achieve both a remarkable caching efficiency improvement and high
robustness against IFAs, in comparison both to the original system as well as to
the state of the art.
Zusammenfassung
Das Internet spielt eine wichtige Rolle im Leben seiner Nutzer. Man verwendet
es für gesellschaftliche Zwecke ebenso wie für Arbeit, Bildung und Unterhaltung.
Das derzeitige Internet wurde bereits vor 50 Jahren entworfen um verlässliche
Verbindungen zwischen Rechnern zu schaffen. Die heutige Verwendung beinhaltet
jedoch hauptsächlich das Verteilen von medialen Inhalten.
Um dieser Veränderung der Nutzung des Internet Rechnung zu tragen wurden in
den letzten Jahren drei verschiedene Technologien entwickelt: Peer-to-Peer (P2P)
Systeme, Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) und Information-Centric-Networking
(ICN). P2P und CDN Technologien werden heutzutage intensiv genutzt. ICN
Technologie ist demgegenüber ein vielverspechendes Forschungsfeld, mit dem Ziel
das Internet von Grund auf neu zu entwerfen.
Der Fokus dieser Dissertation liegt auf P2P und ICN Systemen. Trotz der
großflächigen Nutzung von P2P und den vielversprechenden Eigenschaften von
ICN Systemen müssen noch immer diverse Forschungsfragen effizient gelöst werden.
Ziel ist daher die Verbesserung von P2P Systemen und das Erbringen von Beiträgen
zur Realisierung von ICNs.
Zuerst wird dazu das am weitesten verbreitete P2P System, KAD (eine populäre
Implementierung von Kademlia), hinsichtlich der Eigenschaften von Topologie
und Routing-Tabellen untersucht. Im Gegensatz zu vorhandenen Arbeiten werden
Momentaufnahmen von Graphen realer Systeme verwendet. Das Erstellen dieser
Momentaufnahmen erfordert jedoch eine neue Methode, da existierende Verfahren
nicht in der Lage sind große Mengen sich schnell verändernerd Information nahezu
verzögerungsfrei zu speichern. Zu diesem Zweck wurde der KadSpider entwickelt.
Dieser nutzt das Protokolldesign von KAD um repräsentative Momentaufnahmen
um ein Vielfaches schneller und mit weniger Kommunikationsaufwand als bekannte
Crawlers zu erstellen.
Die Analyse der Momentaufnahmen liefert wichtige Informationen über
KAD. Insbesondere wird in dieser Arbeit gezeigt, dass Simulationen, welche
die Basis der bisherigen Forschung bilden, von realen Systemen in bestimmten
Eigenschaften abweichen. Am interessantesten ist hierbei, dass reale Graphen
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vermuten lassen. Dies gilt ebenso für solche Simulationen, die mit einem weithin
in der Forschung akzeptierten Churn-Modell durchgeführt wurden.
Des Weiteren werden die Momentaufnahmen in dieser Arbeit dazu verwendet
die Diversität der Nachbarn in den entsprechenden Teilen der Routing-Tabelle
der Knoten zu untersuchen. Außerdem wird gezeigt, dass die mittlere Entfernung
(hop count) zwischen Knoten reduziert werden kann, wenn die Diversität
maximiert wird. Aufgrund dieser neuen Erkenntnis wurde ein Schema für
die Nachbarschaftswahl in KAD entwickelt. Dieses ist abwärtskompatibel
mit Kademlia und dessen Derivaten und erzeugt nur vernachlässigbaren
Rechenaufwand. Die Nützlichkeit des neuen Schemas wird durch theoretische
Überlegungen, Simulationen in drei Kademlia-ähnlichen Systemen und durch
Messungen auf KAD Knoten nachgewiesen.
Im Anschluß daran werden in dieser Arbeit zwei wichtige Probleme der
NDN Architektur, einer vielversprechenden ICN Architektur, betrachtet. Das
ist zum einen das (i) Zwischenspeicher-Management und zum anderen (ii) die
Verteidigung gegen Interest Flooding Attacks (IFA), welche die Eigenheiten der
NDN Architektur ausnutzen. Im Rahmen dieser Arbeit wird gezeigt, wie beide
Probleme mithilfe netzwerkweiter Zugriffs- und Systemstatusinformationen gelöst
werden können. Die dezentrale Architektur des Internets, die große Dynamik und
das hohe Volumen an Statusinformationen stellen eine große Herausforderung in
Hinblick auf die Implementierung dar.
Um dieser Herausforderung zu begegnen ist CoMon, ein neuartiges Framework,
entwickelt worden. Es bietet (i) die Überwachung von Zugriffen auf Inhalte und
Ressourcen und (ii) eine begrenzte Verbreitung von relevanten Statusinformationen.
CoMon verteilt dafür Überwachungsaufträge an eine kleine Anzahl an Knoten,
die so selektiert werden, dass an ihnen der gesamte Netzwerkverkehr anliegt.
Diese Netzwerkknoten sind, in Verbindung mit einem zentralen Controller,
für das Weiterleiten von Anfragen an netzwerkinterne Zwischenspeicher und
die Verteidigung gegen IFAs verantwortlich. Die Evaluationen, basierend auf
Simulationen, zeigen, dass CoMon vernachlässigbaren Kommunikationsaufwand
erzeugt. Sie zeigen außerdem, dass CoMon verglichen mit der originalen
Variante und dem Stand der Technik sowohl eine Steigerung der Effizienz der
Zwischenspeicher, als auch eine erhöhte Robustheit gegenüber IFAs erzielt.
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1
Introduction
The Internet has been designed in the 1960s as a network for reliable host-to-host
communications. Each IP packet travels across the network from a source host to
a destination host. Along its way, the packet is forwarded, hop-by-hop, towards
its destination. In the past years, however, there has been a big shift in the
Internet usage in contrast to what the Internet was designed for. In particular,
the majority of interactions over the Internet relates today to content distribution,
e.g. users publish content on Facebook [fac] and google+ [goo], watch and share
videos on YouTube [you], and browse and share photos on Flickr [fli].
Content distribution applications generate very large and ever increasing
traffic volumes, mainly due to redistribution of popular contents. Cisco forecasts
[cis14] that the monthly Internet traffic will reach 132 exabytes (i.e. 132,000,000
terabytes) by 2018, with a 21% compound annual growth rate (see Figure 1.1).
The same report states that video contents will represent 79% of the overall
Internet traffic in 2018 (up from 66% in 2013).
Such massive traffic translates to high charges for network operators. In
addition, with the traditional host-centric communication model, overlapping
requests particularly for popular contents result in congestions and bottlenecks.
This happens both in the network and at the providers’ side, which lowers
users’ quality-of-experience (QoE). Therefore, it became doubtful that the current
Internet can fulfil the demands of its users in the near future.
The increasing demand for highly scalable and efficient distribution of
content over the Internet motivated the development of three technologies: (i)
Content Delivery Networks (CDNs), (ii) Peer-to-Peer (P2P) systems, and (iii)
Information-Centric Networking (ICN). The common idea is to request and retrieve
contents by their names, irrespective of how or from where they are retrieved.
CDNs and P2P systems are popular today, both working on top of the Internet.
The file-sharing P2P traffic and the traffic that crosses CDNs are expected to
exceed 6,700,000 and 56,000,000 terabytes, respectively, per month by 2018 [cis14].
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Figure 1.1: Forecasts for the monthly Internet traffic from 2013 to 2018 (adapted from
[Ind14])
A CDN is composed of a number of dedicated servers, spreading across the
Internet, cooperate to deliver content to users. Content providers (e.g. YouTube)
sign up with a CDN service provider so that their contents become accessible from
the CDN servers, and they pay for this service. Requests of users are then routed
to the most appropriate (e.g. closest) server hosting a replica of the requested
content. This way, CDNs decrease the workload on the origin content providers,
improve the QoE, and lower the overall bandwidth consumption.
As for P2P systems, they form self-organizing overlay networks atop the
Internet. The key idea is that several nodes (also called peers) share their
resources among each other in a completely distributed way. More precisely, each
node acts simultaneously both as a client (uses others’ resources) and as a server
(shares its resources with others). This way, P2P systems offer scalability and
fault tolerance by design.
Instead of forming overlay networks atop the current Internet, the ICN
paradigm proposes for a radical shift from the current host-centric communication
model into a content-centric one. More precisely, ICN suggests to redesign the
Internet from scratch as a content-centric network. This concept was the basis for
several ICN architectures proposed in the last years. Notable examples include:
Data Oriented Network Architecture (DONA) [KCC+07], Named-Data Networking
(NDN) [JST+09], Publish/Subscribe Internet Routing Paradigm (PSIRP) [LVT10],
and Network of Information (NetInf) [Dan09]. Despite their differences, those
architectures are based on two common ideas: (i) networking named contents and
(ii) in-network caching.
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1.1 Problem Statements
We deal in this dissertation with two systems from the field of content distribution:
(i) Kademlia [MM02], the most actively used P2P system, and (ii) NDN [JST+09],
the most extensively researched ICN proposal and widely considered a potential
architecture for the future Internet. In spite of the success and popularity of
Kademlia-type systems and the great promises of NDN, several research problems
still need to be addressed in both systems. We address in this dissertation three
of those problems: (i) characterizing topological and routing table properties of
Kademlia, (ii) coordinating cache management in NDN, and (iii) defending against
DDoS attacks in NDN. We state and motivate the three problems in this section.
1.1.1 Characterizing Topological and Routing Table
Properties of Kademlia
Topological and routing table properties represent predominant concerns when
designing P2P systems with outstanding performance, reliability, and availability
features. Accurate characterization of these properties is requisite for evaluating
the performance and robustness of these systems, for proposing accurate models,
and for suggesting design improvements.
In particular, the resilience of graph connectivity, both to random failures and
to targeted attacks, is a direct measure for the system’s availability and reliability
for communications [DNF+08,DGLL07]. Both completeness of routing tables and
diversity of node’s contacts over the respective identifier space sections influence
the routing performance [SR06a]. The degree distribution describes the structure
of the topology and it also relates to the resilience and routing table properties.
We focus on Kademlia, the most popular P2P system today. The
aforementioned properties were analysed in Kademlia-type systems so far based
on partial measurements or oversimplified simulations. These simulations
implemented small system sizes and ignored user misbehaviour and dynamics.
Instead, accurate characterization can be derived from analysis of graph snapshots
of real Kademlia-type systems. However, such snapshots were not provided
by previous measurements, and capturing them is challenging since it involves
collection of large amount of information almost instantly from distributed, large
[WK13,SS13a], and rapidly changing [SENB09] systems.
The first problem which we address in this dissertation is threefold: (i)
capturing accurate graph snapshots of an active Kademlia-type system, (ii)
characterizing the aforementioned properties using the captured snapshots, and
(iii) utilizing the obtained knowledge for improving the system if possible.
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1.1.2 Coordinating Cache Management in NDN
NDN implements in-network caching to improve content delivery as well as to
diminish the pressure on the network bandwidth. NDN applies an autonomous
cache management scheme. That is, each node takes independent caching-related
decisions according to its own view of the requested and cached contents. Such a
scheme, although simple, is not efficient [RR11,SLYJ13]. In particular, it results in
unnecessary large cache redundancy as well as in suboptimal selection for contents
which are given priority for caching. In addition, routing of content requests in
NDN is cache-ignorant. Hence, a cached copy of the requested content can be
used only if it is located on the default route of the corresponding request packet.
Consequently, cache coordination has been the subject of several recent studies
(e.g. [SLYJ13,BKST13,SFT13]). The solutions, however, are either of limited
benefit since their designs do not enable to efficiently leverage in-network caches
or impractical due to their high coordination overhead.
The second problem which we address in this dissertation is to develop a
coordinated cache management scheme for NDN that is efficient and practical.
1.1.3 Defending Against DDoS Attacks in NDN
NDN is vulnerable to new types of Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks
[AHZ15]. Among the identified attacks, the Interest Flooding Attack (IFA) can
significantly degrade the QoE of users [AMM+13,DWFL13]. The adversary in IFA
exploits two properties of NDN: (i) routing based on longest name-prefix match
and (ii) storing a forwarding state per content request (known as interest packet)
in the so-called Pending Interest Table (PIT). More precisely, the adversary issues
interest packets for non-existent contents. Consequently, one PIT entry is created
per interest packet in each node on the path and stays there till it eventually
expires. Overflowing PITs leads to dropping part of legitimate interest packets.
Despite the considerable number of proposed defence mechanisms against IFA
(see [AMM+13,DWFL13] and the references therein), they are not highly effective,
and part of them incurs high overhead.
IFAs can be mitigated effectively when they are detected and mitigated quickly
close to potential attack sources based on timely and aggregated attack-related
information. The third problem which we address is to realize such a solution
with low overhead.
1.2 Research Methodology
We apply a unified research methodology to address the three aforementioned
problems. The methodology, as shown in Figure 1.2, consists of three steps:
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Firstly, we develop measurement approaches that are able to address the challenge
of collecting large volume of system-wide information quickly from systems that
are large and dynamic. Secondly, we use the developed measurement approaches
to measure relevant properties. Thirdly, we use the knowledge that is gained
from the measurements either to suggest representative system models and design
improvements or to adapt the system operation.
Suggest 
representative 
models and design 
improvementsDevelop
measurement 
approaches
Measure 
relevant properties
Adapt system 
operation
Figure 1.2: Research methodology
1.3 Contributions
We address in this dissertation the three aforementioned problems through five
scientific contributions. The contributions were published in the proceedings of
peer-reviewed conferences and workshops.
We structure the dissertation in two parts: in Part I, we address the problem of
characterizing topological and routing table properties of Kademlia-type systems.
After that, in Part II, we address both the problem of coordinating cache
management and the problem of defending against IFA in NDN.
Part I consists of the following three contributions:
1. We develop KadSpider, a crawler for capturing accurate graph snapshots of
KAD (a popular Kademlia-type system).
2. We present and discuss the results of an extensive characterization study for
Kademlia-type systems using KAD as a case study. The analysis is based
on both real graph snapshots captured by KadSpider and synthetic graphs
generated by simulations.
3. Using real KAD routing tables collected by KadSpider, we analyse a
previously disregarded property: the diversity of contacts within each routing
table section over the respective sections of the identifier space. We also show
that maximizing this diversity improves the standard routing performance.
We consequently propose a modified neighbour selection scheme that
maximizes the aforementioned diversity. The new scheme causes negligible
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overhead, and it is compatible both with the standard protocol as well
as with former protocol improvements. We evaluate the new scheme via
derivations of our theoretical model for Kademlia routing [RSS15], extensive
simulations of three Kademlia-type systems, and measurements on KAD
clients.
The three contributions above were presented and published in [SS13a],
[SRS14a] 1, and [SRS14b], respectively.
Part II is constituted of the following two contributions:
4. We present the design and evaluation of CoMon, a framework for
network-wide coordination in NDN. CoMon assigns monitoring and other
coordination-related tasks to few nodes only. We develop a heuristic to
select these nodes such that they capture the entire network traffic, at an
early stage. As part of this contribution, we employ CoMon to coordinate
caching-related decisions and to realize cache-aware routing on Autonomous
System (AS)-wide scale. We evaluate the caching efficiency which can be
achieved with CoMon as well as its signalling and hop count overhead
through simulations applying realistic settings, comparing CoMon both to
the original system and to notable prior solutions.
5. We develop a new defence mechanism against IFA. The mechanism detects
and mitigates IFAs in a coordinated way based on aggregated attack-related
information. In practice, our solution adapts the design concepts of CoMon
to achieve effective and low-overhead coordinated defence. We evaluate the
solution via an extensive simulation study.
The idea and preliminary evaluation of CoMon first were presented and
published as a poster paper [SSS14]. Then, the detailed design and evaluation of
CoMon (as a framework for coordinating caching-related decisions) were published
in [SS15]. Similarly, the last contribution was first introduced in [SWS15b] and
then detailed in [SWS15a].
1.4 Organization
The remainder of this dissertation is structured as follows. Part I, presenting the
characterization study of Kademlia-type systems, is organized in four chapters: in
Chapter 2, we give an overview of the key design elements and operation primitives
of Kademlia and three of its notable derivatives, with which we deal in this part.
Then, in Chapter 3, we present the design and evaluation of KadSpider, our
1 Best student paper in IEEE ISCC 2014.
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measurement approach for capturing graph snapshots of KAD. Next, we present
and discuss the characterization results of measured and synthetic KAD graphs
in Chapter 4. After that, we describe and evaluate our new neighbour selection
scheme for Kademlia-type systems in Chapter 5.
We document in Part II our work on improving the NDN architecture in three
chapters: we start by giving an overview of NDN, highlighting the design details
which directly relate to our work in Chapter 6. Next, in Chapter 7, we present
and evaluate CoMon, our solution for coordinating caching-related decisions in
NDN. After that, in Chapter 8, we describe how we adapt and employ CoMon
for defending against IFA. Finally, we summarize the dissertation and suggest
directions for future work in Chapter 9.
1.5 Use of Published Work
We adapt portions of this dissertation from the material of the aforementioned
co-authored publications with permission from the corresponding co-authors. In
particular, Part I includes material adapted from [SS13a,SRS14a,SRS14b,RSS15],
while [SSS14,SS15,SWS15b,SWS15a] constitute the three chapters of Part II. We
add proper citations whenever the adapted material is not originally written or
not plotted by the author of this dissertation.

Part I
Understanding and Improving
Kademlia
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2
Overview of Kademlia-type Systems
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) systems can be categorized as either unstructured or structured.
On the one hand, in unstructured P2P systems connections are established
arbitrarily, and nodes rely on query flooding to search for objects (e.g. files). Each
queried node answers with a list of matching objects. Since flooding is extremely
inefficient, unstructured P2P systems usually enforce a hop count limit on flooded
queries. Such a limit, however, decreases the chances to find requested objects.
In structured P2P systems, on the other hand, routing is deterministic, and
nodes adhere to a certain structure that defines the relationship between nodes and
object locations. This design guarantees that requested objects, if they exist, are
found. The popular form of structured P2P systems is the so-called Distributed
Hash Table (DHT). Similar to the hash table, the DHT maps objects in the
form of key-value pairs to nodes. To resolve this mapping, the DHT facilitates a
decentralized message routing to the respective node in a very robust fashion.
In this part of the dissertation, we exclusively study Kademlia [MM02], the
most popular and most widely deployed DHT, today. We give in this chapter an
overview of the concepts that Kademlia-type systems are based on.
2.1 The Original Kademlia
Kademlia is implemented as an overlay network for discovering peers and objects
in highly popular applications such as BitTorrent [bt] and eMule [emu]. It also
was experimented as a communication overlay for video streaming applications
[Jim13] and botnets [HSD+08,SKK08].
Kademlia uses a b-bit (b = 160) identifier space from which the identifiers of
nodes and objects are assigned. It implements key-based routing and storage of
key-value (identifier-object) pairs. The nodes at the closest distance to a content’s
identifier are responsible for storing it. The distance between two identifiers is
defined as the XOR of their values.
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Each node v stores the identifiers and the addresses of other nodes (also called
neighbours or contacts) in a b-level tree-like routing table. Each level in the
routing table consists of the so-called k-buckets, where each bucket stores up to k
known contacts sharing a common prefix with v’s identifier. More precisely, for
each routing table level i the stored contacts are of distance between 2i and 2i+1
from v’s identifier. Kademlia uses k > 1 to improve the robustness of routing
information in the presence of churn (i.e. independent arrival and departure of
nodes). Contacts within each bucket are kept sorted from least-recently seen to
most-recently seen. Information stored in the routing table becomes outdated, or
stale, when the respective nodes leave the system.
Kademlia applies a least-recently seen eviction policy in the routing table
buckets. The only exception is that live nodes are not evicted from the routing table.
This exception is driven by the authors’ analysis of the Gnutella measurement
trace data collected by Saroiu et al. [SGG01]. In particular, the authors in [MM02]
calculated the percentage of nodes that stay online one more hour as a function
of the current uptime. They found that the longer a node has been online, the
more likely it is to stay online another hour. Accordingly, keeping the oldest live
contacts increases the probability that they will remain online.
Kademlia implements a key-based greedy routing protocol (also called the
lookup protocol): to route a message from a node v to a target x, v picks the α
closest contacts to x and sends them lookup requests in parallel. Each queried
contact, if online, replies with a set of β contacts that are locally known as being
closest to x, thus extending v’s set of candidate contacts. This process iterates
either until no further contacts closer to x are discovered or until a timeout is
held. In this protocol, the lookup’s hop count refers to the number of edges on the
shortest path traversed during a lookup, where each hop represents a transition
from a set of queried contacts either to another set of queried contacts or to lookup
termination [RSS15]. The original Kademlia paper suggests to use k = 20 and
α = 3.
With the above described designs of the routing table and the routing protocol,
Kademlia realizes highly efficient routing. In particular, the number of nodes that
are contacted during a lookup as well as the number of contacts every node needs
to store grow only logarithmically in the system size [MM02].
The above design is the basis for a family of Kademlia-type systems. We focus
in this dissertation on three variations of Kademlia: the mainline DHT (MDHT),
a modified version of mainline called iMDHT, and KAD. We deal with MDHT
and KAD motivated by their high popularity: they are used by about 27 million
[WK13] and half a million [SS13a] simultaneous users, respectively. iMDHT
was proposed in [JOK11] to improve MDHT. The authors showed that iMDHT
improves the routing performance of MDHT remarkably. Next, we describe the
specifications of the three systems.
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Figure 2.1: Routing table structures of three Kademlia-type systems (adapted from
[WTCT+08]): (a) MDHT, (b) iMDHT, and (c) KAD. Each routing table encodes the
distances in the identifier space: the top part stores the farthest contacts, while the
bottom part stores the closest ones. Each leaf represents a bucket of contacts.
2.2 MDHT and iMDHT
The mainline implementation of BitTorrent (MDHT) integrates a Kademlia-type
overlay for node discovery. In MDHT, the routing table (Figure 2.1a) includes a
single k-bucket per level. uTorrent [ut], the most popular MDHT implementation,
uses k = 8, α = 4, and β = 1 [JOK11].
Considering the fraction of the identifier space that is covered by each routing
table level i, Jimenez et al. [JOK11] introduced a variation of MDHT implementing
variable bucket sizes (iMDHT) to increase the distance reduction at each hop.
The bucket sizes are chosen to be 128, 64, 32, and 16 for the buckets at levels 0, 1,
2, and 3, respectively, and 8 for the rest (Figure 2.1b). Both MDHT and iMDHT
use b = 160.
2.3 KAD
KAD1 is used by the popular file-sharing application eMule. It uses b = 128,
k = 10, α = 3, and β ∈ {2, 4, 11} depending on the search type. KAD implements
a different routing table structure: as shown in Figure 2.1c, starting from the
fourth level, the routing table includes multiple buckets per level, grouping contacts
according to the first l ∈ {3, 4} bits after the first varying bit. Consequently, the
bit gain (i.e. the difference between the common prefix length of the current hop
and the next hop to x) is at least l.
1 We describe here only the specifications of KAD that are directly related to our work. For
a detailed description of KAD, the reader is referred to [Bru06] and [Mys06].
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The routing process in KAD relies on two UDP-based messages2:
Kademlia_request (KAD_REQ) and Kademlia_response (KAD_RES). Among
other fields, the KAD_REQ message specifies β, the target identifier field, as
well as the contact information of the destination node represented by its KAD
identifier (KID), IP address, and UDP port.
2.3.1 Routing Table Maintenance
In order to mitigate the effect of churn, each node performs maintenance for its
routing table by running two processes. The first process aims at populating
buckets that have many empty slots. More precisely, each bucket is checked every
hour if it contains less than three contacts, or if it can be divided into two buckets.
In either case, the process looks for an identifier selected uniformly at random
(but within the corresponding identifier range) if the bucket has a matching prefix
length of less than five bits with the node’s identifier. Otherwise, the process
looks for the node’s identifier itself. The returned contacts are then inserted in
the corresponding buckets (or in the resulted children buckets).
The second process aims to keep the routing information up-to-date. For this,
it checks whether the stored contacts are still responsive or not, and removes the
unresponsive (i.e. stale) ones. More precisely, the process associates each contact
with an expiry time, and checks it periodically according to its life time, where
long-lived contacts are checked less frequently than newer ones. This design is
based on the aforementioned observation which states that the longer a contact
has been online the more likely it remains online in the future. The node sends to
each expired contact a Hello_request message, and removes it from the routing
table if it does not respond within two minutes. Contact removals may result in
merging buckets.
2.3.2 Bootstrapping
In case a node does not have any active contact in its routing table, either because
the node is new or because it did not connect to KAD for a long time, the
bootstrap process should be executed. To do so, the node first has to know one
or more active contacts3. The node then sends to each of the learned contacts
a KAD’s Bootstrap_request. Each queried contact, if online, answers with a
Bootstrap_response message containing 20 contacts selected uniformly at random
from its own routing table.
2 The nodes that cannot directly receive unsolicited UDP packets (e.g. because they are
located behind Network Address Translators (NATs)) are not part of the DHT [SR06b,emu].
Such nodes still can participate in the file-sharing activities but only through directly connected
nodes called buddies.
3 These contacts are usually obtained from the client’s website [emu].
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2.3.3 Populating the Routing Table
Contacts in KAD are added to a node’s routing table in the following occasions.
When the node starts-up, it reads contacts from a file storing the contacts
learned during the last time the node was online. Contacts also are added during
bootstrapping as well as during routing table maintenance. Another case is to add
the contacts from which the node receives Bootstrap_requests or Hello_requests,
in case the corresponding buckets have free slots.
2.3.4 Protection Against Flooding Attacks
The recent version of KAD (called KAD2) implements the so-called flooding
protection mechanism. This mechanism aims both at protecting the nodes against
flooding of request messages as well as at detecting and dropping unsolicited
response messages.
With this mechanism, KAD sets a threshold on the number of messages that
can be received from a node within a specific period of time. For instance, a node
is allowed to send another node one KAD_REQ within six seconds. Messages
exceeding this limit are considered malicious and dropped. Cases of repeated
misbehaviour are treated by banning the sender permanently.
2.4 Summary
We reviewed in this chapter the key design elements and operation primitives of
Kademlia, the most widely deployed P2P system, with three notable examples
of its real implementations. Kademlia maps key-value pairs to nodes. It resolves
the mapping through a decentralized message routing to the corresponding node
in a robust way. Such a resolution is highly efficient: both the number of nodes
that are contacted to resolve a discovery request as well as the state maintained
by every node grow only logarithmically in the system population. This high
efficiency is mainly attributed to the tree-like routing table as well as to the greedy
and parallel routing protocol.
With the goal to better understand and improve Kademlia-type systems, we
present in the next three chapters an extensive characterization study on these
systems. In particular, we focus on topological and routing table properties
relating to routing performance and the robustness of the network graph for
communications.

3
Capturing Accurate Snapshots of the
KAD Graph
Kademlia and its derivatives are the most popular and the most widely deployed
P2P systems, today. We aim in this part of the dissertation to contribute to
the understanding of these systems’ performance and robustness by studying
relevant topological and routing table properties. In particular, we focus on
five properties: (i) the diversity of routing information over the corresponding
identifier space sections, (ii) the completeness of routing information with respect
to global knowledge of the system graph, (iii) the degree distribution, (iv) the
graph resilience in face of random node departures, and (v) the graph resilience
in face of targeted node removals. Accurate characterization of these properties
is substantial to evaluating and improving these systems and the protocols that
work over them, as well as to deriving representative models.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to analyse the properties (i) and
(ii). As for the properties (iii)–(v), they were studied based on simulations only
(e.g. [DNF+08,HYEN09]). The simulative studies, however, applied small system
sizes and oversimplified churn settings, and they disregarded user misbehaviour.
Instead, with the goal to achieve more accurate and realistic results, we propose
to study these properties in a real system using snapshots of the system graph.
Such snapshots were not provided earlier. In addition, capturing them is highly
challenging [SRS08], because it requires to download large amount of highly
dynamic and distributed information [SR06b,SENB07] almost instantly.
We address this challenge by KadSpider, our own crawler for capturing
representative graph snapshots of KAD. A crawler is a widely used term in
the P2P and network measurements literature. It refers to a measurement tool
that walks a P2P system querying every node for its neighbours (or part of them)
to iteratively explore the entire graph [SR09]. We chose KAD for our analysis
because it is a popular implementation of Kademlia [SENB09,WC11].
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We describe in this chapter the design and evaluation of KadSpider, and we
also give an overview of our dataset.
3.1 Related Work
There was a considerable number of measurement studies for several P2P systems,
in recent years. We restrict the discussion in this section to studies that developed
crawlers for Kademlia-type systems. We group prior Kademlia crawlers by the
type of information they collect in two groups.
The first group includes crawlers that download partial routing tables either
from all discovered nodes or part of them. Notable examples include the following:
Kutzner et al. [KF05] introduced a crawler for Overnet (a Kademlia-type system)
to measure the network size, availability of nodes and their distribution in the
underlay network, as well as the distribution of nodes’ round-trip-times (RTTs).
BitMon [JADH10] was designed to measure part of the Mainline DHT to estimate
several network usage statistics. Closer to our work, some studies crawled KAD.
For instance, Cruiser [SR05a] measured churn behaviour in KAD [SR06b]. Blizzard
[SENB09] measured several properties in KAD such as lengths of user sessions,
geographical distribution of users, and identity aliasing. Wu and Chen [WC11]
developed a crawler which improved on Blizzard. In particular, they deployed
the crawler in a distributed way and slightly improved the crawling algorithm. A
similar crawler is Rainbow [LMCC10] which was developed to measure information
about the nodes, client’s software, and popularity of shared files. Yu et al.
[YLX+11] developed a crawler called Rememj to analyse lookup traffic.
The second group of crawlers includes those that download entire routing
tables, but from a fraction of DHT nodes only. Such crawlers were developed, for
instance, by Wang et al. [WTCT+08] to perform certain attacks on KAD, by Kang
et al. [KCTHK09] to study the replication performance, and by Stutzbach and
Rejaie [SR06a] to study the completeness and freshness of routing information.
From the design’s point of view, the idea of the aforementioned crawlers is the
same: the crawler progressively explores the system by querying known contacts
for their neighbours, adds discovered contacts to the list of known nodes, and
iterates over the list till nearly no new contacts are discovered.
Despite the important knowledge provided by the aforementioned studies, none
of them captured snapshots of the system graph. Such snapshots, however, are
necessary to analyse the completeness of routing tables (with respect to global
system knowledge), the in-degree and degree distributions, as well as the two
aforementioned types of graph resilience.
Capturing accurate graph snapshots is more challenging than previous
measurements: it requires discovering all online nodes and download their entire
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routing tables nearly instantly and without information losses. Previous crawlers
are not designed to conduct such measurements in an efficient way. Hence, a
new crawler, that improves on previous designs and deployments, is necessary to
capture accurate graph snapshots (for our characterization study).
3.2 Crawling Task and Challenges
Definition 1. A graph G = (V,E) consists of a set V of nodes (or vertices) and
a set E ⊂ V × V of edges (or links).
The KAD graph is unidirectional, meaning that (u, v) ∈ E (an entry in u’s
routing table towards v) does not imply (v, u) ∈ E. Consequently, the task of
capturing a snapshot of KAD graph implies two interleaving steps: (i) discovering
online nodes and (ii) downloading their routing tables.
Capturing exact (i.e. instant and complete) snapshots of the KAD graph is
technically infeasible due to the large size and high dynamics of KAD [SR06b,
SENB09], in addition to the large size of its routing table (Figure 2.1c). That
is to say, the aforementioned crawling task will involve sending, receiving, and
processing massive amount of network traffic within a short period of time.
Consequently, very high crawling rates will cause excessive network congestions.
Given that KAD crawlers mainly rely on the standard UDP-based1 routing packets,
it is to be expected that part of these packets will be lost. Losses of response
packets, in turn, affects the completeness of captured snapshots. Furthermore, it
is important that the crawling rate should not violate KAD’s flooding protection
mechanism (Section 2.3.4). Otherwise, the target nodes will drop (at least part
of) the crawling queries.
Instead, we guide the design of KadSpider by two more practical requirements:
R1) Graph changes during crawling (due to churn) should be kept low.
R2) Graph information should be nearly complete.
3.3 Design and Implementation
We describe in this section KadSpider’s design and implementation details.
3.3.1 Advanced Crawling Techniques
We describe here four design and deployment techniques implemented in KadSpider:
(i) dividing the routing table tree into sub-trees of buckets, (ii) avoiding querying
1 UDP (User Datagram Protocol) uses a simple connectionless transmission that does not
give guarantee of delivery.
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empty buckets, (iii) adaptive crawling rate, and (iv) distributing the crawling task.
The first two techniques exploit KAD design better than prior crawlers, aiming
to outperform them in terms of the time and signalling overhead of downloading
routing tables. Note that reducing the signalling overhead leads to lower network
congestions, thus to lower losses of crawling messages (i.e. higher completeness).
The third and fourth techniques aim to improve the completeness of the captured
snapshots.
Dividing the Routing Table Tree into Sub-trees of Buckets
KadSpider relies on the standard routing packets of KAD: KAD_REQ and
KAD_RES. Each routing query (hereafter, crawling query or query) is used to
download a certain region of the routing table. Prior studies (e.g. [SCB10])
assumed that the maximum number of contacts that can be returned in a
KAD_RES (i.e. β) is 11. Consequently, their crawlers were designed to target
one bucket (containing up to 10 contacts) only per query.
However, β in the client code can take any value between 0 – 31. This means
that more contacts can be returned per query, thus the total number of queries
for downloading an entire routing table can be reduced. However, this requires to
prepare the queries such that the overlaps of retuned contacts is minimized.
KadSpider realizes this as follows. It divides the routing table tree into 256
non-overlapping sub-trees: 129 two-bucket sub-trees and 127 three-bucket sub-trees.
In Figure 3.1, the sub-trees 0 and 8 are examples of two-bucket and three-bucket
sub-trees, respectively. The sub-trees are numbered from 0 to 255, starting from
the routing table’s top-left part towards its bottom-right edge (which contains the
node’s closest contacts). Consequently, KadSpider uses a single crawling query to
download a sub-tree of buckets, rather than a single bucket only per query. Given
that a sub-tree of buckets contains on average about 2.5 buckets, KadSpider (only
by using this technique) accelerates the time for downloading routing tables and
reduces the number of crawling messages, both by about 2.5 times.
In compliance with this design, KadSpider prepares KAD_REQs as follows:
with a maximal bucket size of 10 in KAD, KadSpider sets the β field (number of
requested contacts) to 30 for targeting three-bucket sub-trees or to 20 for targeting
two-bucket sub-trees. As for the target-ID field, its value is computed as: target
node’s KID ⊕ sub-tree root’s ID, where the sub-tree root’s ID is a 128-bit value
representing the position of the sub-tree’s root in the routing table.
Avoiding Querying Empty Buckets
The measurements of Stutzbach and Rejaie on KAD routing tables [SR06a] showed
that a large part of routing table buckets are empty, particularly at low levels
(due to the limited number of matching contacts in the system). This also likely
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Figure 3.1: Exemplary sub-trees in a KAD routing table. The top-left part stores the
farthest contacts, while the bottom-right part stores the closest ones. "0" and "8" are
examples of two-bucket and three-bucket sub-trees, respectively. (The original routing
table figure is adapted from [WTCT+08].)
means that there are sub-trees of empty buckets. According to this observation,
we implement a technique in KadSpider that attempts to avoid querying sub-trees
of empty buckets.
The technique works as follows: the crawler first sends five KAD_REQs to
discover one contact in each of the five lowest routing table sub-trees (251− 255),
i.e. the ones that store the closest contacts (Figure 3.1). Next, the crawler
shifts to the top of the tree, and starts downloading sub-trees of buckets from
top-left towards bottom-right (0− 255), in order, till it encounters the previously
reported five closest contacts again. At that moment, KadSpider stops sending
KAD_REQs to the target node because there are no further contacts, deeper in
the tree, to discover. The more sub-trees that are skipped with this technique,
the faster the crawling task and the lower its signalling overhead.
Adaptive Crawling Rate
With this technique, KadSpider tunes the crawling rate (i.e. the rate at which
crawling queries are sent) according to the observed packet losses. In practice,
KadSpider continuously measures packet losses by parsing network system files2
that report relevant traffic-related values, and tunes the crawling rate according
to the ratio of lost packets.
2 "/proc/net/dev" and "/proc/net/udp" in Linux operating systems.
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Distibuting the Crawling Task
In principle, there are two main approaches to crawl a system: centralized or
distributed. In the centralized approach (e.g. Blizzard [SENB09]), a single
crawling machine performs the entire crawling task. This approach is appropriate
when the crawling overhead (in terms of processing, memory, and bandwidth) can
be handled by a single machine. As discussed above, our crawling task involves
sending and receiving large amount of data and on-the-fly computations within
a short period of time. Conducting our measurements on a single machine, we
faced several problems such as software crashes and large amount of packet losses
due to network congestions. Therefore, we chose to distribute our crawling task
over multiple machines locating at different networks, as illustrated in Figure 3.2.
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Figure 3.2: Crawling architecture of KadSpider: the crawling task is distributed over
equal crawling machines, each of them crawls a certain (non-overlapping) section of the
identifier space.
In more detail, since KAD is assumed to distribute nodes’ KIDs uniformly over
the identifier space [SENB09], we partition the identifier space of KAD into equal
non-overlapping sections, and distribute them evenly on the available crawling
machines, assuming they have the same resources. Each crawling machine works
independently and exclusively on its own identifier space section. The machines
thus do not require to synchronize among each other. This way, the crawling
overhead is distributed over the machines, which facilitates higher crawling rates
and simultaneously reduces network congestions thus lowers the losses of crawling
messages.
In addition, we used a monitoring machine to check whether the primary
crawling machines work properly or not. If not, malfunctioning crawling machines
are automatically substituted by other (backup) machines.
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3.3.2 Algorithmic Design
We describe here the algorithmic design of KadSpider which consists of three
asynchronous threads (Algorithms 1 – 3). The main data structures used by the
threads are the following:
• k-Node: struct{KID, IP address, UDP port}
• close: struct{Node (k-Node), found_again (bool)}
• a-Node: struct{Node (k-Node), Last_packet1, Last_packet2, Last_time,
closest[ ] (close), Stop_send (bool)}
. Last_pkt1 and Last_pkt2 specifies the index of the last KAD_REQ sent
by Send-1 and Send-2, respectively, to the corresponding node (i.e. the last
queried routing table sub-tree). Last_time specifies the time when the last
query was sent to the corresponding node, and closest specifies the node’s
closest five contacts.
• known-Nodes (KN)
. A file that stores contact information of 1000 nodes (a list of k-Node
elements) from the previous crawl. The contacts are selected such that their
KIDs are uniformly distributed over the identifier space.
• current-Nodes (CN)
. List of a-Node elements storing information of nodes discovered during the
crawl. When a new crawl starts, CN is initialized with the nodes information
stored in the KN file. The Last_packet1, Last_packet2, Last_time, and
Stop_send fields are initialized with: 251, 0, the current time, and false,
respectively. This initialization applies for all CN ’s newly added entries.
The Send-1 thread (Algorithm 1) is responsible for downloading the closest
five contacts of each responding node in CN. It does so by iterating over the CN
list and sending each node five KAD_REQs, using β = 1, targeting the routing
table sub-trees 251− 255.
The Send-2 thread (Algorithm 2) is responsible for downloading routing tables
of all responding nodes in CN. It iterates over the CN list, and for each node,
the thread sends KAD_REQs targeting the routing table sub-trees 0 − 255 in
order. The thread skips the nodes whose Stop_send field is set to true; this
means either that all 255 sub-trees are already queried or that the five closest
contacts are returned twice (in two different KAD_RESs: queried by Send-1
and Send-2, respectively). In order to not violate KAD’s flooding protection
mechanism, Algorithm 1 (line: 3) and Algorithm 2 (line: 4) restrict the query rate
for each target node to one query every six seconds.
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Algorithm 1 Send-1
1: while true do
2: for each m ∈ CN do
3: if CN[m].Last_packet1 ≤ 255∧diff(CN[m].Last_time, now) ≥ 6 then
4: Send_KAD_REQ(CN[m].Last_packet1)
5: ++ CN[m].Last_packet1
6: CN[m].Last_time ← now
7: end if
8: end for
9: end while
Algorithm 2 Send-2
1: while true do
2: for each m ∈ CN do
3: if Not CN[m].Stop_send then
4: if diff(CN[m].Last_time, now) ≥ 6 then
5: Send_KAD_REQ(CN[m].Last_packet2)
6: ++ CN[m].Last_packet2
7: if CN[m].Last_packet2 == 256 then
8: CN[m].Stop_send ← true
9: end if
10: CN[m].Last_time ← now
11: end if
12: end if
13: end for
14: end while
The Receive thread (Algorithm 3) is responsible for handling incoming
KAD_RESs, which includes the following steps: First, it extracts new contacts
from the received KAD_RESs, and inserts them to the CN list. Second, it
extracts the information of nodes’ closest contacts, and accordingly updates
the closest array as well as the Stop_send field (in case any of the respective
conditions is met). Third, it extracts graph information that is returned in the
KAD_RES, and records it in a log file (hereafter, graph_file). More precisely,
each KAD_RES contains information of β contacts, each of them represents a
graph edge originating from the sender node towards another node in the graph.
Each edge in the graph is represented in the graph_file by a five-field record,
specifying the source node’s IP address and UDP port, and the destination node’s
IP address, UDP port, and KID. At the end of the crawl, the graph_file is used
to reconstruct the corresponding graph snapshot.
Due to churn in KAD, the crawl needs to be stopped as soon as the rate
of discovering new contacts becomes very low. Otherwise, the accuracy of
the captured snapshot becomes low [SR05b]. In KadSpider, we use the crawl
3.4 DATASET AND PERFORMANCE RESULTS 25
Algorithm 3 Receive
1: while true do
2: for each received KAD_REQ RES do
3: for each node M ∈ RES do
4: graph_file.add(Edge: Sender → M)
5: if M 6∈ CN then
6: CN.add(M)
7: end if
8: if Not CN[c].Stop_send then . c: corresponding node
9: if β == 1 then . Response to a query from Send-1
10: CN[c].closest.add(M, false)
11: else . Response to a query from Send-2
12: if M ∈ CN[c].closest then
13: CN[c].closest[x].found_again ← true
14: . x: matching closest contact entry
15: if CN[c].closest.found_again ∀ five closest contacts then
16: CN[c].Stop_send ← true
17: end if
18: end if
19: end if
20: end if
21: end for
22: end for
23: end while
termination technique of Blizzard [SENB07]. More precisely, KadSpider stops
querying nodes when 99% of the active nodes in the nodes list are queried
completely. After that, the software waits 60 seconds for late responses before
terminating the crawl completely. We do not include these details in the listed
algorithms.
3.4 Dataset and Performance Results
In this section, we first describe our measurements setup and dataset of captured
KAD graphs (Section 3.4.1). After that, we evaluate the performance of KadSpider
with respect to the predefined design requirements (Section 3.2).
3.4.1 Measurement Setup and Dataset Description
We used the German-Lab (G-Lab) testbed [gla] for the final deployment of
KadSpider. In particular, we used 64 primary crawling machines, 20 backup
crawling machines, and one monitoring machine. Accordingly, we partitioned the
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identifier space of KAD evenly into 64 non-overlapping sections.
Our dataset contains hundreds of partial snapshots and 65 snapshots captured
in the full crawls (i.e. those that targeted the entire KAD graph). We captured
these snapshots using KadSpider at different times over the period between April
2012 and September 2013.
Table 3.1 gives an overview of the snapshots captured in the full crawls3.
In particular, the table shows the maximum, minimum, median, average, and
standard deviation values of (i) concurrent online KAD nodes, (ii) all discovered
KAD nodes (including both online and oﬄine nodes), and (iii) number of crawling
queries that are needed to download an entire routing table. We count the nodes
by their unique UDP socket identities (i.e. 〈IP address, UDP Port〉). Our statistics
are based on the information contained in the KAD_RESs received from the
nodes that remained online since they were discovered till the end of the crawl4.
Since NATed nodes do not participate in the DHT (see Section 2.3), we do not
count them in these statistics, nor does their absence affect the accuracy of our
snapshots.
Table 3.1: Overview of 65 KAD graph snapshots captured in the full crawls over the
period between April 2012 and September 2013
Conc. online nodes All discovered nodes Sent KAD_REQs
Minimum 352,390 3,521,470 23
Maximum 508,059 4,705,002 74
Median 470,981 3,826,106 33
Average 452,740.35 3,812,030.43 31.92
Std. dev. 48,709.12 212,641.71 7.59
The KAD population reported in the full crawls, although smaller than prior
results (e.g. Rememj [YLX+11] reported 1.2 – 1.8 million nodes in 2009), indicates
that KAD is still highly active and popular, thus was a proper choice for our
characterization study.
We plot in Figure 3.3 the geographical distribution of KAD nodes showing the
top ten countries (in terms of KAD usage), both for the concurrent online nodes
as well as for all discovered nodes. The results represent an exemplary full crawl
conducted on 12.09.2013 (started at 20:00 GMT). This distribution is similar to
what we observed in the other snapshots, and it also resembles the distributions
3 In cooperation with the developer of Blizzard [SENB09], we validated our measured KAD
population results via crawling tests performed by Blizzard. Very close to our results, Blizzard
estimated the population of concurrent online KAD nodes in August 2012 by about 500, 000.
4 This applies for all results. This information also is used for reconstructing the graph
snapshots from the graph_file.
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reported by previous studies [SENB09]. It can be seen that the largest fraction of
users are from China, followed by users from west European countries.
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Figure 3.3: Geographical distributions (top ten countries) of both active nodes and all
discovered nodes in KAD, as seen in an exemplary snapshot captured on 12.09.2013
An interesting observation in these results is the high disparity between the
geographical distribution of active nodes and the geographical distribution of all
discovered nodes (including both active nodes and stale routing table entries).
The highest disparity is associated with the Chinese users: they represent about
73% of all contacts, but only about 33% of the active nodes. This disparity can be
attributed to some KAD client software in China such as FlashGet and Thunder
that generate a new random KID at the beginning of each new session [YFX+09].
3.4.2 Crawling Performance
We evaluate here the crawling performance of KadSpider, with respect to the
preset design requirements (Section 3.2). In particular, we use two measures in
our evaluation: (i) the crawling time and (ii) the completeness of the captured
graph snapshots.
Crawling Time
The time that is required to perform a crawl consists of two interleaving time
elements: (i) the time for discovering the nodes and (ii) the time for downloading
their routing tables. The time for downloading a routing table depends on the
maximum number of KAD_REQs needed to download a routing table, and it is
also influenced by the aforementioned six-second restriction of KAD’s flooding
protection mechanism.
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During the full crawls, the average value of the first time element was 189.8
seconds, while the average value of the maximum number of sent KAD_REQs was
74. The worst case scenario is to discover the node with the maximum number
of non-empty sub-trees at the end of the crawl. The crawling time in that case,
using the aforementioned average values, is:
Crawl time = 189.8 + 6× 74 = 633.8 seconds.
However, when we enabled the adaptive crawling rate technique in our experiments
(Section 3.3.1), the average crawling time increased to 907.85 seconds (minimum
= 518 ; maximum = 1311 ; median = 922 ; standard deviation = 151.29).
In order to measure the impact of the reported average crawling time on the
accuracy of the captured graph snapshots, we performed the following experiment.
Using KadSpider, we searched for 10000 online nodes and downloaded their routing
tables. After 907.85 seconds5 from the beginning of the crawl, we queried the
nodes for their routing table entries again. We repeated the experiment ten
subsequent times and reported (i) the ratio of stable nodes and (ii) the ratio of
stable routing table entries, both are calculated with respect to the previous crawl.
As shown in Figure 3.4, the results show that the changes in the discovered
nodes or their routing tables, over the reported average crawling time, are
very small in general: over the nine comparisons, the average stability ratios
of online nodes and their routing table entries were 95.8% and 90.2%, respectively.
Consequently, we consider the impact of the reported average crawling time on
the accuracy of the captured graph to be small enough to maintain the properties
of interest.
Completeness of the Captured Graph Snapshots
In theory, the completeness of captured snapshots is measured with reference to a
ground truth. In our case, however, such knowledge (i.e. the real KAD graph) is
unavailable. Instead, we measured the completeness of our snapshots as the ratio
of received KAD_RESs to the sent KAD_REQs.
Using this measure, the average completeness values in our partial crawls and
the full crawls were 97.53% and 84.48%, respectively. We summarize the main
related statistics in Table 3.2. Note that the measured completeness represents
a lower bound on the actual completeness. This is because it is likely that the
crawling packets that are considered lost by the aforementioned completeness
measure were learned via other KAD_RESs. More precisely, outgoing edges of the
target node may returned in responses to crawling queries targeting neighbouring
sub-trees (if the sub-trees contain less than β contacts). In this case, the queried
5 This is our reported average crawling time in the full crawls.
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Figure 3.4: Stability ratios of 10000 online KAD nodes and their routing table entries
after 907.85 seconds (our reported average crawling time for the full crawls)
node complements the β contacts from closest buckets to the targeted sub-tree. To
validate this assumption, we compared the total number of routing table entries
(i.e. with duplications) that are returned in KAD_RESs during an exemplary
full crawl to the corresponding number of unqiue entries. The ratio was 1.89.
That is, each routing table entry was downloaded nearly twice, on average. This
result confirms our assumption that the actual completeness of captured graphs is
higher than the completeness value reported by our aforementioned completeness
measure.
Table 3.2: Completeness statistics of 65 KAD graph snapshots captured in the full
crawls
Full crawls (%) Partial crawls (%)
Minimum 78 90
Maximum 93 100
Median 84 97
Average 84.48 97.53
Std. dev. 3.23 1.6
We attribute losses of crawling messages to two main factors: (i) using
UDP-based crawling packets (UDP is unreliable) and (ii) the massive amount of
crawling traffic (which causes network congestions). While we cannot do anything
with the first factor (neither the UDP nature nor the type of crawling messages
can be changed), we succeeded to mitigate the impact of the second factor by
the above described design and deployment techniques (Section 3.3.1). Note
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that the reported completeness can be improved by migrating our crawler to a
more capable measurement environment. That is, by crawling each identifier
space section multiple times in a synchronized way, message losses decreases
exponentially to the degree of crawling parallelism.
3.5 Discussion
We summarize the performance results of KadSpider as follows: the reported
average time to conduct a full crawl and the average completeness of the captured
snapshots are 907.85 seconds and 84.48%, respectively. These values imply that
KadSpider does not capture exact snapshots of the KAD graph. However, during
the reported crawling time, 95.8% of the discovered online nodes and 90.2% of
their routing tables’ entries, on average, remained intact. That is to say, the
impact of the crawling time on the accuracy of the captured snapshots is small.
Furthermore, we explained why the actual completeness is expected to be better
than the reported one. According to these results, we argue that the captured
graph snapshots are close the original graph in a statistical sense. That is, the
captured snapshots maintain the five properties that we aim to analyse in our
study.
KadSpider cannot be directly compared to previous KAD crawlers for two
reasons: First, the amount and the type of targeted information are different. More
precisely, KadSpider captures graph snapshots, while other crawlers download
partial information. Second, previous crawlers were not restricted by the recently
added KAD’s flooding protection mechanism.
KadSpider outperforms previous crawlers in terms of the time and the number
of crawling packets for downloading nodes’ routing tables. More precisely,
KadSpider’s technique of querying sub-trees of buckets enables it to target 2.5
buckets (download up to 25 contacts) per query, on average. In contrast, previous
crawlers (except Rememj [YLX+11]) target one bucket only (i.e. download up
to ten contacts) per query. That is to say, by this technique alone, KadSpider
can download routing table buckets about 2.5 times faster, using about 2.5 times
fewer queries. In addition, KadSpider’s results become much better when it avoids
querying empty buckets. As shown in Table 3.1, 74 queries were used at maximum
by KadSpider to download an entire routing table. In contrast, previous KAD
crawlers (except Rememj) can do that with 636 queries (the number of buckets in
a perfect routing table [Bru06]). That is about 8.6 times the maximum number of
queries used by KadSpider.
Regarding Rememj, it uses KAD’s bootstrap packets to download up to 20
contacts by each crawling query. However, we argue that our crawling methodology
outperforms Rememj for two reasons: First, bootstrap responses return random
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contacts. Hence, Rememj cannot guarantee coverage of the entire routing table,
while KadSpider can guarantee that using KAD’s routing packets. Second, the
number of contacts contained in a bootstrap response (up to 20) is smaller than
the number of contacts that can be contained in a routing response (up to 31).
3.6 Summary
We presented in this chapter the design and evaluation of KadSpider, our own
crawler for capturing representative graph snapshots of real Kademlia-type systems.
Our results showed that KadSpider is capable of capturing representative snapshots
of the KAD graph, and that it significantly outperforms prior crawlers in terms of
the time and number of messages required to download entire routing tables. The
results also showed that KAD is still a very active P2P system.
Table 3.3 summarizes the design elements and features that enable KadSpider
to fulfil its preset design requirements (Section 3.2).
Table 3.3: KadSpider: Mapping design elements to the requirements
R1 R2
Dividing the routing table tree into
sub-trees of buckets
X X
Avoiding querying empty buckets X X
Adaptive crawling rate X X
Distributed crawling architecture X X
Monitoring the crawling process X
In the next two chapters, we use the graph snapshots that we captured by
KadSpider to analyse topological and routing table properties of KAD.

4
Topological and Routing Table
Properties of KAD
We continue in this chapter the study that we started in Chapter 3 on characterizing
topological and routing table properties of Kademlia-type systems. In particular,
we present the first part of the characterization focusing on four properties: (i) the
degree distribution, (ii) the completeness of routing information with respect to
global knowledge of the system graph, (iii) the graph resilience in face of random
node departures or removals, and (iv) the graph resilience in face of targeted node
removals.
These properties represent predominant concerns when designing distributed
systems with outstanding performance, reliability, and availability features. More
precisely, the degree distribution describes the network structure in general, and
it is necessary to calculate the resilience. Furthermore, the accurate analysis of
nodes’ degrees over the system graph can be utilized in the detection of attacks and
other anomalies. Regarding the completeness of routing information, it directly
relates to routing (i.e. lookup) performance. As for the analysis of the graph
resilience both to random node departures and to intentional removals, it provides
direct information about the quality of the system graph for communications.
For instance, the resilience is of interest to determine whether a certain DHT is
suitable for botnet command and control or not [DNF+08,DGLL07].
In contrast to former studies that relied on oversimplified simulations, we
analyse the aforementioned properties based on (i) snapshots of real KAD graphs
captured by KadSpider and (ii) synthetic graphs of KAD generated both by our
own KAD simulator and by approximating standard models. In addition, we
compare the results of the measured graphs and the synthetic graphs to each
other, and we also identify the reasons for the observed differences.
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4.1 Related Work
During the last years, a considerable amount of research work considered several
aspects of P2P systems (e.g. see [HKLM03,TBF+03,CMSS13,PGES05, SR09,
SR06b,SENB09,YFX+09,RSS15] and the references therein). However, very few
studies considered system-wide topological and routing table properties. Existing
studies are mainly concerned with protocol-specific analysis, whereas our goal
lies in analysing these properties in both reality and models. Early work on
characterization of P2P overlay topologies considered two unstructured P2P
systems: Gnutella [SRS08,MIF02,JAB01] and Kaaza [LKR04]. However, their
characterizations are not representative for structured P2P systems like Kademlia.
To the best of our knowledge, the only three papers that analysed global
topological properties of structured P2P systems are [HYEN09,DNF+08,DGLL07].
They studied the effectiveness of P2P-based botnets in comparison to other botnet
structures. In more detail, Ha et al. [HYEN09] studied several graph-theoretic
properties of KAD, with the goal to analyse the effectiveness of structural detection
of KAD-based botnets, via monitoring of overlay traffic. Their key conclusion
was that structural detection of KAD-based botnets is not effective. Davis
et al. [DNF+08] analysed the resilience and other characteristics of Overnet
(a Kademlia-type system) and compared its properties with Gnutella and two
theoretical graph models. Their results showed that Overnet is less resilient to
failures than the three other graphs, but it surpasses them in terms of resilience
in face of targeted attacks. Dagon et al. [DGLL07] provided a taxonomy and
a detailed analysis of P2P-based botnets, in which they approximated graphs
of structured P2P-based botnets by the Erdös-Rényi’s model of random graphs
[ER59].
The three aforementioned studies are based on small-scale simulations,
disregarded churn and had some other oversimplified assumptions. Such limitations
lead to mischaracterizing the degree distribution and graph resilience. Instead,
we use both real-world measurements and simulations, and we also compare them
to each other. In addition, none of the studies above analysed the completeness
of routing tables, an important routing performance factor.
The only comprehensive measurement study in a similar area is the
characterization of routing tables in KAD by Stutzbach and Rejaie [SR06a].
Though their focus was on the aliveness and completeness of routing tables, they
indirectly sampled the out-degree distribution. Their analysis, however, is based
on a small sample of routing table buckets. Hence, their work cannot capture
the in-degree, the resilience, nor the completeness with respect to global graph
knowledge. Capturing these properties requires the knowledge of the system graph
(i.e. entire routing tables of all active nodes).
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4.2 Background
4.2.1 Topological and Routing Table Properties
In the following, we use Definition 1 when talking about the KAD graph. We
denote nodes by u and v, and we denote the expected value of a random variable
X by E(X).
Degree Distribution
The in-degree of a node v in a graph is d−(v) = |{(u, v) ∈ E : u ∈ V }|, i.e. the
number of incoming edges. Correspondingly, the out-degree d+(v) = |{(v, u) ∈ E :
u ∈ V }| is the number of outgoing edges of v (i.e. the sum of entries in v’s routing
table buckets). The degree d(v) = d−(v) + d+(v) is the sum of in- and out-degree.
The (in-/out-)degree distribution D of a graph G maps each non-negative integer
k to the fraction of nodes in G that have (in-/out-)degree k.
Routing Table Completeness
We define the maximal out-degree Mv(D) to be the number of contacts that can
be contained in the routing table of a node v if v has global knowledge of all graph
vertices. We compute the routing table completeness as the ratio r = d+(v)/Mv(D).
This measure is an indicator for the impact of missing knowledge of contacts and
outdated information (i.e. stale routing table entries) on the completeness of
routing tables.
In addition, we compute the expected maximal out-degree Ev(D). More
precisely, let Xn,p ∼ B(n− 1, p) be a binomially distributed random variable with
n trials and success probability p. Let n denote the number of nodes, and let p
denote the fraction of contacts a bucket is responsible for. The expected number
of entries E(Cn,p) in the bucket is:
E(Cn,p) =
10∑
i=1
1− i−1∑
j=0
(
n− 1
j
)
pj(1− p)n−1−j
 .
Given that a perfect KAD’s routing table contains eleven buckets in the fourth
level and five buckets in each of the levels 5 to 127 (Section 2.3), E(D) is given by:
E(D) = 11E (Cn,0.54) + 5
127∑
i=5
E
(
Cn,0.5i
)
. (4.1)
Accordingly, the expected completeness ratio: re = d+(v)/Ev(D).
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Graph Resilience
We define the resilience of a graph, with regard to a removal strategy R, to be
the fraction of nodes (including their incident edges) that need to be removed
so that no giant connected component remains. At this point, the graph breaks
into small partitions, each containing less than half of the remaining nodes. In
agreement with similar studies (e.g. [DNF+08]), we consider random removal (or
departure) of nodes as a model for failures, and removal of the nodes with the
highest (in-/out-)degree as a model for targeted attacks.
In general, there are two main approaches to compute the resilience of a graph.
The first is to simulate the resilience by iteratively removing nodes from the graph
and then recomputing the giant component. We did not use this approach since it
is computationally expensive and does not scale to graphs as large as the measured
KAD graphs (on average, each snapshot included about 452, 740 concurrent active
nodes and about 3, 812, 030 unique routing table entries).
The second approach to compute the resilience [CEBAH00,CEBAH01] uses the
degree distribution of the graph’s nodes. This approach requires a computational
overhead of O (min{m+m−, n}), where m−/+ = maxv∈V d−,+(v) is the maximum
in- and out-degree. This approach scales to the size of the real KAD graph, and
therefore we decided to use it in our analysis. However, this approach is designed
for bidirectional graphs, while the KAD graph is unidirectional. Therefore, we
first need to adapt it for unidirectional graphs before adopting it in our analysis.
Towards this end, we used the adaptation method from [SRS14a], which can be
summarized as follows:
For unidirectional graphs with a give degree distribution D (modelled as a random
vector D = (D−, D+)), G has a giant connected component almost surely if
E(D−, D+)− E(D+) > 0 ,
and G almost surely does not have a giant connected component if the above
quantity is less than 0 [MR95,NSW01].
In order to obtain the resilience under a removal strategy R, the degree
distributions D˜p = (D˜p−, D˜p+) after removing a fraction p of nodes are derived.
Then, we determine the fraction p that needs to be removed such that no giant
component exists as
E(D˜p−, D˜p+)− E(D˜p+) = 0 . (4.2)
For random failures, Eq. 4.2 resolves to
(1− p)E(D−, D+)− E(D+) = 0 . (4.3)
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For targeted attacks, let r(p, k, j) be the fraction of removed nodes with in-degree
k and out-degree j, and also let F¯D(d) be the probability of a node to have a
degree ≥ d. For a fraction p of removed nodes with the highest degree:
r(p, k, j) =

P (D = (k, j)), F¯D(k + j) ≤ p
0, F¯D(k + j + 1) ≥ p
p−F¯D(k+j+1)
F¯D(k+j+1)−F¯D(k+j) , otherwise.
The fractions of removed outgoing edges, p−, is then given by
p− =
m−∑
k=1
m+∑
j=1
r(p, k, j) k
E(D−)
,
and similarly for p+. Eq. 4.2 can be then transformed to
(1− p−) (1− p+) (E(D−, D+)− E(D+)− 2kjr(p, k, j)) = 0 (4.4)
so that p can be computed from the definitions of p− and p+ and Eq. 4.4.
4.2.2 Standard Graph Models
In addition to KAD, we deal in this study with two standard graph models: (i)
Erdös-Rényi’s random graph model [ER59] and (ii) Barabási-Albert’s scale-free
model [BA99]. We give an overview of them in this section.
Erdös-Rényi’s Random Graph Model
The Erdös-Rényi’s (ER) model [ER59] generates random graphs with two
parameters: (i) |V |, the number of vertices, and (ii) P , the probability of an
edge to exist. The graphs have binomial degree distributions, in which each
node is connected with an equal probability to the other |V | − 1 nodes, resulting
in |E| =
(|V |
2
)
P edges, on average. Graphs of Kademlia-type systems were
approximated by this model [DGLL07].
Barabási-Albert’s Scale-free Model
The Barabási-Albert’s (BA) model [BA99] generates graphs in which the
probability that a node connects with k other nodes is roughly proportional
to k−γ , for some constant γ. This results in a power-law degree distribution: few
nodes will have very high degrees, while most the nodes have very low degrees.
This distribution is also called scale-free distribution. Such a distribution is
widely observed in several systems, such as the Internet and some P2P and social
networks. It has been shown that BA’s scale-free graphs are highly resilient in
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face of failures [CEBAH00] but not in face of targeted attacks [CEBAH01]. That
is, removing the highly connected nodes from these graphs may easily impact
their connectivity.
4.3 Methodology
As we mentioned earlier, our analysis is based on both measured graphs and
synthetic graphs. We give in this section an overview of the analysed graphs
and our methodology to capture them. As illustrated in Figure 4.1, we extract
two graphs from each measured and each synthetic KAD graph: the first graph
(hereafter, active graph) includes only online nodes, while the second graph
(hereafter, complete graph) includes all nodes (both active nodes and stale routing
table entries). For the measured graphs, we extract two other graphs from each
of the complete and active graphs: one includes nodes that use the same IP
address and UDP port but multiple KIDs (due to manipulation of the client
software), while the other graph excludes them. We analyse each of the four
graphs separately.
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Figure 4.1: Illustration for the four graphs extracted from a graph snapshot of KAD.
The red-coloured nodes in the two lower graphs denote modified clients.
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4.3.1 Measurements
Our analysis of measured KAD graphs is based on our dataset of KAD graph
snapshots which we collected using KadSpider (Section 3.4.1). The dataset consists
of 65 graph snapshots with 452, 740.35 concurrent active nodes and 3, 812, 030.43
unique routing table entries, on average. The analysis results that we obtained
from all measured graphs are very similar and lead to the same conclusions.
Therefore, we select an exemplary graph snapshot and show its results here to
represent the entire dataset. In particular, we consider a graph snapshot captured
on 12.09.2013 (started at 20:00 GMT). This snapshot includes 498, 765 active
nodes and 4, 194, 667 unique routing table entries. These values imply that about
88% of routing table entries in this snapshot are stale. The snapshot also contains
65, 623 nodes (about 13.2% of the active nodes) using multiple identifiers, mainly
due to software manipulation.
4.3.2 Simulations
KAD Graphs
In order to obtain synthetic KAD graphs comparable to the measured graphs, we
need to simulate KAD as it is implemented in the real client software. Existing P2P
simulators (such as PeerSim [MJ09], PeerfactSim.KOM [SGR+11], and OverSim
[BHK07]) implement different structured P2P systems, including Kademlia-type
ones, but none of them implements KAD. Although KAD is derived from Kademlia,
there are several differences between the two protocols which make developing a
new simulation model for KAD more straightforward than adapting an existing
Kademlia-type model.1
Towards this end, we developed a new simulation model of KAD. In particular,
we implemented KAD as a new P2P protocol in OverSim, a widely used simulator
which is based on the OMNeT++ framework [OMN]. Our simulation model
implements the protocol design and settings as in the eMule 0.50a client software.
We performed simulations on three graph sizes: 1000, 5000, and 10000 nodes.
We performed 20 simulation runs for each of the three graph sizes, and the
results for the same size were almost identical. The results that we explain in
Section 4.4 represent three synthetic graphs (one for each of the three graph
sizes). The simulator assigned each node a 128-bit identifier generated uniformly
at random. Each simulation run lasted 12000 simulation seconds, during which
each online node requested a random identifier once every 300 simulation seconds.
The snapshots were captured after the target size is reached and the nodes have
populated their routing table buckets with contacts.
1 For a detailed comparison between Kademlia and KAD, the reader is referred to [Mys06].
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Regarding churn, our simulations applied the settings of [BH12], which were
believed to resemble nodes’ behaviour in the real system [SR06b,SENB09]. In
particular, we assigned the nodes a Weibull distributed session times with shape
k = 0.5, and average life time and average dead time both of 10000 seconds.2
With these settings, the resulted ratio of stale contacts in the complete graphs
were about 45%, 42%, and 30% in graphs containing 1000, 5000, and 10000 nodes,
respectively.
Erdös-Rényi’s Random Graphs
We used GTNA [SS13b] (Graph-Theoretic Network Analyser, a general framework
for graph and routing analysis) to produce ER’s random graphs. In particular,
we generated static ER’s random graphs containing 7000 nodes each3. We chose
this size to make the ER’s random graphs comparable with our 10000-node KAD
graphs in which 30% of the nodes are stale. The generated ER’s random graphs
have average degrees very similar to the respective KAD graphs.
4.4 Results
We now discuss our analysis results: the degree distribution in Section 4.4.1, the
routing table completeness in Section 4.4.2, and the graph resilience in Section 4.4.3.
We used GTNA to compute the degree distributions and graph resilience, as they
are defined in Section 4.2.1.
4.4.1 Degree Distribution
In this section, we first describe our expectations for the degree distributions.
After that, we give an overview of the degree distributions of the measured graphs,
and we also analyse the impact of stale routing table entries and manipulated
clients on the degree distribution. Next, we compare the measured KAD graphs
to synthetic graphs both of KAD and ER’s random networks.
Expectations
According to the description of Kademlia [MM02] and the implementation of KAD
in eMule [emu], we have the following expectations for the degree distribution of
the KAD graph:
2 For more information about the churn models that are implemented in OverSim, the reader
is referred to: http://oversim.org/wiki/OverSimChurn.
3 Note that without churn, both the active graph and the complete graph are equivalent.
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• The out-degree is bounded by the maximal number of routing table entries.
Hence, we expect many nodes with similar out-degrees and none with a very
high out-degree. The in-degree, in contrast, is unbounded because stable
nodes attract more and more links over time. We thus expect a power-law
in-degree distribution.
• We expect the degree distributions of the active graph and the complete
graph to be highly different, given the large fraction of stale routing table
entries in the complete graph (88%). The complete graph is bound to have
a lower average degree and more nodes with a low degree corresponding to
stale routing table entries. However, the complete graph is expected to have
a higher maximal degree, because all entries in the routing tables of active
nodes are counted.
• The nodes that use multiple identifiers potentially have higher degrees than
the degrees of ordinary nodes, because they are expected to have neighbours
from a larger fraction of the identifier space. However, we expect their
influence on the degree distribution to be marginal, because they only
represent a small fraction of the graph size.
• The synthetic KAD graphs should have degree distributions relatively similar
in shape to the degree distributions of the measured graphs, although shifted
due the lower number of nodes in the simulations.
• We expect the differences between the degrees of highly-connected nodes and
low-connected nodes in the degree distribution of KAD graphs to be higher
than in the binomial degree distribution of the ER model. In particular, the
ER model does not result in nodes with very high in-degrees like long-aged
KAD nodes.
Analysis Results
We discuss here the results that we obtained from analysing degree distributions of
our measured and synthetic graphs. We first give an overview of the distribution
shapes of the measured graphs. After that, we discuss the impact of stale routing
table entries and modified clients. Next, we compare the distributions of the
measured graphs to those of the synthetic graphs. To a high extent, the actual
results agree with the expectations above.
Overview: Figure 4.2 depicts the distribution shapes of the four graphs that
we extracted from our exemplary measured graph. The out-degree distribution
(Figure 4.2a) increases up to a mode, and drops rapidly afterwards when the
capacity of the routing table is reached. Nodes with low out-degrees are the nodes
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that did not fill their routing tables yet, i.e. nodes that are still in the connection
or bootstrapping phase.
The in-degree distribution of the complete graph (Figure 4.2b) has the signature
of power-law distribution (looks like a line on a log-log plot) with a spike around
the average in-degree. The same observations apply for the active graph except
that the nodes with in-degrees smaller than the average value have a slowly
decreasing (nearly constant) distribution.
The shapes of degree distributions (Figure 4.2c) are asymptotically equal to the
respective in-degree distributions, but they also show the mode of the out-degree
distributions at degree of roughly 1000.
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Figure 4.2: Degree distributions of measured KAD graphs
Impact of stale entries and modified clients: In Figure 4.2, we also can
observe (i) the small impact of manipulated clients and (ii) the drastic impact of
stale routing table entries. In particular, nodes having multiple identifiers do not
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change the general shape of the curves but lead to higher degrees, as expected. In
particular, these are the nodes with the highest in-degrees.
Regarding the impact of stale routing table entries, we can see that
the out-degree distribution when considering only active nodes shows higher
probabilities up to a routing table size of about 1000. However, the out-degree
distribution considering all routing tables’ entries (i.e. in the complete graph)
shows a higher probability for large degrees. Note that when including all
entries, 88% of nodes are with out-degree of zero (inactive nodes or stale routing
table entries). For the in-degree distribution, on the other hand, the complete
graph shows a considerably higher fraction of nodes with a low in-degree, which
corresponds to the high fraction of stale routing table entries. As discussed
above, the active graph has much fewer nodes with low in-degrees to form a
standard power-law in-degree distribution. Consequently, such a more uniform
in-degree distribution is very likely to make the active graph more resilient to
targeted attacks than both standard scale-free graphs and the complete KAD
graph, because it reduces the graph reliance on highly connected nodes (also called
hubs).
Measured graphs versus synthetic graphs: We now compare the degree
distributions of the measured graph with those of the synthetic graphs. We
exclude measured nodes with multiple identifiers from the comparison, because
they do not appear in the synthetic graphs. We plot the comparison results both
for the complete graphs (Figure 4.3) as well as for the active graphs (Figure 4.4).
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Figure 4.3: Degree distributions of complete KAD graphs (log-log scale): measurements
vs. simulations
In the complete graphs, the out-degree distributions (Figure 4.3a), both of
the measured and the synthetic KAD graphs, show the characteristic drop at the
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Figure 4.4: Degree distributions of active KAD graphs (log-log scale): measurements vs.
simulations
maximal routing table size. However, there is a difference in the shapes with regard
to the in-degree distributions (Figure 4.3b): while the in-degree distribution of the
measured graphs exhibits a constant negative slope, the synthetic graphs result in
local extrema. These observations also apply for the active graphs (Figure 4.4).
We show in Figure 4.4 the out- and in-degree distributions of an ER’s random
graph with 7000 nodes. Although this graph has a similar size, average degree,
and staleness degree as the active part of the 10000-node KAD graph, the degree
distributions of the two graphs are different. In comparison to the above explained
distribution of the synthetic KAD graph, the random graph has a binomial degree
distribution narrowed around a degree k = P (|V | − 1) (which is to be expected
for the ER model). Nodes with very small or large (in-/out-)degrees do not exist
in the ER’s random graph.
4.4.2 Routing Table Completeness
DHTs, in theory, achieve relatively good routing performance: typically O(log|V |)
routing steps. These analytical derivations, however, disregard churn and its
consequences, namely the staleness and incompleteness of routing information.
We showed in Section 3.4.1 that churn results in a staleness ratio of about 88% in
real KAD routing tables. Later, we showed in Section 4.4.1 that such high ratio
has a drastic impact on the topology. Hence, it is expected to have a negative
impact both on routing performance [SR06a] and graph resilience.
In this section, we extend our analysis for KAD, considering a previously
disregarded routing performance factor: the completeness of routing tables with
respect to global graph knowledge.
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Expectations
Before discussing the actual completeness results, we first compare the values of
the actual average out-degree (out-deg) with the expected maximal out-degree
(E(D)) assuming global graph knowledge (computed according to Eq. 4.1). After
that, we compute the ratio re between out-deg and E(D). Table 4.1 displays the
results, which confirm our expectations for degree distributions. In particular,
the impact of the high stale entry rate in the measured graphs on the average
out-degree is high: the average out-degree of about 56 in the complete measured
graph (of roughly four million nodes) is below the average out-degree of about 87
that is observed in synthetic graphs of only 1000 nodes. When only considering
active nodes, the average degree is higher in measurements than in simulations,
as expected, given the larger graph size.
Table 4.1: Average out-degree, expected out-degree, and the expected completeness
ratio re: measured vs. synthetic KAD graphs
Complete Active
Graph out-deg E(D) re out-deg E(D) re
Sim-10000 87.02 285.7 0.305 129.45 271.11 0.477
Sim-50000 112.00 401.86 0.279 155.13 382.85 0.405
Sim-10000 141.00 451.87 0.314 162.81 431.04 0.378
Measured 56.3 887.45 0.063 363.76 733.86 0.496
Similar conclusions hold for the ratio re. In the synthetic graphs, re is between
0.279 and 0.314, about five times the corresponding value in the measured graphs
when considering all routing table entries. However, in the active graphs, the
ratios both in the measured graphs and in the synthetic graphs are close to each
other. More precisely, routing tables in standard KAD are expected to include
almost half the active contacts that they would include if they know the system
graph. We compare now the expected values with the actual ones.
Actual Results
We show now the results of the actual routing table completeness in KAD (based
on the exemplary measured graph). In particular, we analyse the impact of
stale routing information in three cases: (i) complete-1 includes the discovered
active nodes and their routing tables (including the stale entries), (ii) complete-2
corresponds to the complete graph, and (iii) active corresponds to the active
graph.
Figure 4.5 depicts the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the measured
routing table completeness. In general, the results show that nodes in KAD have
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low to intermediate routing table completeness. In particular, 50% of the active
nodes have completeness degrees of less than 34% and 44% in complete-1 and
active, respectively. In the case of complete-2, the results are much worse since
about 88% of the nodes already have out-degree of zero. We summarise the main
related statistics in Table 4.2.
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Figure 4.5: CDF of the actual routing table completeness of an exemplary measured
KAD graph
Table 4.2: Routing table completeness statistics of a measured KAD graph
Complete-1 Complete-2 Active
Minimum 0.9980 0.9980 0.9740
Maximum 0.0180 0 0.0110
Median 0.7560 0 0.6101
Average 0.6567 0.0837 0.5574
Std. dev. 0.2558 0.2373 0.2475
Comparing the average values of the actual completeness to the corresponding
expected values (Table 4.1), considering the complete-2 and active cases, we can
see that our expectations (according to Eq. 4.1) are somehow close to the actual
values. The differences among the three cases confirm the impact of stale routing
information on the completeness results, too.
In addition to the completeness itself, we analysed which routing table entries
are missing with regard to their distances from the owners of the analysed routing
tables. Figure 4.6 shows the distribution over the common prefix length of the node
identifier and the missing entries in its routing table, considering the complete-1
case.
4.4 RESULTS 47
 0
 0.01
 0.02
 0.03
 0.04
 0.05
 0.06
 0.07
 0.08
 0  20  40  60  80  100  120  140
Fr
ac
tio
n 
of
 m
is
si
ng
 e
nt
rie
s 
wi
th
 le
ng
th
 L
Common Prefix Length: L
Figure 4.6: Distribution of missing routing table entries with respect to the common
prefix length (representing routing tables of an exemplary measured KAD graph)
It can be seen that the number of missing entries with a low common prefix
length is small, because there are many contacts fulfilling this criterion, and
therefore it is expected to fill the respective buckets. The probability to miss
an entry increases up to a common prefix length of 12 bits. After that, this
probability decreases, mainly because the number of contacts with longer common
prefixes is low (i.e. the buckets cannot be filled anymore). More particularly,
there are very few contacts with a common prefix length between 25 and 127 bits,
and consequently there are few missing entries in that range. However, there are
missing entries with identical identifiers (i.e. with a common prefix length of 128)
which mostly correspond to modified clients.
4.4.3 Graph Resilience
We analysed in Section 4.4.1 the degree distribution which has an impact on
the system performance, but it does not directly provide information about the
quality of the system graph for communications. This information can be obtained
through analysing the graph resilience, a predominant concern when designing
distributed systems, especially for highly dynamic systems.
We analyse in this section the resilience of KAD graphs to failures (i.e. random
node removals or departures), as well as to targeted attacks. We compare the
results of measured KAD graphs with both synthetic KAD graphs and ER’s
random graphs. We also contrast our findings with results of prior studies. The
resilience computations are performed according to Eq. 4.3 and Eq. 4.4.
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Expectations
Inspired by the analysis results of degree distributions in KAD (Section 4.4.1), we
have the following expectations for the graph resilience:
• The graph resilience to failures is high and increases with the graph size, as
shown for standard scale-free graphs in [CEBAH00]. Therefore, we expect
the measured graphs to be more resilient to failures than the synthetic
graphs. In addition, the difference between the resilience of the active graph
and the resilience of the complete graph to failures is likely to be small.
• We expect the KAD graph to be more resilient to targeted attacks than
what was showed in [CEBAH01] for standard scale-free graphs. This is
because the theoretical analysis in [CEBAH01] is only asymptotic, and our
graphs have a very high average degree in comparison to their analysed
graphs. We still expect the graphs to be more resilient to failures than to
targeted attacks.
• We expect the active graph to be more resilient to targeted attacks than the
complete graph, because the disparity between nodes with low degrees and
nodes with high degrees is less pronounced in the active graph. That is, the
hubs are less influential because they have less connections. Similarly, since
this disparity is less pronounced in the ER’s random graph than KAD graphs
with the same size and similar average degree, we expect the ER’s random
graph to be more resilient in face of targeted attacks than the receptive
KAD graphs.
• The synthetic graphs are expected to be more resilient to targeted attacks,
because their maximal degree is lower. Hence, the impact of the removed
hubs is much lower. As for the manipulated clients in the measured graphs,
they tend to show higher degrees. Hence, they are expected to reduce the
graph resilience to targeted attacks.
Analysis Results
Overview: Table 4.3 shows the resilience results both of the measured and the
synthetic graphs, separately considering all nodes and only active nodes. The
provided values characterize the fraction of nodes that need to be removed until
there is no giant connected component.
The results confirm our expectations: on the one hand, the resilience to failures
is well above 99% in all considered graphs. In addition, the resilience slightly
improves with the graph size, being at its maximum in the measured graphs. The
difference between the complete graph and the active graph is negligible in the
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Table 4.3: Resilience values of measured and synthetic KAD graphs
Complete Active
Graph Random Targeted Random Targeted
KAD-Sim-10000 (active: 553) 0.9928 0.5428 0.9929 0.9194
KAD-Sim-50000 (active: 2906) 0.9944 0.5776 0.9944 0.9119
KAD-Sim-10000 (active: 7004) 0.9951 0.7359 0.9951 0.8860
ER-7000 (active: 7000) 0.9950 0.9919 0.9950 0.9919
KAD-Meas: w/o modif. clients 0.9984 0.1100 0.9980 0.8625
KAD-Meas: w. modif. clients 0.9984 0.1105 0.9980 0.8443
case of failures. On the other hand, the active graph under targeted attacks is
much more resilient due to the lower impact of hubs, as discussed above.
Impact of size, stale entries, and modified clients: Deriving the influence
of the graph size is complex. Particularly, when considering all nodes, the increase
of the size correlates with increased resilience in the synthetic graphs. Here,
the increased average degree seems to be the dominating factor. Naturally, the
resilience to targeted attacks seems very low in the case of the measured graphs.
However, given that about 88% of the entries are stale (i.e. needing to remove
about 12% of the nodes), it means that the majority of active nodes has to be
removed.
When considering only active nodes, however, the resilience in general is
higher, but deceases with the graph size. This is because the average degree is
already high, so that the stronger proportional increase of the maximal degree
is dominating. As a consequence, high-degree nodes become more important
when the graph is larger, i.e. removing those nodes destroys the structure faster.
Including nodes with multiple identifiers reduces the resilience of the measured
graphs to targeted removals, as expected. Nevertheless, the difference is small (a
reduction of about 2% only), which is to be expected because they represent only
a relatively small fraction of the graph size.
KAD graphs versus ER’s model graphs: Comparing the results of the active
synthetic KAD graph with the generated ER’s random graph (both have the same
size and similar average degrees), we can see that both graphs have almost identical
resilience in face of random departures. However, the resilience to targeted attacks
is lower in KAD by about 11%. This is mainly because the difference between
the degrees of highly-connected nodes and the degrees of low-connected ones is
much higher in KAD than in ER’s random graphs. These results indicate that
approximating graphs of Kademlia-type systems by ER’s random graph is not
accurate.
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We also compared our results with the findings of Davis et al. [DNF+08].
Although the authors used a different measure of resilience, the conclusions derived
from our and their graph resilience results should be comparable. In particular,
using synthetic graphs of Overnet (a Kademlia-type system) and comparing them
to ER’s random graphs of the same size and similar average degree, they conclude
that Overnet is less resilient to failures but more resilient in face of targeted
attacks than ER’s random graphs. We argue that their results mischaracterize
Overnet properties, for two reasons: First, they are based on simulations that
disregarded user dynamics and misbehaviour. Second, the simulations limited the
node degree in a 25000-node Overnet graph to 20 edges, which is highly different
from the degrees in the real system (Figure 4.4).
Conclusion: To sum up, we saw that deriving the resilience of large graphs
by analysing the protocol on a small scale provides only qualitative information,
and that the resilience increases (or decreases) according to the graph size. That
is to say, the tendencies observed in the synthetic graphs are indicators for the
resilience of the measured graphs. This also applies for approximating the KAD
graph by ER’s random graphs. However, the resilience of the measured graphs
when considering both active and stale nodes (i.e. complete graphs) can be
much lower against targeted attacks. In addition, anomalies such as nodes with
multiple identifiers harm the resilience of the graphs to attacks (according to
their population), and they were never simulated. These findings confirm that
topological properties can be used to automatically detect anomalies and attacks.
Furthermore, our results regarding the resilience of measured KAD graphs are
of interest on their own, regardless of their relation to synthetic graphs. They
indicate that the KAD graph is highly resilient both to random failures and to
targeted attacks. Hence, KAD is a suitable choice for distributed applications,
such as critical infrastructures or botnets’ command and control, requiring high
resilience.
4.5 Summary
We analysed in this chapter topological and routing table properties of KAD.
In particular, we analysed representative graphs collected from a large-scale
measurement campaign, and compared them both with synthetic graphs generated
by a novel simulation model of KAD as well as with ER’s random graphs.
At a high level, the results showed that the rate of stale routing information
significantly influences the average degree, the shapes of degree distributions, and
the graph resilience to breakdowns. These properties also are influenced, relatively
slightly, by the system size and presence of manipulated clients.
In more detail, we saw that the active KAD graph is highly robust not only to
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random departure but also to targeted attacks, making it suitable for distributed
applications requiring high resilience. Resilience to random departure and shapes
of degree distributions are well modelled by KAD simulations. However, due
to a greatly increased ratio of stale routing information, the complete graph in
the real system is much more vulnerable to targeted attacks in comparison to
estimations based on simulation results. We also showed that prior results that
are based on oversimplified assumptions are not representative for the real system,
in several cases. In addition, the analysis of routing information completeness
showed that nodes in KAD achieve about half the maximal completeness value
only, when considering active nodes. This result suggests that the standard
approaches for discovering neighbours should be modified so that the nodes can
increase the number of active contacts in their routing tables (to improve the
routing performance).
We extend our characterization of KAD in the next chapter by studying
a previously disregarded routing table property, which affects the routing
performance: the diversity of node’s contacts over the corresponding identifier
space sections. Consequently, we propose and evaluate a lightweight modification
for the original neighbour selection scheme, with the goal to improve the routing
performance.

5
Improving the Routing Performance in
Kademlia-type Systems
The routing (or lookup) protocol of Kademlia-type systems received high
attention from the research community in the last years. Several studies (e.g.
[LSG+05,SR06a,SCB10,FPJ+07,CW07,JOK11,RSS15]) identified limitations in
the standard routing protocol, and consequently raised doubts about its suitability
for latency-sensitive applications. In addition, part of these studies proposed
modifications to the standard protocol design, aiming to improve the routing
performance. Considered performance metrics in these studies are the hop count,
the latency, and the signalling overhead (i.e. the number of messages sent during
a lookup).
We aim to improve the routing performance of Kademlia-type systems to
maintain high service quality in case of large number of participants. This
is particularly important when these systems are adopted by latency-sensitive
applications such as P2P video streaming [Jim13]. Towards this end, we study a
previously disregarded routing performance factor: the diversity of neighbours’
identifiers inside each routing table bucket over the corresponding identifier space
sections.
We show that maximizing this diversity can improve the routing performance.
Consequently, we propose a new neighbour selection scheme that attempts to
maximize this diversity, aiming to reduce the lookup’s hop count. The scheme
is compatible not only with the standard Kademlia system and its variations
but also with previous improvements. Moreover, the scheme does not change
the standard routing protocol nor the routing table structure, and it does not
cause signalling overhead. It is also consistent with the original policy that
gives preference for long-lived contacts and hence maintains the logic behind it
(Section 2.1). It requires only small changes to the routing table’s maintenance
processes (Section 2.3.1), causing small overhead for computing diversity degrees.
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In order to get an indication about the impact of the proposed scheme on the
routing performance, we first evaluate it via an extended version of our generic
model for Kademlia routing [RSS15,SRS14b]. After that, we extend the evaluation
by performing both extensive simulations for three Kademlia-type systems as well
as measurements on standard and modified KAD nodes.
5.1 Related Work
Kademlia-type systems, motivated by their success and high popularity [SS13a,
WK13], were the subject of many studies in the last years. In Chapter 3 and
Chapter 4, we discussed prior work on Kademlia-type systems, focusing on
measurement-based and system characterization studies. We shift our attention
here to prior studies that are more relevant to the contribution that we present
in this chapter. In particular, we focus on (i) studies that analysed the routing
performance and (ii) those that improved it.
Crosby and Wallach [CW07] measured the lookup latency in MDHT and
Azureus1. Most importantly, the authors reported relatively high lookup latency
values, and attributed this result to the high ratio of stale routing information.
Similarly, Stutzbach and Rejaie [SR06a] analysed the lookup process and measured
the lookup latency in KAD. Steiner et al. [SCB10] studied the lookup latency in
KAD taking into account the impact of both external factors (e.g. RTT of lookup
messages) as well as internal lookup parameters such as lookup parallelism. In
[RSS15], we developed a comprehensive formal model allowing the derivation of
hop count distribution in the entire family of Kademlia-type systems.
In addition, there are studies investigating the possibility to improve the
standard routing performance. For instance, Falkner et al. [FPJ+07] suggested
to adapt the lookup parameters during the runtime according to the number of
expected lookup response messages. Their approach reduced the median lookup
latency on the cost of increasing the lookup overhead. The study of Steiner et al.
[SCB10], in addition to the aforementioned analysis of lookup latency, improved
the lookup latency by coupling the lookup with content retrieval. More recently,
Jimenez et al. [JOK11] suggested several modifications to MDHT, with which
they succeeded to reduce the lookup latency. In addition, other studies succeeded
to reduce the lookup costs, measured by the latency or signalling overhead,
via caching [EFK13,WXLZ06], geographical proximity [KLKP08,CDHR02], or
recursive lookups [Hee10].
In contrast to the aforementioned studies, we do not focus on optimizing the
parameters governing the routing table structure or the lookup scheme. Instead,
we aim to develop a low-overhead scheme to improve the lookup performance,
1 Azureus is the P2P overlay network used by the Bittorent’s Vuze clients [vuz].
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that can be easily integrated both with existing Kademlia implementations as
well as with previous improvements. In particular, we propose to improve the
routing performance, in form of reduction in the average hop count by adapting
the standard neighbour selection scheme. Although our approach differs from
earlier improvements, it is orthogonal and compatible with them. It thus can
improve their performance gains further.
5.2 Improving Routing Performance
We introduce here our approach for improving the routing performance in
Kademlia-type systems: Section 5.2.1 explains the idea of our approach. After
that, to confirm the necessity for a modified scheme that maximizes the diversity
degrees, we measure in Section 5.2.2 the diversity degrees of real buckets and
how far are they from the maximal degree. Next, in Section 5.2.3, we explain
how our approach can be implemented in existing Kademlia-type systems without
changing the key design elements.
5.2.1 The Idea
Our approach to improve the routing performance is based on a modified neighbour
selection scheme. We describe here the idea of the new scheme and the logic
behind it.
In Kademlia, at most k contacts in each routing table bucket share a common
prefix. This means that these contacts are associated with a specific range of
identifiers, i.e. represent a certain section of the identifier space. This way, without
further restrictions on the selection of neighbours, it is likely that a standard
bucket stores multiple contacts with very close identifiers. This is because selection
of neighbours in Kademlia is not uniform. More precisely, the nodes tend to
choose neighbours of neighbours, and those can be close to each other. Such
identifiers represent contiguous portions in the respective identifier space section,
whereas there are other portions not covered by the stored contacts.
By storing contiguous contacts within the same bucket, the node’s view of the
corresponding identifier space section becomes narrow. We propose to improve
the routing performance by widening this view. That is, the node should try to
maximize the diversity of contacts inside each bucket independently, by choosing
contacts whose identifier prefixes are maximally diverse. Then, the expected
common prefix length of the closest contact to an arbitrary target identifier is
maximized, which should lead to a lower hop count.
We use the term diversity degree of a bucket to indicate how diverse are
the prefixes of the identifiers stored in it. In particular, the diversity degree is
measured by the number of distinct blog2 kc bits after the bucket’s common prefix,
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resulting in a maximal degree of 2blog2 kc. That is 3 bits in MDHT and KAD,
whereas iMDHT considers 7, 6, 5, and 4 bits for buckets at levels 0, 1, 2, and 3,
respectively, and 3 bits for the lower levels. Figure 5.1 shows an exemplary MDHT
routing table: the diversity degrees of buckets A and B are 8 (the maximal value
in MDHT) and 4, respectively.
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L2
L3
L4
L5
.
.
.
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.
L159
.
.
.
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.
01
01
01
01
01
k = 8
xx 000 …
xx 010 …
xx 100 …
xx 101 …
xx 011 …
xx 001 …
xx 110 …
xx 111 …
xxxx 111 …
xxxx 000 …
xxxx 101 …
xxxx 000 …
xxxx 001 …
xxxx 101 …
xxxx 000 …
xxxx 111 ...
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Diversity of the contacts stored in buckets A and B over 
the respective sections of the identifier-space
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4
5
6
7
8
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1 6 2 5 3 4 7 8 1
2
54 367 8
Figure 5.1: Exemplary MDHT routing table: buckets A and B are located at the
second and fourth levels (i.e. levels 1 and 3), thus have common prefix lengths of 2 and
4, respectively. Considering the first blog2 8c = 3 bits after the common prefix, the
respective diversity degrees are 8 (the maximal value) and 4.
In [SRS14b] we showed that the expected bit gain (i.e. the difference between
the node and the closest contact in its routing table to a target identifier
x) is increased, thus the average hop count is reduced, by maximizing the
aforementioned diversity degree. More precisely, we proved that the expected bit
gain offered by the closest contact to x when maximizing the diversity degree is at
least as big as the expected bit gain for the standard contact selection. This result
is promising and motivates an in-depth evaluation for the new scheme, which we
provide in the following sections.2
Note that the idea above is similar to the KAD’s routing table structure
(Section 2.3), which divides contacts having the same common prefix length with
the routing table owner into buckets according to the first 4 bits after the common
prefix. However, our approach is more flexible, since it does not restrict the number
of prefixes per bucket. Instead, it selects more diverse prefixes, if possible, allowing
for a less diverse contact selection if the maximal diversity is not achievable.
2 The theoretical analysis of our scheme can be found in [SRS14b].
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5.2.2 Diversity Degrees in a Real Kademlia-type System
The aforementioned idea to improve the routing performance could be beneficial
only if the diversity degrees of standard Kademlia-type buckets are not already
high. We validate in this section our expectation that buckets in Kademlia-type
systems are likely to store multiple contacts with contiguous identifiers, i.e they
do not uniformly cover all parts of the respective identifier space sections.
We validate this expectation experimentally as follows: we downloaded routing
tables of randomly selected online KAD nodes using KadSpider, and analysed the
diversity degrees of their buckets. We restricted our analysis to the fourth-level
buckets, for two reasons: First, these buckets are expected to be used much more
frequently than buckets at lower levels. In particular, given the routing table
structure of KAD (Figure 2.1c), fourth-level buckets cover 1116 of the identifier
space. Hence, on average, 1116 of the lookup requests will use contacts from these
buckets. Second, there exist with a very high probability contacts in the system
that can fill these buckets with all possible prefixes, which enable them to achieve
high completeness [SR06a], thus to achieve high diversity degrees. Lower level
buckets, in contrast, are likely to achieve lower diversity degrees, due to the fact
that there are no contacts with the same prefixes to fill them, as discussed in
Section 4.4.2.
The results that we discuss here represent 1.5 million buckets selected at
random from a full crawl of KAD conducted on 12.09.2013. We classify these
buckets, by the number of contacts they contained, into three groups: (i) 11.31%
of the buckets contained eight contacts each, (ii) 18.04% contained nine contacts
each, and (iii) 70.65% contained ten contacts each (i.e. complete buckets). For
each group, we computed the CDF of buckets with a diversity degree ≤ d.
Figure 5.2 shows the results: 42% to 67% of the buckets have d ≤ 4 (i.e. half
the maximal value), and at most 8% have the maximal value of 8. These results
confirm our expectation about diversity degrees in real systems. This means that
there is a room to increase the diversity, thus to improve the routing performance.
5.2.3 Implementation
The aforementioned idea to improve the routing performance can be implemented
in real Kademlia-type systems by only slightly modifying the standard routing
table’s maintenance processes (Section 2.3.1). More precisely, when a node has to
find new contacts (either to insert them to low-populated buckets or to replace
stale contacts), it gives preference to those whose identifiers increase the diversity
degrees of the corresponding buckets.
By this, our approach does not induce any additional overhead, except for
computing the diversity degrees over the bucket’s potential identifiers. It also does
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Figure 5.2: CDF of the diversity degrees of standard KAD buckets
not change the original routing table structure nor the original routing protocol.
Furthermore, nodes implementing the modified neighbour selection scheme still
give preference for long-lived contacts, thus preserving the logic behind this policy
(as described in Section 2.1).
5.3 Evaluation
We assess the impact of our modified neighbour selection scheme on the lookup’s
hop count. The evaluation consists of three parts: First, we evaluate the scheme
in a system-wide implementation scenario (i.e. all system nodes implement our
scheme) in Section 5.3.1. Since none of the existing Kademlia-type systems
incorporates our scheme, we perform this part of the evaluation through an
extended version of our theoretical model for Kademlia routing [RSS15,SRS14b].
We also validate the model derivations through simulations. Second, we measure
the improvement that is gained by our scheme in a real Kademlia-type system
(Section 5.3.2). In particular, we measure the routing performance of instrumented
KAD nodes implementing our scheme while they are connected to the standard
KAD system. Third, we study the impact of system size and churn on the
performance gain of our scheme in Section 5.3.3.
5.3.1 Performance Gain: Full Deployment
We evaluate a full deployment of the new neighbour selection scheme, with respect
to the lookup’s hop count. Such an evaluation is infeasible in real Kademlia-type
systems, since none of the lifelike Kademlia-type systems implements our scheme
nor we can enforce all system nodes to do so. Therefore, we perform this part of the
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evaluation through both theoretical derivations and simulations. Our evaluation
considers three exemplary Kademlia-type systems, namely MDHT, iMDHT, and
KAD, as they are described and motivated in Chapter 2. We give in the following
an overview of the theoretical model, and then we describe our simulation setup,
before we discuss the results.
Theoretical Model
The model that we use in our evaluations [RSS15, SRS14b], to the best of our
knowledge, is the most comprehensive model for Kademlia routing. It supports
various routing table structures and lookup parameters. The main limitation of
the model is that it does not support churn. That is to say, it cannot derive the
performance gain of our scheme under churn. Still the model derivations can give
us an indication about the impact of the scheme on the routing performance.
In short, the model analytically derives the hop count distribution in
Kademlia-type systems both for the standard design [RSS15] as well as for
the modified one [SRS14b]. More precisely, the model analytically answers the
question: "Given an arbitrary target identifier x and a Kademlia-type system, how
likely is it to discover the responsible node within h hops for all h?". That is, the
model determines the probability that the path to find the closest node to a target
identifier x is of length h.
The lookup process is modelled as a Markov chain: states of the chain represent
the common prefix length of the α closest nodes with the target identifier x. Due
to the prefix-based routing table structure, the common prefix length is sufficient
to determine the transition probabilities. That is, the probability to change from
one set of common prefix lengths either to another set of common prefix lengths
or to a terminal state. Then, the probability to reach the target in h hops is given
by the probability that the Markov chain attains the terminal state after h steps.
Simulation Environment and Setup
We used our simulation model of KAD (Section 4.3.2) as a basis for this part
of the evaluation. We extended the original simulation model first by adding
MDHT and iMDHT, and secondly by implementing the new neighbour selection
scheme. We experimented with 10000 nodes, both without churn and with churn.
Following the setup of [BH12], in simulations with churn, session times followed a
Weibull distribution with shape k = 0.5.
Each online node searched for a random identifier once every 300 simulation
seconds. At the beginning of each simulation run, nodes are added to the system
until the target size is reached. After an initial stabilization phase of 2000 seconds,
the simulator recorded the statistics of interest. All simulation results are averaged
over 20 runs.
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Performance Results Without Churn: Model Versus Simulations
We first show the results for systems without churn. In particular, we show both
the model derivations and simulation results and compare them to each other.
Figure 5.3 plots the resulting CDFs of the hop count distributions for the three
standard systems as well as for the respective modified ones.
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Figure 5.3: CDFs of hop count distributions: model derivations vs. simulations of three
exemplary 10000-node Kademlia-type systems without churn
We show in Table 5.1 both the model derivations as well as the corresponding
simulation results: (i) the average with the 95% confidence interval (CI), and the
median hop count values, and (ii) the hop count improvement achieved by the
modified scheme, computed as the difference between ”standard average− CI”
and ”modified average+ CI”.
All in all, both the model derivations and simulation results, agreeing with
each other, show that the modified systems achieve lower average and median
hop count (i.e. improve the performance). These results confirm the utility of the
proposed scheme.
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Table 5.1: Hop count and achieved improvement from model derivations and simulations
of three exemplary 10000-node Kademlia-type systems without churn
Simulations Model
Average ± CI Median
MDHT
Standard 2.89145± 0.00199 3 2.88697
Modified 2.76611± 0.00172 3 2.75416
Improvement (%) 4.20961 - 4.60025
iMDHT
Standard 2.31044± 0.00177 2 2.30470
Modified 2.14706± 0.00146 2 2.12828
Improvement (%) 6.93672 - 7.65508
KAD
Standard 1.98461± 0.00094 2 1.98609
Modified 1.95545± 0.00077 2 1.95535
Improvement (%) 1.38405 - 1.54760
In addition, it can be seen that the highest performance improvement among
the three systems is achieved by iMDHT, whereas the lowest is achieved by
KAD. In particular, iMDHT improves the hop count by about 7%, whereas KAD
improves it by about 1.5% only, and the improvement achieved by MDHT is in
between with about 4.5%. We attribute this disparity among the three systems to
the different structures of their routing tables. On the one hand, KAD implements
some form of diversity by design (as we discussed in Section 5.2.1), which limits
the impact of the additional diversity that is enabled by the new scheme. On the
other hand, MDHT and iMDHT do not have such a feature in their standard
designs, and therefore they are expected to benefit from the new scheme more
than KAD. Comparing iMDHT to MDHT, the buckets in the top four routing
table levels in iMDHT (the ones that are expected to be mostly used, Figure 2.1c)
can hold more contacts. They hence are expected to have relatively much higher
diversity degrees than the respective buckets in MDHT, which explains the higher
routing performance improvement achieved by iMDHT.
5.3.2 Performance Gain: Partial Deployment in KAD
We now evaluate the impact of our neighbour selection scheme on the routing
performance in a real Kademlia-type system. However, as we discussed earlier,
measuring the routing performance with our scheme on a system-wide scale is
infeasible. Instead, we measure the routing performance achieved by modified
nodes implementing the new scheme, during their participation in a standard
Kademlia-type system. Although the modified nodes are expected to benefit from
the new scheme, we expect their gains to be limited in comparison to what could
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be achieved with a full deployment. We describe in the following the setup of our
measurements, and after that we discuss the results.
Measurement Environment and Setup
We performed our measurements in KAD using four nodes, all of them connected
to KAD at the same time. Two nodes used the standard KAD code as implemented
in the eMule client software, while the other two nodes implemented our neighbour
selection scheme.
During every measurement run, each node issued 512 lookup requests, one
every three seconds. The target identifiers are selected such that their hashes are
uniformly distributed over the identifier space. In particular, we used 512 keywords
from the keyword list of Steiner et al. [SCB10].3 During the measurements, we
reported (i) the number of hops traversed by each lookup request and (ii) the
diversity degrees of fourth-level routing table buckets. We performed in total
40 measurement runs at several times of the day. That is, the results below are
sampled over 512×40 = 20480 lookups per node. The average population of KAD
during the measurements (as measured by KadSpider) was 371, 811 active nodes.
General Performance Results
The results that we obtained from the standard nodes are very close to each other,
and the same holds for the results of the modified nodes. Therefore, we show and
discuss below the results of one standard node and one modified node only.
Figure 5.4 plots the CDFs of the hop count both for the standard node and
for the modified one. The results obviously show the improvement achieved by
the modified node: more lookups complete in fewer hops, in comparison to the
standard scheme. For instance, about 68% of the lookups using the modified
scheme completed in three hops or less, in comparison to about 53% using the
standard scheme.
We summarize in Table 5.2 the related statistics: (i) the average with 95% CI
and median hop count, (ii) the improvement achieved by the modified node over
the standard node, computed as the difference between ”standard average− CI”
and ”modified average + CI”, and (iii) the average diversity degrees of the
fourth-level buckets.
We also can see that the gained improvement correlates with the diversity
degree: the average diversity degree in the modified node was 7.37, which is very
close to the maximal value of 8 in KAD. The corresponding value in the standard
node was 4.68 (close to the results that we discussed in Section 5.2.2).
3 The used keywords are listed in Appendix A.
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Figure 5.4: CDFs of hop count distributions: measurements on standard and modified
KAD nodes
Table 5.2: Hop counts, diversity degrees, and achieved improvement: measurements on
KAD nodes
Standard node Modified node
Median hop count 3 3
Average hop count 3.39862± 0.01583 3.23172± 0.01310
Minimum improvement (%) - 3.36571
Maximum improvement (%) - 7.68003
Average improvement (%) - 4.07861
Average diversity 4.68 7.37
5.3.3 Impact of Churn and System Size
In general, one would expect the performance improvement achieved by the
modified neighbour selection scheme to increase when it is implemented in a
larger network. However, the modified KAD nodes in the measurements, although
connected to a standard KAD system, achieved higher improvement than the
modified KAD nodes in the full deployment scenario. This result can be attributed
to the disparity between the simulation and measurement setups with respect
to (i) system sizes and/or (ii) churn rates. In particular, the simulation results
above represent only 10000 nodes without churn, while the measurements were
conducted in the real (dynamic) KAD system with an average population of
371, 811 active nodes. We expect the hop count improvement of our scheme to
increase with larger system sizes and/or with higher churn rates. This is because
the chance becomes higher to encounter more contacts whose identifiers increase
the diversity degrees of routing table buckets.
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Impact of Churn
To analyse the impact of churn, we simulated the three systems with a fixed
system size of 10000 nodes, and varied the churn rate in each experiment. In
particular, we experimented with five different session’s average life times: 100000,
50000, 20000, 10000, and 5000 seconds. We plot the average hop count reductions
achieved by the three modified systems in Figure 5.5. We also give more detailed
results for two exemplary life time settings in Table 5.3.
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Figure 5.5: Simulative average hop count reduction achieved by three 10000-node
modified Kademlia-type systems under churn with different average life times
The comparison results of the different churn settings, both to each other as
well as to a system without churn (Table 5.1), show that the average and median
hop count without churn are always lower. The results also show that systems
with lower churn rates (i.e. with longer average life times) outperform those with
higher churn rates. These results agree with prior results (e.g. [SR06b,BH12]).
With regard to the churn’s impact on the hop count improvement, it can be
seen in Figure 5.5 that the improvement increases with higher churn rates till some
point, and it then decreases for highly aggressive churn rates. This result confirms
our hypothesis about the positive impact of churn rate on the achieved hop count
improvement. We disregard the reduction in improvement that is observed under
very short average life times, i.e. under aggressive churn rates. This is because
the corresponding results represent only a small fraction of lookup requests, i.e.
reported while the success rate of lookup requests was very low.
We also can observe in these results that the correlation between the churn
rate and the achieved improvement is very small in iMDHT. The reason for this
can probably be found in the extremely large bucket size on high routing table
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Table 5.3: Hop count and achieved improvement from simulations of three Kademlia-type
systems of size 10000 for two exemplary average life times
Average life time
100, 000 sec. 20, 000 sec.
MDHT
Standard: median 3 3
Modified: median 3 3
Standard: average±CI 2.97939± 0.00219 3.21440± 0.00288
Modified: average±CI 2.82948± 0.00185 3.01128± 0.00234
Improvement (%) 4.89921 6.16216
iMDHT
Standard: median 2 3
Modified: median 2 2
Standard: average±CI 2.38366± 0.00192 2.57993± 0.00245
Modified: average±CI 2.21453± 0.00163 2.38774± 0.00200
Improvement (%) 6.95244 7.28376
KAD
Standard: median 2 2
Modified: median 2 2
Standard: average±CI 2.05295± 0.00127 2.22060± 0.01910
Modified: average±CI 1.98838± 0.00101 2.09217± 0.00160
Improvement (%) 3.03599 5.63017
levels (the most used ones). It takes very long to fill these buckets, and hence it
is hard to keep the contacts alive under churn, so that the high stale entry rate
impairs further improvement.
Impact of System Size
We now analyse the impact of the system size on the performance gain of our
scheme by simulating both the standard and modified systems. We experimented
with the three aforementioned Kademlia-type systems without churn, with five
different system sizes: 1000, 5000, 10000, 15000, and 20000 nodes. The calculated
hop count improvements, however, did not show a correlation between the system
size and the performance gain of the new scheme. We confirmed this result
through model derivations of different system sizes, up to 100000 nodes. We show
in Table 5.4 the model derivations for four exemplary network sizes: 10000, 15000,
20000, and 100000.
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Table 5.4: Model derivations for different system sizes: hop count and improvement
Size Standard Modified Improvement (%)
MDHT
10000 2.88697 2.75416 4.60025
15000 2.99908 2.84116 5.26561
20000 3.07960 2.91306 5.71701
100000 3.53212 3.36691 4.90687
iMDHT
10000 2.30470 2.12828 7.65508
15000 2.43094 2.25572 7.76781
20000 2.51711 2.36458 6.45062
100000 2.94909 2.80668 5.07397
KAD
10000 1.98609 1.95535 1.54760
15000 2.04304 1.97799 3.28869
20000 2.09596 2.00861 4.34878
100000 2.49518 2.41235 3.43358
5.4 Summary
We analysed in this chapter a previously disregarded routing performance factor
in Kademlia: the diversity of neighbours over the corresponding identifier space
sections. We showed that the average diversity in a real Kademlia-type system
is almost half the maximal value, and also that maximizing this diversity can
improve the routing performance. Consequently, we proposed a new neighbour
selection scheme in which each node attempts to maximize the diversity within
each routing table bucket independently. Theoretical results, simulations, and
measurements of modified KAD nodes confirmed the utility of our scheme in form
of reduction in the average hop count.
Part II
Improving Named-Data
Networking
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6
Overview of Named-Data Networking
Information Centric Networking (ICN) is a promising research direction that aims
to move the Internet towards a content distribution architecture in order to better
match the current Internet usage. In particular, ICN proposes for a receiver-driven
content-centric communication model that substitutes the current sender-driven
host-centric model.
Several ICN-based architectures emerged in recent years [KCC+07,JST+09,
LVT10,Dan09]. The proposed designs have two ideas in common: (i) in-network
caching and (ii) accessing content by name. Named-Data Networking (NDN), in
particular, is widely looked at as a potential architecture for the future Internet.
This is mainly because its design addresses several technical issues and provides
answers for many relevant questions.
We exclusively deal with NDN in this part of the dissertation, with the goal to
improve its performance and robustness. In the remainder of this chapter, we give
an overview of NDN, and then we describe its key design concepts and features.
6.1 Overview of NDN
Named-Data Networking (NDN) is one of five projects funded by the American’s
National Science Foundation (NSF) for Future Internet Architectures (FIA) [fia].
It is based on the Content-Centric Networking (CCN) architecture [JST+09]
which was initiated at Xerox PARC by Van Jacobson and others, with the goal to
coincide the host-centric design of the Internet with its current content-centric
usage.1
As can be seen in Figure 6.1, NDN makes named contents the thin-waist of its
protocol stack. The stack also includes two new layers: (i) the strategy layer and (ii)
the security layer. The strategy layer is responsible for forwarding and transporting
functions. It is located above the underlying networking technologies including the
1 The terms NDN and CCN are commonly used interchangeably in the literature.
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IP itself. This way, NDN enables to adapt forwarding and transporting services
according to the access network and applications. It also enables to optimize link
selection in multi-homed nodes under dynamic connectivity conditions [JST+09].
As for the security layer, it implements security functions on the content itself
rather than on the communication channels.
  
(a) TCP/IP (b) NDN
UDP, TCP, ICMP
IP
Ethernet, ATM, ...
Sonet, CSMA, ...
Copper, fiber, WiFi, ..
Security
Named
contents
Strategy
IP, UDP, broadcast, ...
Copper, fiber, WiFi, ..
Applications Applications
Figure 6.1: Protocol stacks of: (a) TCP/IP and (b) NDN (adapted from [JST+09])
6.2 Operation Primitives and Packet Types
The communication model in NDN, similar to other ICN architectures, has its
roots in the publish/subscribe (pub/sub) paradigm [EFGK03] which decouples
content requests and responses with respect to both location and time. Such
decoupling enables for location-independent and asynchronous content delivery.
NDN relies on two operation primitives: register and interest, mimicking
publish and subscribe, respectively. More precisely, NDN implements a
consumer-driven content-centric communication model, using two packet types:
interest packets and data packets (Figure 6.2). The consumer uses an interest
packet to request a named content by its name. The content itself is then delivered
inside a data packet on the same path through which it was requested in the
reverse way. At most one data packet can be retrieved per interest packet.
6.3 Content Naming
Each content in NDN is identified, requested, and accessed by a unique
name, rather than location or host address. NDN uses hierarchical
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(a) Interest packet (b) Data packet
Content name
nonce
Content name
signature
Content
Signed info. (publisher ID, ...)
Figure 6.2: NDN packet types: (a) interest packet and (b) data packet (adapted from
[JST+09]). The nonce field in the interest packet is used together with the content
name to identify looping interest packets.
content names, e.g. "/de.tu-darmstadt/dissertations/salah.pdf". In
this example, "/de.tu-darmstadt" is a globally-routable name while
"/dissertations/salah.pdf" is an organizational name. In contrast to flat names,
hierarchical names enable for name aggregation, which reduces the number of
routing entries. Hierarchical names also can be human-readable.
6.4 In-network Caching
Similar to other ICN architectures, in-network caching is a key design element in
NDN. In particular, NDN implements on-path (or en-route) in-network caching.
That is, when a content is retrieved, a copy of it is cached in each node along
the path from the content provider to the consumer. Decisions regarding content
admission and replacement are taken (and executed) by each node independently,
according to its local view of content properties and the cache state (i.e. names
of contents in the node’s cache).
6.5 Node Model
The node model in NDN consists of three data structures:
1. Content Store (CS) or cache: It temporarily holds data packets passing
through the node.
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2. Pending Interest Table (PIT): It maintains content names of recently received
but not yet satisfied interest packets. That is to say, NDN nodes do not only
cache contents but also cache the corresponding requests. Each PIT entry
also specifies the incoming interface(s) through which the corresponding
interest packet was received. A PIT entry is removed either when the
corresponding data packet is received or when its timeout is caught.
3. Forwarding Information Base (FIB): Mimicking a routing table, FIB
maintains a list of potential outgoing interfaces for different content names
(or name-prefixes).
6.6 Packet Handling
With the aforementioned node model, interest packets and data packets are
handled in NDN as follows. On the one hand, upon receiving an interest packet,
the node looks for a matching name in its CS. If it is found, the node forwards the
corresponding data packet to the same interface from which the interest packet
was received. Otherwise, the node looks for the name in its PIT. If a matching
entry is found but the interface from which the interest packet was received is not
listed, the new interface is appended to the same entry, and nothing otherwise.
This way, the nodes avoid forwarding duplicate copies of identical interest packets.
If no matching PIT entry is found, a new one is created, then the FIB is consulted,
and lastly the packet is routed accordingly.
On the other hand, when receiving a data packet, the node first looks for the
content name in its PIT. If it is found, the data packet is cached in the CS, then
the packet is forwarded to the listed interfaces, and lastly the respective PIT entry
is deleted. If no matching PIT entry is found, the packet is discarded.2
Figure 6.3 provides an example illustrating the node model and how packets
are handled in NDN.
6.7 Content-based Security
Since each content is identified and accessed in NDN by its unique name regardless
of its location, NDN applies content-based security mechanisms. That is, NDN
implements security on the content itself instead of securing the communication
channels. More precisely, with the aforementioned security layer, content
authenticity and integrity are dealt in NDN via a digital signature added to
2 Note that with the above described routing and forwarding procedures there is no need to
include addresses in NDN packets.
6.8 SUMMARY 73
  
“/com/p1/”  
Interest packet Data packet
“/org/p2/”  
I have interest in:
/com/p1/stories/s1.htm
N1
N2C2
C1
I have interest in:
/com/p1/stories/s1.htm
f1
f2
f3
f2
f1
t1+
t2
t2+
t3+
t3+
t3+
f4
CS
t1+, t2+
/com/p1/stories/s1.htm
PIT
f1, f3
t1+
t2+
t3+
/com/p1/ f2
FIB
/com/p1/stories/s1.htm f1
/com/p1/stories/s1.htm
f3
t4
t5+
C3
t2+
t3+
t4+
t5
I have interest in:
/com/p1/stories/s1.htm
t1
t3+
/org/p2/ f4
CS
t1+, t2+
/com/p1/stories/s1.htm
PIT
f1t2+
/com/p1/ f2
FIB
/com/p1/stories/s1.htm
/org/p2/ f2
t3+ - t5+
t3+ - t5+
t1+, t3+
Figure 6.3: Handling interest and data packets in NDN – an illustrative example.
Contents of CS and PIT after each time-stamp and FIB of N1 and N2 are shown. ti+
denotes the time after a time-stamp ti till before ti+1. The interest packet sent by C2 is
not forwarded further by N1 since a matching PIT entry is found. The interest packet
sent by C3 is consumed by the matching cached copy that is found in N2.
each data packet (Figure 6.2).3 The signature is computed by the origin content
provider over the content name and the content itself, thus binding them with each
other. The creator’s public key can be retrieved using the information contained
in the packet (Figure 6.2). This way, the packet’s authenticity and integrity can
be verified regardless from where the packet is retrieved.
The above described properties of NDN, namely: in-network caching, the
stateful forwarding plane (using PITs), and name-based routing, make the network
robust to several types of traditional DDoS attacks. For instance, reflection
attacks, bandwidth depletion, black-holing, and prefix hijacking are eliminated or
at least mitigated in NDN, by design (see [cis14] for explanation). Furthermore,
since NDN does not rely on a name resolution service, DNS cache poisoning does
not represent a threat in NDN.
6.8 Summary
We gave in this chapter an overview of the key design elements and features of
NDN, a potential architecture for the future Internet. NDN, same as other ICN
3 Interest packets, in contrast, do not include a signature filed. Hence, their origin and
integrity are unverifiable.
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architectures, aims at matching the host-centric design of the Internet with its
current content-centric usage. Towards this end, NDN implements four ideas:
networking named content, on-path caching, consumer-driven communication
model, and content-based security.
In the next two chapters, we modify the original design of NDN aiming at
(i) realizing coordinated caching and cache-aware routing (Chapter 7) and (ii)
making the system robust in face of a new type of DDoS attack called the interest
flooding attack (Chapter 8).
7
Coordinated Cache Management in NDN
In-network caching is a common design element in ICN architectures with which
they aim to improve the efficiency gains of content distribution over the Internet.
Proposed in-network caching schemes perform cache management autonomously
(i.e. they are uncoordinated or uncooperative). That is, each caching node (or
node) independently caches part of the contents passing through it according to (i)
its local view of content access information (i.e. names of requested contents and
their properties such as frequency or recency of requests) and (ii) names of locally
cached contents (hereafter, local cache state). For instance, in NDN [JST+09]
contents are cached by all nodes on the path from the content provider to the
consumer. This scheme is commonly known as on-path caching.
Autonomous cache management, although simple and does not cause
coordination overhead, has three drawbacks: First, it is likely to cause unnecessary
large cache redundancy; it thus poorly utilizes available (already limited [PV11])
cache space. Second, it is very likely to result in suboptimal selection of contents
that are given priority for caching, as the node’s view for content access is likely
different from the network-wide one. Third, it implies cache-ignorant routing.
That is, the system can take advantage of cached contents only when they are
located on the default routes of interest packets which requested them.
These drawbacks already raised doubts about achieving the intended gains
of in-network caching in ICN. In particular, prior results (e.g [RR11, SLYJ13])
already showed that in some cases only a very small fraction of content requests hit
caches. Consequently, several studies (e.g. [SLYJ13,WLV+12,SFT13,BKST13])
proposed to address the aforementioned drawbacks through cache coordination.
We argue that coordinated cache management can be beneficial only when it
is based on timely and global (i.e. network-wide) knowledge of (i) content access
information and (ii) cache states (i.e. which content is cached by which node?). In
particular, timely and global knowledge of content access information and cache
states enables to realize network-wide caching goals and cache-aware routing.
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However, the distributed nature of the Internet beside the massive volumes and
high dynamics of coordination information render such coordination (hereafter,
global coordination) impractical. Therefore, despite the considerable amount of
prior attempts to coordinate caching in ICN (see [PCP12,LSS04,CHPP12,SLYJ13,
LS11,LSS04,ENM+12,LCS06,SFT13,BKST13] and the references therein), they
either favour low coordination overhead over high efficiency gain or vice versa.
That is to say, a solution that realizes a global coordination with an affordable
coordination overhead is still missing, to the best of our knowledge. Realizing
such a solution is the goal that we aim to achieve here.
Towards this end, we present and evaluate CoMon, a framework for
Coordination that is based on (i) lightweight Monitoring of content access
information, (ii) bounded advertisement of cache states, and (iii) centralized
cache coordination.
In essence, CoMon is designed to work inside an Autonomous System (AS),
and it assigns traffic monitoring and re-routing tasks to a small number of nodes
only. Monitoring nodes are selected such that the entire traffic passes (or is
enforced to pass) through them at an early stage. Selected monitoring nodes work
with a controller that takes AS-wide decisions in a centralized way.
7.1 Motivating Example
This example illustrates the benefits and challenges of coordinating caching
decisions in NDN1. The example compares the performance of four different
systems: a system without coordination, a system applying global coordination,
and two systems applying partial coordination. In both the two systems with
partial coordination, all nodes participate in coordination. They differ from each
other in the coordination-related information that nodes exchange among each
other. In the first (hereafter, partial 1), the nodes exchange only content access
information, while in the second (hereafter, partial 2) the nodes exchange only
cache states.
On the one hand, both the uncoordinated system and partial 1 do not support
cache-aware routing. Instead, interest packets are forwarded along the shortest
path towards the origin content provider. This way, interest packets are consumed
either by the provider or by a cache on the path. Each node in those systems ranks
the observed contents, according to its knowledge of content access information
and cache states, and then caches the top ranked content. On the other hand, the
coordinated system and partial 2 implement cache-aware routing. That is, interest
packets are forwarded towards the other node if the content is cached there or
1 This example extends on an example from [LXWZ13]. Our example includes more cases
and evaluation metrics.
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towards the content provider otherwise. The two systems aim at maximizing the
diversity of cached contents. In practice, each node ranks the observed contents
according to its knowledge of content access information and global cache states,
and it caches the top ranked content unless it is cached by the other node. In the
latter case, the node caches the second ranked content.
In the example, as shown in Figure 7.1, there is an AS called A containing
two consumer nodes N0 and N1 (through which clients access the network and
contents), in addition to a gateway node N2 (connecting A to other networks
including the Internet). N0 and N1 has a cache store (CS) that is capable of
holding one content each, whereas N2 has no CS. N0 and N1 use LFU (least
frequently used) for content replacements in caches; in case of equality, they use
LRU (least recently used). C0 and C1 abstract clients connecting to N0 and N1,
respectively. The clients issue seven interest packets in total at the specified
time-stamps. The server S abstracts all origin content providers. Figure 7.1 also
shows at each ti+ 2 the content cached by N0 and N1.
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Figure 7.1: Coordinated caching – a motivating example
2 ti denotes the time-stamp at which each interest packet was issued, while ti+ denotes the
time between a time-stamp ti and the next time-stamp ti+1.
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We compare the four systems by using four metrics widely used in the literature:
1. Cache diversity: The ratio of unique cached contents to the total number
of cached contents. By maximizing cache diversity, the network operator
aims at reducing the number of contents that are retrieved from outside the
domain. However, this is not always the primary goal. For instance, some
systems allows for cache redundancy with the goal to make cached contents
closer to customers (Wang et al. [WBK14] discuss the trade-off).
2. Server hit ratio: The ratio of interest packets consumed by origin content
providers to the total number of interest packets. Minimizing the server hit
ratio leads to minimizing the network traffic that crosses other ASs. This
is important since the transit cost is commonly charged according to the
traffic volume [DPM11].
3. Normalized hop count: The number of hops traversed by a data packet
normalized over the number of hops between the consumer and the origin
content provider. Since several latencies are incurred at each hop (e.g.
cache lookup, PIT lookup, routing table lookup, forward), network providers
attempt to minimize the hop count (unless it contradicts some other goals).
4. Content replacements: The total number of content replacements in caching
nodes. Fewer content replacements are preferred since it means fewer
computations and less access to the memory.
Table 7.1 summarizes the results, comparing the four systems after all caches
became full (from t3 onwards). We assume that the distance between N2 and S
is 10 hops. The results show that the system with full coordination outperforms
the other systems (for all four metrics), and that the two systems with partial
coordination (remarkably partial 2) outperform the system without coordination.3
However, this superiority comes with a price (i.e. the coordination overhead)
represented by the number of messages that need to be exchanged (between N0
and N1) and processed to coordinate caching and routing decisions.
7.2 Related Work
We discuss in this section prior work on cache coordination in ICN. For a
comprehensive overview and taxonomy of in-network caching schemes, the
3 Note that N0’s local view of content access without coordination is the same as with global
coordination. This is attributed to N0’s central position in the network, and because none of
the interest packets issued by C1 were consumed by N1’s cache. Nevertheless, as can be seen in
the results, this knowledge alone was not sufficient for N0 to take decisions as efficient as if the
cache state of N1 was also known.
7.2 RELATED WORK 79
Table 7.1: Coordinated caching: performance results of the motivating example
Cache diversity
No coordination (1+0.5+1+0.5+1)/5 = 80%
Partial coordination 1 (1+0.5+0.5+0.5+1)/5 = 70%
Partial coordination 2 (1+1+1+1+1)/5 = 100%
Global coordination (1+1+1+1+1)/5 = 100%
Server hit ratio
No coordination (1+1+1+1+1)/5 = 100%
Partial coordination 1 (1+1+1+1+1)/5 = 100%
Partial coordination 2 (0+0+1+0+1)/5 = 40%
Global coordination (0+0+1+0+0)/5 = 20%
Normalized hop count
No coordination (12+12+13+13+12)/62 = 100% 4
Partial coordination 1 (12+12+13+13+12)/62 = 100%
Partial coordination 2 (1+2+13+2+12)/62 ≈ 48%
Global coordination (1+2+13+2+2)/62 ≈ 32%
Replacements per node
No coordination (1+1+0+1+1+1+1)/7 ≈ 86%
Partial coordination 1 (1+1+0+0+1+1+1)/7 ≈ 71%
Partial coordination 2 (0+0+0+1+0+0+1)/7 ≈ 29%
Global coordination (0+0+0+0+0+0+0)/7 = 0
reader is referred to [ZLL13] and [XVS+13]. Existing solutions for coordinating
caching-related decisions can be classified as either indirect (implicit) or direct
(explicit). Both classes aim to outperform uncoordinated caching.
In general, indirect coordination schemes favour low coordination overhead
over high efficiency gains. In these schemes, nodes do not exchange information
among each other or exchange little information. Instead, coordination is realized
implicitly. A notable scheme for indirect cache coordination is probabilistic
caching. In this scheme, returned contents are cached at each node on the delivery
path either with a fixed probability [LSS04] or with a probability determined
by some metric such as the node’s distance from the consumer (the closer the
node the higher the caching probability) [PCP12]. Another indirect scheme is
centrality-based caching in which contents are cached by the most central node
on the delivery path [CHPP12]. Centrality here is calculated by some metric
4 The denominator (number of hops till S) = 12+12+13+13+12 = 62
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such as betweenness centrality5. Alternatively, hash-based solutions use a hash
function to map content names with node identifiers [SLYJ13, LS11]. Interest
packets are then routed to potential cached copies using the same function. The
simplest indirect scheme is to cache returned content in a node locating on the
path selected randomly [ENM+12]. There are other indirect schemes activated
after a cache hit. For instance, after a cache hit, the cached content is moved to
the direct downstream node (Move Copy Down (MCD) [LSS04]), or another copy
is cached at the direct downstream node (Leave Copy Down (LCD) [LCS06]).
In direct coordination schemes, in contrast, nodes make caching-related
decisions based on the information which they exchange explicitly among each
other. Proposed direct coordination schemes work at one of three levels: (i) among
neighbouring nodes [WZB13], (ii) among consumer nodes [BKST13,NST13], or
(iii) among all nodes [SFT13]. Coordination in the last two cases is usually
performed via a (logically) centralized controller. To the best of our knowledge,
among the proposed coordination schemes, only the designs of [SFT13], [BKST13],
and [NST13] can realize nearly global coordination. To do so, either all network
nodes [SFT13] or all consumer nodes [BKST13, NST13] should participate in
coordination. The high coordination overhead of those solutions, however, likely
makes them impractical. Therefore, [SFT13] and [BKST13] also propose lighter
versions of their original (costly) schemes. The lighter versions, however, achieve
lower caching efficiency as shown in the same papers.
To conclude, evaluations of indirect coordination solutions showed that they
outperform the uncoordinated NDN with low coordination overhead. However,
their efficiency gains are still limited in comparison to what can be achieved with
global coordination. This is obvious, for instance, when comparing the caching
efficiency of the original solutions of [SFT13] and [BKST13] to the respective
lighter versions. That said, as yet there is no solution that can realize nearly
global coordination with low overhead. This is the gap that we aim to fill.
In addition to the studies above, there has been a little effort to model an
optimal cooperation policy for in-network caching in ICN [LXWZ13]. However, a
practical solution for realizing such a policy is still missing.
7.3 Design Requirements and Overview
Our goal is to design a cache coordination solution that is efficient and incurs
low overhead. To this end, we present a coordination framework called CoMon.
CoMon is consistent with NDN. However, the design concepts are applicable for
other ICN architectures.
5 The BC score of a node v counts the total fraction of all shortest paths in the network that
pass through v [Fre77].
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In this section, we first list the design requirements of CoMon (Section 7.3.1).
After that, we describe the main idea of CoMon as well as its architecture and
operation primitives (Section 7.3.2).
7.3.1 Design Requirements
We guide the design of CoMon by the following three requirements:
R1) CoMon should enable the network operator to realize network-wide caching
goals (e.g. caching the most popular contents without duplications).
R2) CoMon should enable for cache-aware routing.
R3) CoMon should induce a low overhead.
The first two requirements aim to improve the overall caching efficiency gains
(i) by increasing the quality and accuracy of caching decisions (R1) and (ii) by
increasing the utilization of cached contents even if they are not located on the
default routes of interest packets (R2).
While the intended benefits behind R1 and R2 look appealing, fulfilling them
is challenging, and also they are contradicting R3. In particular, R1 and R2
imply that nodes should have up-to-date global knowledge of cache states. R1
also implies that nodes should know global content access information. The
volume of such information in large networks such as the Internet is significant and
causes high signalling overhead. Such an overhead increases in highly dynamic
environments since global cache states and content access information must be
exchanged frequently. Otherwise, this information becomes outdated, which
results in suboptimal caching decisions.
7.3.2 Architeture and Operation Primitives
We aim to find the right balance between the three aforementioned requirements.
Towards this end, we propose to achieve this in CoMon by reducing the number of
nodes participating in coordination. In particular, CoMon implements coordination
within AS, i.e. a set of nodes (i.e. routers) under a single technical administration
entity [HB96]. CoMon assigns coordination-related tasks to a set M ⊂ V of
influential nodes, where |M |  |V |, with the aid of a centralized controller.
Figure 7.2 shows the system architecture of CoMon. It consists of three
principal components: (i) an AS Controller (AC), (ii) NDN Nodes (NNs), and
(iii) Monitoring Nodes (MNs). We assume in the following homogeneous cache
capacities for all nodes. We let c and C denote the cache capacity per node and
the overall cache capacity of the AS, respectively (i.e. C = |V | × c).
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Figure 7.2: System architecture of CoMon: "AC" stands for AS Controller, "NN" stands
for NDN Node, and "MN" stands for Monitoring Node
We introduce now these components and describe how they work together to
realize AS-wide coordinated caching decisions:
1. AS Controller (AC): Each AS has a controller that (i) aggregates content
access information from a set M ⊂ V of monitoring nodes, (ii) calculates
and commands caching-related decisions, and (iii) advertises the cache states
in the routing plane of monitoring nodes only.
We implement the AC on a single machine. Instead, the AC can be
implemented on multiple machines to distribute the load and to avoid
a single-point-of-failure. We leave such a design as a future work.
2. NDN Nodes (NNs): These are similar to NDN nodes [JST+09] in that
they have routing and caching capabilities. However, instead of taking
autonomous caching decisions, each NN caches and evicts contents as
commanded by the AC.
In response to a command implying to cache contents, each node (i)
identifies which of the contents are not already in its cache, (ii) requests
(i.e. pre-fetches) each of them using an interest packet and creates a PIT
entry initialized without an outgoing interface, and (iii) stores the respective
data packets after it verifies their integrity and provenance (to avoid cache
poisoning). The NN appends the interface information of matching interest
packets that arrive before the NN receives the corresponding data packets
to the respective PIT entries.
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3. Monitoring Nodes (MNs): A set M ⊂ V of nodes are selected as MNs. In
addition to the routing and caching functions of regular NNs 6, each MN (i)
monitors interest packets passing through it and records their names and
characteristics (e.g. number of times a content was requested during the
current observation window), (ii) periodically (as often as determined by the
AC) uploads the recorded content information (hereafter, monitoring reports)
of requested contents to the AC, and clears this information afterwards, and
(iii) receives lists of cached contents (i.e. global cache states) from the AC,
and (re)routes interest packets accordingly.
Note that the system operation described above implies off-path caching (rather
than the default on-path caching scheme). By this, CoMon gets rid of NDN’s
requirements to perform content replacements and signature verifications at line
rate.
The control messages which are used for communications between the AC and
the nodes (Figure 7.2) are unsolicited data packets. The names used in these
packets consist of a reserved name-prefix "/comon/", appended with either "AC",
if the packet is destined to the AC, or the identifier of the target node otherwise.
Being standard data packets, the AC and the nodes can determine whether control
messages are legitimate or not by verifying the contained signatures (Section 6.7).
7.4 Design Specifications
We describe in this section the design specifications of CoMon that are not detailed
in Section 7.3.2. In particular, we describe cache-aware routing (Section7.4.1),
caching-related decisions (Section 7.4.2), selection of monitoring nodes and
maximizing traffic coverage (Section 7.4.3), and a technique to reduce the
coordination overhead (Section 7.4.4).
7.4.1 Cache-aware Routing
CoMon implements Cache-Aware Routing (CAR) as follows:
1. Each interest packet is routed towards the corresponding origin content
provider till it encounters an MN.
2. Only that (the first encountered) MN checks whether the requested
content is among the currently cached contents or not (according to the
most recent global cache states). If not, the original route is preserved.
6 We use the term node in a generic way for referring to any node v ∈ V (i.e. either NN or
MN), and we use NN for referring to a node u without monitoring nor re-routing capabilities
(i.e. u ∈ V : u 6∈M).
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Otherwise, the MN adds the prefix "/comon/node-name" to the original
content name (where "node-name" is the ID of the matching node). For
example, if the content "/de.tu-darmstadt/dissertations/salah.pdf" is
cached atN7, the MN changes the name to "/comon/N7/de.tu-darmstadt/
dissertations/salah.pdf". Then, the MN re-routes the packet towards that
node.
3. In either case, the MN, before forwarding the packet, sets a "checked" flag,
so that next encountered MNs skip the aforementioned checking step.
CAR requires that each node stores |V | − 1 additional FIB entries: one entry
towards each of the other nodes in the AS network (so that all nodes can route
packets towards each other).
7.4.2 Caching-related Decisions
The AC is responsible for all caching decisions. More precisely, at the end of each
observation window (i.e. after receiving new monitoring reports from the MNs),
the AC calculates caching-related decisions according to the network-wide goals
specified by the network operator. In particular, the AC has to determine (i) the
contents that are given priority for caching and (ii) their locations in the network.
These two decisions implicitly determine the redundancy degree for each selected
content as well as its caching duration. That is, each cached copy is kept in the
cache till a more recent decision, implying that the content has to be evicted, is
taken.
CoMon is compatible with any network-wide goals. Without loss of generality,
we describe caching decisions using an exemplary network-wide goal: distributing
the most popular contents over the available cache space without duplication.
With this a goal, the network operator favours data availability over the hop count
required for data delivery inside the network. Similar network-wide caching goals
were adopted in several prior studies (e.g. [SLYJ13,BKST13]). We describe in
the following how CoMon implements the two aforementioned caching-related
decisions according to our exemplary goal.
Content Selection
The AC selects contents that are given priority for in-network caching by
maintaining a list containing the names of both the currently cached contents
and the recently monitored ones. The AC calculates the popularity score fi
for each content i and ranks the contents accordingly. Then (in line with the
aforementioned caching goal), the top-C ranked contents are selected for caching.
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Content-to-Cache Distribution
CoMon distributes contents to the caching nodes following the observations of
Wang et al. [WBK14], with the goal to increase the caching efficiency. In particular,
the authors observed that with our aforementioned exemplary caching goal, a
high caching efficiency can be achieved when most popular contents are placed in
the network core (i.e. on the nodes that have highest betweenness centrality (BC)
scores) while less popular contents are placed at the network edges [WBK14].7
Consequently, CoMon places contents in the network as follows: First, the BC
score of each node v ∈ V is calculated. Second, the nodes are sorted by their BC
scores in descending order. Third, the selected contents, ordered from most to
least popular, are assigned iteratively to the nodes.
7.4.3 Selection of Monitoring Nodes
Guided by the preset design requirements (Section 7.3.1), MNs should be selected
such that:
1. They intercept the entire network traffic. This is essential to collect accurate
content access information, thus to improve the quality of caching decisions.
2. Number of MNs (i.e. |M |) should be kept small. This is because with the
above described system operation, the signalling overhead of coordination
grows linearly with |M |, and the load on AC grows at least linearly with
|M |.
In general, there is a trade-off between the two conditions above. That is
to say, the selection algorithm either increases |M | till covering all routes, or it
selects a small |M | without guaranteeing full coverage.
We solve this trade-off in CoMon by (i) developing an algorithm that selects
a small number of MNs expected to cover the majority of network traffic, and
then (ii) enforcing each interest packets to pass through one of the selected MNs.
However, in NDN this design does not guarantee a full traffic coverage, because
interest packets can be filtered by caches and PITs before they encounter MNs.
Therefore, interest packets that are not monitored before should be forwarded
towards MNs even after they are consumed (by PITs or caches).
In the following, we first present our algorithm for selecting MNs. After that,
we describe how interest packets in CoMon are enforced to pass through MNs
(even after they are consumed by PITs or caches).
7 This observation assumes that both content popularity and BC scores exhibit power-law
characteristics. Otherwise, coupling between content popularity and network topology might
disappear.
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Selection Algorithm
Enforcing interest packets to pass through MNs likely will result in hop count
overhead (unless the resulting route is identical to the original one). To reduce
this overhead, we propose to select MNs not only according to their coverage, but
also to give preference for nodes that are located closely to clients.
The corresponding monitor selection problem can be formulated as follows:
"Given a network consisting of a set V of nodes, which set M ⊂ V should be
selected as MNs such that they together cover the majority of network traffic while
both |M | and hop count from clients to MNs are minimized".
Such a problem has been shown to be NP-hard [SGKT06]. Therefore, we
develop a new selection heuristic, called Placement based on covered Routes
and Closeness to Sources (PRCS). The pseudo-code of PRCS is provided in
Algorithm 4, and it can be outlined as follows:
1. Using Dijkstra’s algorithm [AMO93], identify the set R of shortest cost
paths from each consumer node to each content provider, and then identify
the set N of non-gateway nodes that are located on the identified routes
(lines: 3 – 7).
2. Calculate the weight W (n) for each node n ∈ N (lines: 12 – 15), summing
n’s partial weights on each route r ∈ R. Considering n’s closeness to the
beginning of the route (i.e. to the consumer node), its partial weight on r is
calculated as follows:
wr(n) =
1 +
hr(n)
l(r) , n is located on r
0, otherwise
where l(r) and hr(n) denote the length of r (i.e. hop count) and n’s position
on r, respectively. hr(n) takes the value 0 if n is located next to the gateway
node, and it is incremented by 1 with each hop towards the source otherwise.
This idea is inspired from [HYEN09].
3. The node with the maximum total weight is then selected as an MN
(lines: 16 – 20) and added to the set M (line: 22). The selected node
is removed from N (line: 23), and the routes on which it is located are
removed from R (line: 24).
4. Repeat step 2 and step 3 till the cardinality of M equals a predetermined
value p.
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Algorithm 4 Placement based on covered Routes and Closeness to Sources
(PRCS)
1: R← ∅ . Set of shortest cost paths
2: N ← ∅ . Set of non-gateway nodes
3: for each consumer-provider pair x do
4: Using Dijkstra’s algorithm [AMO93], find the shortest cost path Px
5: R← R ∪ Px
6: N ← N∪ non-gateway nodes on Px
7: end for
8: M ← ∅ . Set of MNs
9: while |M | ≤ p do
10: max← 0
11: for each node n in N do
12: W (n)← 0
13: for each route r in R do
14: W (n)←W (n) + wr(n)
15: end for
16: if max < W (n) then
17: max←W (n)
18: m← n
19: Z ← routes that n is located on
20: end if
21: end for
22: M ←M ∪ {m}
23: N ← N − {m}
24: R← R− Z
25: end while
Monitor-Aware Routing
Monitor-Aware Routing (MAR) modifies the original routing strategy such that
each interest packet crosses at least one MN. We propose two versions of MAR
(hereafter, MAR-V1 and MAR-V2). Both versions involve two routing steps, and
they differ in the first one.
In MAR-V1, the consumer node first routes each interest packet towards the
closest MN. To do that, each consumer node should have an additional FIB entry
pointing to the closest MN. The node name of the designated MN is added as a
prefix to the original content names of interest packets, so that the packets are
forwarded towards the designated MN. Next, once the designated MN receives an
interest packet, it removes the aforementioned prefix, and then routes the packet
either towards the matching local node if the content is cached or towards the
respective origin content provider otherwise. It is obvious that unless the default
path contains an MN, MAR-V1 results in additional routing hops.
MAR-V2 aims at minimizing the hop count overhead of MAR-V1. Towards this
end, the consumer nodes select the target MN (in the first routing step) according
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to the requested content name. This is done using the Finding-First-MN Procedure
(Algorithm 5), which we adapt from the Routing-with-Content-Filtering (RCF)
algorithm [KLS05]. More precisely, the consumer node in Algorithm 5 passes two
parameters to the procedure: (i) its own name and (ii) the name of the requested
content. The algorithm can be outlined as follows:
1. It first compares the shortest path costs of the matching paths (from the
consumer node towards the corresponding gateway node) 8 that contain
MNs (lines: 4 – 12).
The total path cost (line: 7) sums up two values: the cost from the consumer
node to the MN (line: 5) and the cost from the MN to the gateway node
(line: 6).
2. It then selects the path with the lowest cost (lines: 8 – 11).
3. Among the MNs that are located on the selected path, the name of the
consumer node’s closest MN is returned (line: 13). Then, the consumer node
updates its FIB accordingly.
Note that MAR-V1 reduces the number of FIB entries in NNs to |V | − 1, since
each NN needs only to reach the other |V | − 1 nodes (one of them is labelled as
closest MN). As for the MNs, the number of FIB entries is the same as when
MAR is disabled. The same applies for the number of FIB entries in NNs and
MNs when MAR-V2 is enabled.
Forward-Till-Be-Monitored
As discussed above, MAR alone cannot guarantee full traffic coverage. This is
because interest packets still can be consumed by a cache or can be captured by a
PIT before they encounter an MN. To eliminate the effects of these filters, CoMon
implements Forward-Till-Be-Monitored (FTBM), which works as follows:
1. When a node receives an interest packet that is not monitored yet (i.e.
checked = 0) and finds a matching data packet in its cache or a matching PIT
entry, the node (i) looks for the closest MN in its FIB, say "/comon/MNx",
(ii) adds the prefix "/comon/MNx/served" to the original name, and then
(iii) forwards the packet accordingly (to "MNx" in the example).
2. The designated MN (i) extracts the original content name, (ii) updates
content access information accordingly, and (iii) drops the packet. Note that
no states (i.e. PIT entries) are created for served interest packets.
8 We assume that each content’s origin provider is accessible through one gateway node only.
However, extending Algorithm 5 for multiple gateways is straightforward.
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Algorithm 5 Finding the best route’s first MN
1: // Find the best route from a consumer node s towards content’s corresponding
gateway node t that crosses one or more MNs. The procedure returns mc, the
closest MN to s.
2: procedure Finding-First-MN(s, t)
3: min_sum← largest_spc . spc: shortest path cost
4: for each MN m in M do
5: compute spc(s,m)
6: compute spc(m, t)
7: sum = spc(s,m) + spc(m, t)
8: if sum < min_sum then
9: min_sum← sum
10: mc ← m
11: end if
12: end for
13: Return mc
14: end procedure
The overhead of FTBM is measured by the hops traversed by the interest
packet from the moment it was served till it reached an MN. This overhead does
not apply for the respective data packet as the interest packet in this case is
already consumed.
7.4.4 Reducing the Frequency of Updates
Changing cache states after each observation window (according to the newly
calculated caching decisions) results in signalling overhead for exchanging caching
assignments from the AC to the nodes and global cache states from the AC to
the MNs. It also causes computational and memory access overhead of updating
the MNs’ FIBs and consequent content replacements in the caches.
In order to mitigate this overhead, CoMon implements a technique with which
the AC first calculates the feasibility of changing (FoC) the set Hc of currently
cached contents to the set Hn of newly selected contents:
FoC = 1−
∑
x∈Hc,x∈Hn
fx∑
y∈Hn
fy
where fx and fy denote the newly calculated popularity scores of contents x
and y, respectively. The AC then changes the current configurations only if the
resulted FoC value is above some threshold.
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7.5 Evaluation
Our evaluation consists of two parts: First, in Section 7.5.1, we evaluate PRCS
(our algorithm for selecting MNs) with respect to both the fraction of routes
covered by MNs and closeness of MNs to clients. Second, in Section 7.5.2, we
evaluate the caching efficiency gain that can be achieved with CoMon as well as
CoMon’s signalling and hop count overhead.
We fed the simulator with real ISP network topologies measured by the
Rocketfuel project [SMW02]. These topologies are commonly used by the
networking research community. In particular, we experimented with three network
topologies: AS-3967, AS-1755, and AS-3257. We summarize their properties in
Table 7.2 and plot them in Figure 7.3.
Table 7.2: Basic properties of the three ISP network topologies used in simulations
Network |V | |E| (bidir.) Diameter Avg. path length Avg. degree
AS-3967 79 147 10 4.08 3.72
AS-1755 87 161 11 4.53 3.7
AS-3257 161 328 10 4.2 4.08
  
(a) AS-3967
  
(b) AS-1755
  
(c) AS-3257
Figure 7.3: The three ISP network topologies used in simulations
7.5 EVALUATION 91
We repeated each experiment 20 times. At the beginning of each simulation
run, the simulator randomly picks d70%e of the nodes as consumer nodes and
three of the rest as gateway nodes.
7.5.1 PRCS: Coverage and Closeness to Sources
As we discussed in Section 7.4.3, PRCS is developed with the goal to select a small
number of monitoring nodes, close to clients, through which majority of network
traffic is expected to pass. We consequently evaluate PRCS with respect to (i) the
fraction of routes covered by MNs and (ii) closeness of MNs to consumer nodes.
Figure 7.4 plots the CDF of the fraction of covered routes as a function of the
number of MNs (as ranked by PRCS) for an exemplary simulation run. We also
compare PRCS with two baseline monitor selection algorithms: (i) betweenness
centrality (BC) and (ii) random selection.
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Figure 7.4: PRCS: Fraction of covered routes as a function of the number of monitoring
nodes (out of |V |)
For instance, in AS-3967 it can be seen that only 13 MNs (i.e. less than 17%
of the network nodes) are sufficient to cover all routes. That is to say, with those
MNs, it is guaranteed that on each route there exists at least one MN. In contrast,
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the top 13 BC-ranked nodes and the 13 nodes selected uniformly at random cover
only about 73% and 58% of the routes, respectively. The results in the two other
network topologies are even better: PRCS in AS-1755 and AS-3257 achieves the
same with only 9 MNs and 8 MNs (i.e. less than 10% and 5% of the network
nodes), respectively. Note that the aggregated knowledge of packets that can be
captured by these MNs is equivalent to the aggregate knowledge of all consumer
nodes (d70%e of the network nodes in our setup).
Table 7.3 summarizes statistics over 20 simulation runs for the percentage of
MNs that cover all routes. All results confirm the superiority of PRCS over BC
and random selection.
Table 7.3: PRCS statistics: percentage of MNs that cover all routes
AS-3967 AS-1755 AS-3257
Minimum (%) 13.28 10.01 4.48
Maximum (%) 17.95 14.82 6.83
Median (%) 16.01 12.35 5.33
Average (%) 15.86 12.47 5.53
Std. dev. 1.26 1.34 0.76
We plot in Figure 7.5 the CDF of the distances between the MNs (ranked
by PRCS) and consumer nodes. More precisely, for each route, we measure the
number of hops after the consumer node (towards the gateway node) till the
closest MN. We then normalize this distance by the hop count of the entire route.
We can see that the closest MN, for more than 80% of the routes in AS-3967 and
more than 70% of the routes in the other two network topologies, are located on
the first half of the route, i.e. closer to the consumer node than to the gateway.
It also can be seen that part of MNs (20% in AS-3967, 14.1% in AS-1755, and 7%
in AS-3257) are consumer nodes (i.e. distance = 0). Table 7.4 summarizes the
statistics over 20 simulation runs of the fraction of closest MNs that are located
on the first half of the route.
Table 7.4: PRCS statistics: fraction of the closest MNs located on the first half of the
route
AS-3967 AS-1755 AS-3257
Minimum (%) 77.85 69.54 66.09
Maximum (%) 84.25 78.70 75.17
Median (%) 81.93 74.80 71.97
Average (%) 81.42 74.29 71.64
Std. dev. 2.08 2.99 2.14
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Figure 7.5: PRCS: CDF of hops between consumer nodes and closest monitoring node
(normalised by route length)
Based on the results above, it is sensible to conclude that PRCS, to a high
extent, achieves the goals for which it was developed (Section 7.4.3). That is, it
enables to select few nodes that jointly cover the network traffic entirely and close
to clients.
7.5.2 CoMon: Caching Efficiency Gain and Overhead
We performed an extensive simulation study to evaluate both the caching efficiency
gain of CoMon and its overhead. In particular, we use the server hit ratio (as
defined in Section 7.1) to evaluate the caching efficiency9. Regarding the overhead,
we evaluate both (i) the hop count overhead of MAR and FTBM, and (ii) the
signalling overhead of control messages.
9 Note that CoMon maximizes the cache diversity and provides centralized control on
content replacements by design (Section 7.4). Therefore, we exclude those two metrics from our
evaluation.
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Simulation Setup
We simulated using ccnSim [CRR13], a highly scalable OMNeT++ based [OMN]
chunk-level simulator for NDN. ccnSim is primarily developed for caching
behaviour, and it offers several caching-related functionalities. It also implements
several cache management solutions. We adapted ccnSim to produce the behaviour
of CoMon. As baselines for comparison, we also simulated the original NDN system
and two notable prior solutions, namely: (i) probabilistic caching (ProbeCache)
[PCP12] and (ii) Leave Copy Down (LCD) [LCS06] (Section 7.2).
In each simulation run, 106 interest packets are generated from all clients.
Arrival of these packets is modelled as Poisson process as in realistic workloads
[MSB+15]. In order to increase the competition among the contents on the
available storage, we used small cache sizes with a uniform size of c = 10 contents
and a relatively large content population P = 100× C (i.e. 100 times the overall
cache space). Contents are permanently stored at servers that are located outside
the network, where each server is accessible via only one gateway node selected
randomly at the beginning of each simulation run. Following results of widely
accepted measurement studies (e.g. [CKR+07,HS08,BW02]), we modelled content
popularity as both Zipf distribution and Mandelbrot-Zipf (MZipf) distribution10
[Sil99]. However, since there is no consensus in the literature on the distribution
parameters, we performed simulations with varying values of α ∈ {0.5, 0.8, 1, 1.5, 2}.
In addition, we also simulated using MZipf’s parameters: α = 0.8, q = {5, 50}.
Note that with α ≤ 1 (and large q) we catch very bad cases of unpopular contents,
since the smaller α (and the larger q) the larger the number of contents that
represent the majority of client requests.
We simulated with a uniform data packet size of 1100 bytes. We selected such
a small size (even smaller than Ethernet’s maximum transfer unit) in order to not
bias the signalling overhead results (which are normalized over the size of data
packets). We set the observation window and FoC’s threshold to 60 seconds and
0.2, respectively. In a real network, however, both parameters should be adjusted
according to the network size and dynamically to the observed traffic volume. We
also selected as few as top d5%e PRCS-ranked nodes as MNs.
Server Hit Ratio
Figure 7.6 plots the server hit ratio (SHR) results of CoMon, NDN, LCD, and
ProbeCache in the three ISP network topologies with MAR-V1. These results
represent the minimum values (i.e. best SHR) achieved with NDN, LCD, and
10 MZipf distribution models the probability of accessing an item at rank i out of P items as
p(i) = K/(i+ q)α, where K =
P∑
i=1
1/(i+ q)α, α is the distribution skewness, and q ≥ 0 is the
so-called plateau factor. Zipf distribution is a special case of MZipf distributions with q = 0.
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ProbeCache and the maximum values (i.e. worst SHR) achieved with CoMon,
over 20 simulation runs. The results with MAR-V2 are very similar.
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Figure 7.6: Server hit ratio: CoMon vs. vanilla NDN, LCD, and probabilistic caching
We can see that CoMon significantly reduces the SHR in comparison to the
three other systems. This means that, with CoMon, the network traffic that
crosses other ASs (thus the transit costs) also decreases significantly. For instance,
in AS-3967 CoMon reduces the SHR of LCD (the best among the three other
systems) by about 30% for α = 0.8. Although the SHR results in the four systems
are better with other values α (i.e. less or more skewed popularity distribution),
CoMon is always the superior with a remarkable difference, except for very highly
skewed popularity distribution (α = 2). The SHR improvement achieved with
CoMon is relatively low at α = 0.5 since in this case the majority of interest
packets is associated with different content names (i.e. benefit of caching is low
in general). In contrast, at α ≥ 1.5 all systems perform well (even the vanilla
NDN). This is because the majority of interest packets correspond to a very small
fraction of contents, and it hence is consumed either by caches or PITs. That is
to say, utility of caching is low in this case. The improvements that are achieved
with CoMon in AS-1755 and AS-3257 are very similar.
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The superiority of CoMon confirms the utility of global cache coordination
(except when popularity is highly skewed). It enables to take efficient
caching-related decisions and to perform cache-aware routing, thus to maximize
the number of interest packets consumed by caches.
Next, we evaluate three overhead components: (i) the hop count overhead of
MAR, (ii) the hop count overhead of FTBM, and (iii) the signalling overhead of
control messages used for coordination.
Hop Count Overhead of MAR
We first measure the hop count overhead of MAR comparing three cases: (i) when
MAR is disabled, (ii) when MAR-V1 is enabled, and (iii) when MAR-V2 is enabled.
Figure 7.7 plots the CDF of the hop count distribution for the three cases. In order
to distinguish the hop count overhead of MAR from that of FTBM, we consider
the interest packets that are consumed by origin content provides (i.e. those
which travelled the entire path till gateway nodes). The plotted values of the first
two cases represent the simulation run with maximum average hop count (among
20 runs), while the plotted values of the third case represent the simulation run
with minimum average hop count. Table 7.5 reports the corresponding statistics.
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Figure 7.7: Hop count overhead of MAR
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Table 7.5: Hop count statistics of MAR
No MAR MAR-V2 MAR-V1
AS-3967
Minimum 1 1 1
Maximum 7 7 7
Median 4 4 4
Average 3.65 4.26 4.44
Std. dev. 1.44 1.15 1.38
AS-1755
Minimum 1 1 1
Maximum 10 10 10
Median 5 5 5
Average 4.54 5.38 5.38
Std. dev. 1.66 1.94 1.93
AS-3257
Minimum 1 1 1
Maximum 8 9 9
Median 4 4 4
Average 3.83 4.16 4.54
Std. dev. 1.32 1.33 1.62
The results in general show that the hop count overhead of MAR is small,
and that MAR-V2 slightly outperforms MAR-V1. More precisely, the median
hop count values are the same in the three cases, while the average hop count
increases only slightly when MAR is enabled. For instance, in AS-3967 the average
hop count increases from 3.65 to 4.26 and 4.44 with MAR-V2 and MAR-V1,
respectively. Similar hop count overhead is caused by MAR in the two other
network topologies.
We attribute the results above (i.e. low hop count overhead caused by MAR) to
the PRCS’ strategy of giving preference for nodes that are located close to clients.
As for the superiority of MAR-V2 over MAR-V1, it is attributed to MAR-V2’s
strategy of selecting routes of interest packets according to the requested content
name (rather than simply forwarding packets directly to the closest MN).
Hop Count Overhead of FTBM
We now evaluate the hop count overhead of FTBM. As discussed in Section 7.4.3,
this overhead affects only interest packets that are consumed by caches or PITs
before they are monitored. Therefore, we measure this overhead when content
popularity is modelled as Zipf distribution with α = 2. In this scenario, as we
discussed above, the majority of interest packets are consumed by caches or PITs.
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Figure 7.8 plots the hop count distribution both when FTBM is disabled and
when it is enabled. More precisely, to capture the highest overhead, the plotted
values with FTBM represent the simulation run with maximum average hop count,
while the values without FTBM represent the run with minimum average hop
count. We summarize the corresponding statistics in Table 7.6.
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Figure 7.8: Hop count overhead of FTBM
The results show that FTBM causes low to intermediate hop count overhead.
Comparing the average values, we can see that the hop count overhead ranges from
27.2% (increased in AS-1755 from 3.46 to 4.40) to 52.6% (increased in AS-3257
from 2.53 to 3.86). Recall that we measured this overhead with highly skewed
content popularity distribution (as can be seen in Figure 7.8, 37.7% to 59.2% of
interest packets were consumed after one hop only). The hop count overhead of
FTBM was lower with less skewed content popularity distributions.
Signalling Overhead
We measure the signalling overhead of coordination by normalizing the total
number of bytes of control messages (the three message types in Figure 7.2) over
the total number of bytes of regular data packets. Figure 7.9 plots the results
for the three network topologies. The plotted values represent the maximum
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Table 7.6: Hop count statistics of FTBM
No FTBM With FTBM
AS-3967 Minimum 1 1
Maximum 10 10
Median 2 4
Average 3.08 4.32
Std. dev. 2.40 1.69
AS-1755 Minimum 1 1
Maximum 12 12
Median 3 4
Average 3.46 4.40
Std. dev. 2.42 1.72
AS-3257 Minimum 1 1
Maximum 11 11
Median 1 4
Average 2.53 3.86
Std. dev. 2.08 1.34
signalling overhead observed in 20 simulation runs.
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Figure 7.9: Signalling overhead of control messages
Altogether, the results show that the signalling overhead incurred by control
messages is very small. The worst result is associated with AS-3257 at α = 0.5,
with a normalized signalling overhead of about 11% only.
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More generally, the signalling overhead increases with the network size and with
the plateau factor (q), and it decreases with the popularity skewness parameter
(α). These results are to be expected. In particular, the overhead increases with
the network size because the number of MNs also increases with the network
size. As such, the volume of information exchanged between the AC and MNs
(messages labelled ”1” and ”3” in Figure 7.2) increases almost linearly with the
number of MNs. In addition, the overhead increase with q and decreases with α
because the number of observed contents (the main factor that determines the
size of control messages labelled ”1”) also increases with q and decreases with α.
To sum up, both the hop count overhead of MAR and the signalling overhead of
coordination are low. FTBM also results in low to intermediate hop count overhead.
Nevertheless, we argue that the achieved caching efficiency gain (represented by a
remarkable SHR improvement) pays off this overhead.
7.6 Summary
We presented in this chapter a coordination framework for NDN called CoMon.
CoMon fulfils its preset design requirements (Section 7.3.1). Table 7.7 summarizes
the design elements and features that enable CoMon to fulfil these requirements.
Table 7.7: CoMon (coordinated caching): Mapping design elements to the requirements
R1 R2 R3
The AC takes decisions in a centralized way X X
The AC has network-wide information X
MAR & FTBM enable for full traffic coverage X
The AC shares the global cache state with MNs X
PRCS gives preference for nodes close to clients X
Monitoring and cache-aware routing are performed
by a small number of nodes
X
The FoC technique reduces the frequency of updates X
Each packet is checked only once X
Through simulations, we showed that CoMon realizes effective, yet lightweight,
coordination on AS-wide scale. In particular, we employed CoMon for coordinating
caching decisions. CoMon, incurring very low signalling overhead and low to
intermediate hop count overhead, enables to achieve a remarkable caching efficiency
improvement in comparison both to the vanilla NDN and to prior solutions.
We show in the next chapter that the design concepts of CoMon can be applied
to address another problem in NDN: the detection and mitigation of a new type
of DDoS attack known as the Interest Flooding Attack (IFA).
8
Coordinated Defence Against Interest
Flooding in NDN
The work that we present in this chapter is stimulated from a systematic
vulnerability of a new technology that is proposed to replace the current Internet.
In particular, we focus on an NDN-tailored DDoS attack coined in the literature
with the name Interest Flooding Attack (IFA). It has been experimentally shown
that IFA is relatively easy and cheap to perform, and that it is able to degrade the
QoE of users significantly [CCGT13,AMM+13]. The attack aims at flooding the
network and obstructing the service received by legitimate users. Towards this
end, the adversary misuses two design properties of NDN: (i) routing based on
longest name-prefix match and (ii) storing a forwarding state per interest packet
in the Pending Interest Table (PIT). In more detail, the adversary sends interest
packets with unique fake content names targeting name space(s). Consequently,
one PIT entry is created per interest packet in each NDN node on the path. These
entries stay in the PITs till they expire at the end. Succeeding to overload some
or all PITs results in dropping legitimate interest packets.
Despite the considerable amount of research on IFA, proposed defence
mechanisms (e.g. see [GTUZ13, CCGT13, AMM+13, GCFE13, DWFL13] and
the references therein) have one or more of the following drawbacks: First, attack
detection is difficult close to sources especially for distributed low-rate IFAs.
This is because the observable amount of traffic is relatively small. In contrast,
detection close to the attack targets is likely not robust due to the large volume
of attack traffic. Second, legitimate traffic can be damaged because proposed
reactions do not distinguish legitimate packets from malicious ones. Third, every
node is required to perform attack detection and mitigation. Consequently,
independent or not well coordinated decisions can result in inaccurate attack
detection, overreactions, or inequitable punishments [AMM+13]. Collaborative
mechanisms also result in high signalling overhead.
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The main contribution that we present in this chapter is a new defence
mechanism against IFA. The mechanism detects and mitigates IFAs in a
coordinated way. This is done based on aggregated and timely knowledge of
content access information and forwarding states of interest packets.
In practice, we adapt CoMon, our framework for coordination in NDN. This
choice is motivated by CoMon’s ability to realize coordination that is efficient and
feasible. This was showed in Chapter 7 in which we developed CoMon initially to
coordinate caching-related decisions in NDN on AS-wide scale. Using the design
concepts of CoMon, IFAs are detected and mitigated in our defence mechanism by
the monitoring nodes (MNs) with the aid of the centralized AS controller (AC).
8.1 Interest Flooding Attack
Despite the built-in security features of NDN (Section 6.7), its design opens the
door for new types of attacks [AHZ15]. Among those, the Interest Flooding attack
(IFA) is harmful, and it is relatively easy to perform with rather limited resources.
IFA can be mounted by taking advantage of two NDN’s properties: (i) storing a
forwarding state per interest packet in each node on the path and (ii) routing by
longest name-prefix match.
In practice, the adversary (through distributed bots) produces a large number
of interest packets and inserts them into the network. With such an attack,
the adversary aims at (i) overloading PITs of NDN nodes and/or (ii) immersing
the targeted content provider so they cannot handle legitimate interest packets.
Note that since contents in NDN are requested by their names (rather than IP
addresses), it is difficult to attack specific hosts or nodes in the network. Instead,
the adversary can easily target content providers through their name spaces.
IFAs are classified, according to the interest packets used in the attacks, into
three types [GTUZ13]. In particular, interest packets can be used to request (i)
existing, (ii) dynamically-generated, or (iii) non-existent content. Caches of NDN
nodes provide a built-in mitigation for type (i). The attack in type (ii) aims both
at exhausting resources of origin content providers on serving malicious interest
packets as well as at consuming nodes’ PITs. However, its impact on PITs is
eliminated once the corresponding data packets are received. In type (iii), as can
be seen in the example in Figure 8.1, the adversary targets a specific name space1
(e.g. "/de.tu-darmstadt/"), by producing interest packets with name-prefixes
belonging to the targeted name space (e.g. "/de.tu-darmstadt/dissertations/")
appended by a unique suffix per packet. The name suffixes are chosen such that
the resulted content names are fake, i.e. they will not be satisfied. Consequently,
1 This way, the malicious interest packets are routed towards and as close to the origin data
provider (i.e. the victim) as possible, which increases the effectiveness of the attack [AMM+13].
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a PIT entry is created per fake interest packet in each node on the path. Note that
the total number of unique fake interest packets sent during the attack represents
an upper bound on the amount of memory that can be exhausted in the PITs of
victim nodes. Note also that the closer the node to the content provider responsible
for the targeted name space, the more the fake interest packets that the node
receives, thus the larger the impact of the attack on its memory. Since malicious
interest packets are non-satisfiable, the corresponding PIT entries remain till they
eventually expire. Due to the aforementioned consequences of type (iii), it is
considered the most harmful type of IFA. We focus on this type only, and we
associate it with the name IFA from now onwards.
  
“/de/tu-darmstadt/”
PIT1
PIT0
PIT3
N1
N0
N3
Malicious interest Legitimate interest Data packet
C0
C1
C2
N2
PIT2
Content 
Provider
Figure 8.1: Example of IFA: All interest packets use the same name-prefix
"/de.tu-darmstadt/", thus are routed towards the same server. At the beginning, C0
and C1 concurrently issue one interest packet each, using the same suffix. Hence, both
packets are aggregated, i.e. they hold a single PIT entry in each bypassed node. The
created entries are eliminated once the corresponding data packet arrives. After that,
the five adversaries issue malicious interest packets (10 in total) almost concurrently.
Each of those packets uses a unique non-existent suffix. Consequently, a single PIT
entry is created per malicious interest packet in each bypassed router, staying till it
expires. Next, before the entries that correspond to the malicious interest packets expire,
C2 issues a legitimate interest packet. Assuming a PIT capacity of 10, this packet is
dropped by N3 because N3’s PIT is full.
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8.2 Related Work
We restrict the discussion in this section to prior work on IFA. For a broad overview
of research on security of NDN and other ICN architectures, the reader is referred
to [AHZ15].
IFA was discussed for the first time by Lauinger [Lau10]. After that, Gasti et
al. [GTUZ13] detailed IFA’s operation and types. Both studies suggested tentative
defence mechanisms against IFA. Evaluations of those mechanisms, however, were
left for future research. Afterwards, several studies evaluated the effectiveness of
IFA, and they agreed on the necessity to protect nodes and content providers in
NDN against such an attack. These studies also proposed and evaluated several
defence mechanisms against IFA. The proposed mechanisms can be classified as
either autonomous or collaborative.
On the one hand, in the autonomous mechanisms, each individual node detects
attacks based on its local view of network traffic and/or PIT usage. For instance,
an attack is detected when the observed ratio of unsatisfied interest packets (or PIT
expiration rate) exceeds a preset threshold. Then, a reaction (e.g. dropping part
of suspicious incoming interest packets) is taken by each node independently. Such
mechanisms, although being simple and inexpensive, have three key drawbacks:
First, attack detection is difficult close to attack sources, because the amount of
received traffic (thus the effect of the attack) is small. This is particularly true
for distributed low-rate IFAs. Late detection and reaction, in contrast, take place
after wasting lots of resources in several regions of the network, and likely cannot
prevent the attack before it causes a big damage. Secondly, independent attack
reactions may result in overreactions or inequitable punishments [AMM+13]. The
third drawback is that applied detection algorithms do not distinguish malicious
interest packets from legitimate ones. Hence, they may harm legitimate traffic.
Notable examples of autonomous mechanisms include [GCFE13],
satisfaction-based acceptance [AMM+13], and the autonomous version of
Poseidon [CCGT13]. Widjaja [Wid12] presented another autonomous mechanism
with a unique approach. In particular, the author proposed to defend against
IFAs by removing the PIT completely from the node model. Instead, nodes cache
interest packets in the cache store as regular data packets. Such a mechanism,
however, makes indexing and forwarding of interest packets more complicated,
and it hence was considered impractical [WZQZ14].
In the collaborative countermeasures, on the other hand, nodes exchange
information about their local observations and taken reactions. This information
is used by the nodes to update parameters related to attack detection (e.g. some
thresholds) and reaction decisions (e.g. percentage of dropped interest packets).
By this, the nodes can detect and mitigate attacks faster (i.e. while they are in
progress) and close to their sources. This applies for Interest Traceback [DWFL13]
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and pushback-like mechanisms such as satisfaction-based pushback [AMM+13],
Cooperative-Filter [WZQZ14], and the collaborative version of Poseidon [CCGT13].
These mechanisms, although outperform their autonomous counterparts, still suffer
from one or more of the aforementioned drawbacks. Furthermore, they incur high
overhead.
8.3 Design Requirements and Overview
8.3.1 Design Requirements
We aim to achieve effective defence against IFAs that can overcome the drawbacks
of prior defence mechanisms. Towards this end, we guide the design of our defence
mechanism by the following requirements:
R1) IFAs should be detected based on aggregated (can be network-wide)
information of packets transmitted and corresponding forwarding states.
Such information enables accurate attack detection, even for low-rate IFAs.
R2) Both the detection and the mitigation of IFAs should be performed at an
early stage close to the attack sources (before malicious interest packets
consume lots of resources).
R3) Both duplicate attack detections and overreactions should be avoided.
R4) The mechanism should be able to distinguish between legitimate interest
packets and malicious ones to avoid damaging legitimate traffic.
R5) The mechanism should induce a low overhead.
8.3.2 Architeture and Operation Primitives
Our goal is to realize a defence mechanism against IFA that fulfils all above
requirements on AS-wide scale. However, as we discussed in Chapter 7, the
distributed nature of ASs in addition to the huge volume and high dynamics
of coordination-related information (i.e. information to be aggregated and
disseminated) render such a solution impractical.
We addressed a similar challenge in Chapter 7 (coordinating caching-related
decisions on AS-wide scale) by CoMon, a framework for coordination in NDN.
Motivated by CoMon’s results in which we showed its ability to realize effective
and lightweight coordination, we decided to use its design concepts as a basis for
our defence mechanism against IFA.
By adapting CoMon, our solution relies on a small number of NDN nodes to
monitor network traffic and forwarding states of interest packets. Attacks are
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detected either by the MNs with the aid of the AC (which aggregates observations
of all MNs). Reaction to potential attacks is then performed by the MNs. Similar
to the original CoMon framework, MNs are selected such that the entire network
traffic passes (or is enforced to pass) through at least one of them, at an early
stage. This way, their unique observations jointly represent the entire network,
and they can detect and react to attacks quickly.
More particularly, our solution (as in the original CoMon framework) is
designed to work within an AS. Each AS network consists of a set V of nodes.
We use the same principal elements of CoMon (Figure 8.2): an AC, NNs (NDN
Nodes), and MNs.
  
NN
Content
Providers
NN
NN
AC
MN
MN
       Observed interests and their forwarding states          Attack-related Information (AS-wide)
NN
2 2
1
1
21
NN
NN
Figure 8.2: System architecture and the control messages used in the coordinated
defence against IFAs: "AC" stands for AS Controller, "NN" stands for NDN Node, and
"MN" stands for Monitoring Node
We describe now how CoMon is adapted to provide a coordinated defence
against IFAs:
1. The AC collects monitoring reports about exchanged packets and
corresponding forwarding states from a predetermined set of MNs. It uses
this information to detect attacks on AS-wide scale. After that, the AC
shares attack-related information with the MNs.
2. NNs are similar to standard NDN nodes. They mainly perform routing and
caching tasks only.
3. MNs (a set M ⊂ V ), in addition to the functions of regular NDN nodes,
monitor interest packets passing through them, and they check whether
these packets are satisfied (by data packets) or not. Consequently, the
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MNs compute expiration rates of their PIT entries per incoming interface.
When the expiration rate exceeds some preset threshold, the corresponding
incoming interface(s) and name-prefixe(s) are considered infected.
The MNs periodically report summaries of their observations and results to
the AC. The AC in turn sends the MNs a feedback summarizing information
of attacks ongoing over the entire AS. The MNs also are responsible for
mitigating potential IFAs.
8.4 Design Specifications
We describe in this section the design specifications of our solution that are not
discussed in Section 8.3.2.
8.4.1 Detection of IFAs
IFAs are basically detected by each MN independently. The corresponding
detection algorithm can be outlined as follows:
1. MN m continuously monitors the utilization of its PIT, arriving interest
packets, and corresponding PIT entries. As mentioned in Section 7.4.1,
the MNs do not monitor previously monitored interest packets (i.e. when
the flag checked = 1). This way, duplicate detection is avoided in our
mechanism.
2. MN m calculates the PIT utilization ratio U(m, q). This ratio represents the
maximum number of PIT entries observed during the observation window q,
divided by the PIT size.2
3. MN m calculates the PIT expiration rate E(mf , q) per incoming interface f
over the observation window q, as follows:
E(mf , q) =
e(mf , q)
e(mf , q) + s(mf , q)
(8.1)
where e(mf , q) and s(mf , q) represent the corresponding counts of expired
and satisfied PIT entries, respectively. As mentioned above, both values
consider only PIT entries that correspond to interest packets not monitored
before (i.e. the value of checked = 0).
2 The observation window here refers to the time period after which the MNs (i) check
existence of attacks (i.e. triggers the detection function) and (ii) send monitoring reports to the
AC.
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The two detection parameters above are similar to the ones which were used
in [WZQZ14]. However, aiming to achieve better detection, our detection
algorithm employs them differently. In particular, our mechanism computes
them based on aggregate data and without repetitions.
4. MNm triggers the reaction function at the end of q if E(mf , q) is positive and
U(m, q) exceeds a threshold τ . In this case, m identifies the name-prefixes
of expired PIT entries. Those name-prefixes as well as the interface f are
then considered infected. The MN then calculates the PIT expiration rate
E(mjf , q) for each infected name-prefix j (calculated as in Eq. 8.1, but only
for entries with prefix j). Next, m sends a report to the AC including its
observations and detection results (Figure 8.2).
To minimize false positives, due to transient failures in accessing the network
or delivery of packets, τ should be given a large value. However, such a setting
reduces the sensitivity of the detection function for low-rate IFAs. We address
this problem by implementing an additional, AS-wide, detection in our defence
mechanism performed by the AC. The corresponding algorithm consists of the
following steps:
1. The AC aggregates the monitoring information that it received from the
MNs at the end of the observation window q.
2. For each name-prefix j, the AC calculates the ratio Q(j, q) which represents
the maximum number of corresponding expired PIT entries divided by the
PIT space. Q(j, q) considers only PIT entries corresponding to interest
packets that are monitored first by the MN which sent the report. This way,
Q(j, q) represents an upper bound on the PIT entries that can be occupied
in any subsequent node by interest packets with name-prefix j.
3. If Q(j, q) exceeds a threshold γ, j is considered infected.
4. The AC informs the MNs about the infected name-prefixes. Each MN, in
turn, calculates the expiration rate for each of those name-prefixes on all
incoming interfaces and then triggers the reaction function accordingly.
8.4.2 Reaction Against Potential IFAs
When triggered, the reaction lasts along the next observation window. The
pseudo-code of the reaction function is provided in Algorithm 6.
In essence, the PIT expiration rate is used to determine the probability of
rejecting (i.e. dropping) incoming interest packets. We adapted this idea from the
satisfaction-based acceptance mechanism [AMM+13], motivated by its simplicity.
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Algorithm 6 Reaction against potential IFAs
1: J ← infected name-prefixes observed on interface f during observation window q
2: procedure Reaction(f, J)
3: while receiving interest packets on f do
4: for each interest packet I do
5: if checked = 0 & I ∈ J & I 6∈ A then . A: Satisfied interests ∈ J
6: Drop I with probability P (E(mjf , q)) . P (a) = a (∀ a ∈ [0, 1])
7: end if
8: end for
9: end while
10: end procedure
Our solution, however, is more generic as it can incorporate any other reaction
strategy. The function uses a uniform probability distribution model, and it is
applied in our algorithm on each infected interface per name-prefix (line: 6), while
[AMM+13] disregards the name-prefix granularity.
Before applying the strategy above, the algorithm first (line: 5) excludes (i.e.
directly accepts) interest packets that are (i) checked earlier by another MN, (ii)
not belonging to an infected name-prefix, or (iii) satisfied earlier (i.e. returned
a data packet). These exceptions aim at fulfilling the design requirements R3
and R4 (Section 8.3.1). In particular, by directly accepting previously monitored
interest packets (exception (i)), duplicate detection and overreactions are avoided.
As for exceptions (ii) and (iii), they are included to avert dropping legitimate
interest packets. More precisely, both interest packets that do not belong to
infected name-prefixes (exception (ii)) as well as those that were satisfied earlier
(exception (iii)) should be accepted directly since they are surely not part of an
attack.
8.5 Evaluation
We performed a simulation study to evaluate both the effectiveness of our defence
mechanism and its signalling overhead. We first describe the setup and evaluation
parameters. After that, we discuss the results.
8.5.1 Simulation Setup
ccnSim (the simulator that we used in Chapter 7 for implementing and evaluating
CoMon) is developed foremost to study caching efficiency, and it implements PIT
and content names in an elementary way. Hence, ccnSim (without substantial
changes) is not suitable to simulate neither IFA nor defence mechanisms. Instead,
we decided to implement both IFA and our defence mechanism in ndnSIM
[AMZ+12], an implementation of NDN for the NS-3 network simulator [NS3].
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ndnSIM implements most NDN design elements as they are described in [JST+09],
and it was used in many related studies. We also used ndnSIM to simulate the
satisfaction-based pushback (SBP) mechanism [AMM+13] (which was considered
an effective defence mechanism).
We fed the simulator with the three ISP network topologies that we described
in Section 7.5. At the beginning of each simulation run, d70%e of the nodes
are selected as consumer nodes and three of the rest are selected as gateway
nodes. Attackers accessed the network through d25%e of consumer nodes. Those
selections were performed uniformly at random. Each legitimate client requests
existing contents with a rate of 100 interest packets per second (ipps). In contrast,
each attacker requests non-existent contents at higher rates. In particular, we
experimented with several attack rates ranging from 200 ipps to 20000 ipps.
However, the influences of attack rates lower than 300 ipps were very small. As
for attack rates above 5000 ipps, their influences were nearly the same without
defence: the large majority of legitimate interest packets were dropped. Therefore,
we show and discuss only the results of two attack rates representing two main
cases: 500 ipps (low) and 10000 ipps (massive).
We used a uniform PIT size of 5000 entries, a PIT timeout period of 2 seconds,
and a uniform data packet size of 1100 bytes3. Each simulation run lasted for 540
simulation seconds. The attack started at the beginning of the 61st second and
stopped at end of the 360th second. This duration was long enough to examine
both the influence of the attack and the effectiveness of the defence mechanisms.
We configured the observation window in the MNs to 10 seconds. In a real
network, this value should be adjusted according to the network size, as well as
dynamically to the observed traffic volume and attack rate. As we discussed in
Section 8.4.1, τ and γ (both ∈ (0, 1]) should be assigned relatively small and
large values, respectively. In our experiments, we set τ to 0.3 and γ to 0.5. The
simulator selected the top d10%e PRCS-ranked nodes as MNs.
We repeated each experiment 20 times and obtained nearly the same results
from repeated runs. We plot the results of one exemplary simulation run for each
experiment, and we also provide the main statistics of the corresponding 20 runs.
8.5.2 Evaluation Metrics
We use the following three metrics to evaluate our solution. The first two measures
the effectiveness against IFAs, while the third measures the signalling overhead.
1. Satisfaction ratio of legitimate interest packets: This metric is an indicator
for the QoE of legitimate clients during the attack period.
3 As mentioned in Section 7.5.2, we selected such a small packet size to not bias the signalling
overhead results.
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2. Network-wide PIT usage: It refers to the utilization ratio of the overall PIT
space. This metric is an indicator for the impact of the attack on the usage
of PIT (the main resource targeted by IFA).
3. Signalling overhead: It is measured by normalizing the number of bytes used
by defence-related messages (Figure 8.2) over the number of bytes used by
regular data packets.
8.5.3 Results
Effectiveness Against IFAs
We plot in Figure 8.3 the satisfaction ratio of legitimate interest packets in the
three topologies, under each of the two aforementioned attack rates.
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Figure 8.3: Satisfaction ratio of legitimate interest packets under two attack rates
(attack period: seconds 61 – 360)
A defence mechanism is considered effective if it can remarkably raise the
satisfaction ratio of legitimate interest packets, while the network is under attack.
We compare the results of three systems: (i) the vanilla NDN system (i.e. without
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defence), (ii) NDN with our defence mechanism, (iii) NDN with satisfaction-based
pushback (SBP) [AMM+13]. We plot the reported satisfaction ratio of legitimate
interest packets before the attack, during the attack (second 61 – second 360), and
after the attack. The satisfaction ratios were reported every 20 seconds. Table 8.1
summarizes the main related statistics during the attack period calculated over
20 simulation runs.
Table 8.1: Satisfaction ratio of legitimate interests during attack periods
SBP CoMon
Attack rate (ipps) Attack rate (ipps)
500 10000 500 10000
AS-3967 Minimum 80.47 14.53 93.64 60.40
Maximum 90.92 18.29 99.68 69.37
Median 85.64 16.37 96.40 65.49
Average 85.54 16.37 96.52 65.31
Std. dev. 2.83 1.08 1.86 2.94
AS-1755 Minimum 87.91 13.90 94.24 66.45
Maximum 97.49 16.71 99.78 73.77
Median 90.25 15.01 97.12 70.04
Average 90.38 15.07 96.97 70.09
Std. dev. 1.56 0.72 1.65 2.31
AS-3257 Minimum 67.94 11.65 85.33 62.43
Maximum 74.44 17.21 91.87 69.29
Median 71.98 14.25 88.46 66.57
Average 72.01 14.37 88.40 66.32
Std. dev. 1.46 1.62 2.07 2.26
The improvement which is achieved with our defence mechanism is obvious:
during the attack period, legitimate interest packets achieve much higher
satisfaction ratio with our mechanism. The highest improvement can be seen
in the AS-3967 network topology: the average satisfaction ratio raises with our
mechanism from about 59% to about 96% under a low attack rate, and it raises
from about 23% to about 65% under a massive attack rate. In contrast, the
average satisfaction ratios that are achieved with SBP under the low and massive
attack rates are only about 86% and 16%, respectively. Although the values are
slightly different in the other two network topologies, the conclusion above holds
for them: our mechanism significantly improves the satisfaction ratios of legitimate
interest packets and remarkably outperforms SBP. Note that the impact of SBA
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under massive attack rates becomes negative! This is likely because SBP does not
distinguish between malicious and legitimated interest packet.
The effectiveness of our mechanism against IFAs is also confirmed by the results
of the second metric: Figure 8.4 shows that our defence mechanism lowers the
global (i.e. network-wide) PIT usage during the attack period. For instance, the
PIT usage in the AS-3967 network topology is reduced from about 16% to about
11% under attack rate of 500 ipps and from about 36% to about 29% under attack
rate of 10000 ipps. Similar reductions (although with slightly lower values in some
cases) can be seen in the results of the other two network topologies. Table 8.2
summarizes the main related statistics for the corresponding 20 simulation runs.
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Figure 8.4: Global PIT usage under two attack rates (attack period: seconds 61 – 360)
Note that the adversary nodes in our setup issue malicious interest packets
through only 0.25× 0.7 = 0.175 of the nodes to target just one content provider
(accessible through one out of three gateway nodes). Therefore, it is likely that
there are several nodes not locating on the paths which are used by malicious
interest packets, and they hence are not affected by the attack. Such nodes,
however, are also counted when calculating the global PIT usage. This explains
why the improvement values which are reported by the second metric are smaller
than those which are reported by the first metric.
In addition to the effectiveness of our mechanism, it is important to note
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Table 8.2: Statistics of global PIT usage during attack periods
Without defence CoMon
Attack rate (ipps) Attack rate (ipps)
500 10000 500 10000
AS-3967 Minimum 13.99 35.93 9.03 26.01
Maximum 16.79 37.73 12.59 31.96
Median 15.57 36.08 11.07 29.13
Average 15.54 36.01 11.04 28.97
Std. dev. 0.87 1.13 1.09 1.67
AS-1755 Minimum 14.15 35.32 10.50 26.15
Maximum 17.49 42.69 13.44 34.52
Median 16.06 39.21 12.25 30.39
Average 15.99 39.04 12.23 30.63
Std. dev. 1.11 2.09 0.93 2.62
AS-3257 Minimum 8.89 25.01 8.52 19.70
Maximum 14.01 33.99 12.98 23.37
Median 11.35 29.36 10.59 21.47
Average 11.51 29.48 10.69 21.49
Std. dev. 1.42 2.60 1.38 1.07
its high responsiveness: the results in Figure 8.3 and Figure 8.4 show that the
reaction against potential IFAs start very shortly after the beginning of the attack,
and it also stops very shortly after the end of the attack. This indicates that
our detection algorithm results in very few false positives. That is to say, the
defence mechanism rarely harms legitimate packets even while the network is free
of attacks.
Signalling Overhead
Last but not least, we plot the signalling overhead that is incurred by our defence
mechanism during an exemplary simulation run in Figure 8.5. We also summarize
the main related statistics of 20 simulation runs in Table 8.3. We can see that
the overhead is very marginal both when no attack exists as well as during the
attack period. We also can see that the signalling overhead is higher during the
attack period, and it increases with the attack rate. This is because the amount
of information that is exchanged between the AC and the MNs (e.g. observed
content names and their information) also increases with the attack rate. Note
also that the signalling overhead reported here is even smaller than the overhead
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that is reported in Figure 7.9. This is mainly because coordination in the case of
defending against IFAs does not involve sending information from the AC to the
NNs4. In addition, the amount of information exchanged between the AC and the
MNs is larger in the cache coordination case.
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Figure 8.5: Signalling overhead under two attack rates (attack period: seconds 61 – 360)
Table 8.3: Statistics of signalling overhead (percentage) during attack periods
Attack rate (ipps)
500 10000
AS-3967 Minimum 0.03001 0.05126
Maximum 0.03098 0.05890
Median 0.03050 0.05511
Average 0.03050 0.05522
Std. dev. 0.00028 0.00223
AS-1755 Minimum 0.0116 0.02612
Maximum 0.0157 0.03120
Median 0.0137 0.02846
Average 0.0137 0.02865
Std. dev. 0.0012 0.00144
AS-3257 Minimum 0.03789 0.04440
Maximum 0.04043 0.04945
Median 0.03945 0.04813
Average 0.03944 0.04808
Std. dev. 0.00017 0.00041
4 In the cache coordination case, the AC sends each NN the corresponding cache assignments.
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8.6 Summary
We presented in this chapter a new defence mechanism for the so-called Interest
Flooding Attack in NDN. The attack detection is basically performed by a small
number of monitoring nodes, from which a network-wide knowledge of traffic
and forwarding states can be acquired, with the aid of a centralized controller.
Reactions against potential attacks are also performed by the monitoring nodes.
Table 8.4 summarizes the design elements and features that enable our solution
to fulfil its preset design requirements (Section 8.3.1).
Table 8.4: CoMon (coordinated defence): Mapping design elements to the requirements
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5
The AC has network-wide information and
shares it with the MNs
X
MAR and FTBM enable for full traffic
coverage
X
Placement of the MNs near clients X
Only first MN reacts to potential attacks
(per packet)
X X
Each packet is checked only once X X
Detection per name-prefix X
Satisfied interests are always accepted X
Monitoring and main defence tasks are
performed by a small number of the MNs
X
No explicit coordination among the nodes X
Through extensive simulations, we showed that the proposed mechanism incurs
negligible signalling overhead, and that it is highly effective against IFAs: with our
defence mechanism, the large majority of legitimate interest packets were satisfied
under a low attack rate. Under a massive attack rate, the achieved satisfaction
ratio was above intermediate (nearly 65% – 70%). In all experiments, our defence
mechanism significantly outperformed a former solution which was considered
effective.
The effectiveness of our defence mechanism can be improved (particularly
under massive attack rates) by enforcing clients to lower their interest packet rates
when the observed attack rate exceeds a certain threshold. We leave the design
details and evaluation of this extension for future work.
9
Summary and Outlook
In this chapter, we first conclude our work with a summary of the presented
contributions and results. Finally, we suggest possibilities for future work.
9.1 Summary
We dealt in this dissertation with two systems: (i) Kademlia, the most popular
P2P system today, and (ii) NDN, a potential architecture for the future Internet.
Both systems aim to achieve efficient content distribution over the Internet. We
structured the dissertation accordingly into two parts. We summarize Part 1 and
Part 2 in Section 9.1.1 and Section 9.1.2, respectively.
9.1.1 Understanding and Improving Kademlia
We addressed in the first part the problem of characterizing topological and
routing table properties of Kademlia. This was motivated by the importance
of understanding these properties for assessing and improving the system’s
performance and robustness. Accurate characterization of these properties can
be derived from analysis of graph snapshots captured from a real Kademlia-type
system. Capturing such snapshots, however, is challenging because it involves
collection of large amount of information, within a short period of time, from
large and rapidly changing systems.
We addressed the aforementioned challenge by KadSpider, our own crawler for
KAD (an implementation of Kademlia with about four million nodes, of which
about half a million nodes can be found online at the same time). We showed that
KadSpider, mainly by exploiting KAD design, downloads a complete routing table
up to eight times faster (with eight times fewer crawling messages) than prior
KAD crawlers. During the time that KadSpider took to capture a graph snapshot
(about 908 seconds), almost 96% of the discovered online nodes and 90% of their
117
118 9. SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK
routing table entries remained intact. That is to say, the impact of the crawl
time on the consistency of the collected information is marginal. In addition, we
reported an average snapshot completeness of about 85%. Although this means
that the captured snapshots are not identical to the real system graph, both the
system size and the properties of interest are maintained in the captured snapshots.
We consequently considered the captured snapshots valid for our analysis.
For comparison purposes, we generated synthetic KAD graphs using a novel
simulation model of KAD as well as standard graph models (used in prior work
to approximate topological properties of Kademlia-type systems). With the goal
to make it behaving like the real system, we implemented KAD in our simulation
model exactly as it is implemented in eMule (the most popular client software of
KAD). We also applied widely accepted churn settings [BH12].
Analysing the measured and synthetic graphs, we showed that the shape of
degree distributions and the resilience of graph connectivity to random departures
are well modelled by simulations. However, the system size in addition to the
ratios of stale routing information and manipulated clients affected the results for
certain properties. Most interestingly, the impact of stale routing information was
significant: with nearly 88% stale routing table entries in the measured graphs,
the complete graph (including active nodes and stale routing table entries) was
much more vulnerable to targeted attacks than in the synthetic graphs.
Using real KAD routing tables, we also analysed two previously disregarded
routing performance factors: (i) the completeness of routing tables with respect
to global knowledge of active identifiers and (ii) the diversity of contacts over the
corresponding identifier space sections.
The analysis of the first factor showed that nodes in KAD on average can
double the number of active contacts contained in their routing tables, if they
would have global system knowledge. Increasing the number of active contacts
will improve the routing performance in terms of lookup’s hop count and latency
as well as the success rate of lookup messages.
Regarding the second factor, it is measured for each routing table bucket
independently. We showed that routing table buckets in KAD achieved on average
almost half the maximal diversity degree. We also showed that maximizing
the diversity can improve the standard routing performance. We consequently
proposed and implemented a new neighbour selection scheme in which the nodes
aim at maximizing the diversity. The scheme is compatible with Kademlia and
its derivatives, and it incurs almost no extra overhead. Small-scale simulations
for three notable Kademlia-type systems without churn, in agreement with the
derivations of our model for Kademlia routing [RSS15], showed that our scheme
enables to achieve an average routing hop count reduction up to nearly 7%.
Simulations with churn showed that the reported performance gain increases with
the churn rate as long as the success rate of request packets is not very low. In
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addition, modified clients, while connecting to the real system, achieved an average
improvement of about 4%. The reported improvement values, although small,
confirms the utility of our scheme. We also argued that this utility could be higher
if the scheme was implemented in a real system completely (i.e. in all the nodes).
However, evaluating our scheme in such a scenario is technically infeasible, since
none of the existing Kademlia-type systems implement our scheme, nor we could
enforce all system nodes to use it.
9.1.2 Improving Named-Data Networking
We addressed in the second part of the dissertation two problems in NDN: (i)
coordinated cache management and (ii) defending against the so-called Interest
Flooding Attack (IFA), an NDN-tailored DDoS attack. We argued that both
problems can be effectively addressed in a coordinated way based on timely
knowledge of system-wide information. However, realizing such a solution in large
networks such as the Internet or Autonomous Systems (ASs) with low overhead is
challenging and was not achieved earlier.
Towards this end, we developed CoMon, a framework for AS-wide coordination
in NDN. CoMon relies on few nodes to perform monitoring and re-routing of
content requests towards in-network caches. These nodes are selected such that
they intercept the entire network traffic in an early stage (i.e. close to the clients)
and coordinate via a centralized controller.
The coordination in the cache management case is based on AS-wide knowledge
of both content access information and cache states. Extensive simulations showed
that incorporating CoMon in NDN enables to achieve a remarkable caching
efficiency gain, compared both to the vanilla NDN as well as to notable cache
coordination solutions [LCS06, PCP12]. Most notably, under a bad case of
content popularity (MZipf content distribution with α = 0.8 and q > 0), CoMon
outperformed LCD [LCS06] (which in turn outperformed ProbeCache [PCP12]
and the vanilla NDN) by about 30% in terms of the fraction of content requests
that cross the AS boundaries. Furthermore, CoMon’s signalling overhead of
coordination was negligible in all conducted experiments.
Finally, motivated by the importance of treating threats in a prospective future
Internet architecture, we adapted CoMon to defend against IFAs. The proposed
defence mechanism detects and reacts to IFAs based on AS-wide attack-related
information close to the potential attack sources. The mechanism assigns attack
detection and reaction tasks to the monitoring nodes, in collaboration with the
aforementioned controller. We confirmed the effectiveness and feasibility of our
defence mechanism via a simulative study. The results showed that the mechanism
offers a highly effective defence against IFAs, outperforming both the original NDN
system and the satisfaction-based pushback (SBP) mechanism [AMM+13] (which
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was considered effective), causing negligible signalling overhead. In particular, our
mechanism increased the satisfaction ratio of legitimate interest packets by about
9% – 37% under a relatively low-rate attack, and by about 27% – 42% under a
massive-rate attack. In contrast, SBP improved the aforementioned ratio under
the same low-rate attack by about 2% – 28% only. Even worse, the influence of
SBP under the same massive-rate attack was negative.
9.2 Outlook
There are several directions to build on the work that we presented in this
dissertation. For instance, we believe that our findings in Chapter 4 about the
disparities between simulative results and the actual system should be taken into
account when developing simulation models for P2P systems. In addition, designs
of existing simulation models should be revised accordingly.
We showed in Chapter 5 that Kademlia-type systems, when implementing
our new neighbour selection scheme, can reduce the average lookup’s hop count
with negligible overhead. We consequently recommend to use our scheme in
future implementations of Kademlia. It also would be interesting to measure the
routing performance when our scheme considers not only the diversity of contacts
over the respective identifier space sections but also their geographic proximity
[Str07, CDHR02,KLKP08]. The same applies for combining our scheme with
other routing performance improvements such as [LSMK05]. Since our scheme is
compatible with previous improvements, it is expected to enhance their original
performance gains further, when it is integrated with them.
We explained in Chapter 7 how CoMon is designed in a generic way so that
it can adapt different caching strategies. So far we evaluated CoMon with an
exemplary caching strategy: selecting the most frequently requested contents, as
observed over the entire AS, for caching. Alternatively, the caching strategy can
take other factors into account. For instance, it could be beneficial for the overall
caching efficiency to consider the content type and/or the cost of fetching the
content from outside the AS.
From the design’s point of view, CoMon can be improved by redesigning and
reimplementing the AS controller in a distributed way, both for load balancing
and for fault tolerance. Another logical extension is to implement CoMon on
a multi-AS scale. In this case, different ASs maintain content-level peering
agreements to leverage each other’s cached contents and/or perform inter-AS
collaborative defence against IFAs. Such a design, however, creates severe privacy
threats as ASs have to reveal sensitive information such as names and access
statistics of contents requested by their users. Therefore, a solution for preserving
the privacy of published data is required. The challenge in this case is to balance
9.2 OUTLOOK 121
the trade-off between data privacy and utility of published data for analysis. While
several solutions were proposed in the last years to address such a challenge, there
are several issues remain to be addressed (for instance, see [GDLS14,RY15]).
Our vision of CoMon is broader than just a framework for coordinating
caching-related decisions and for defending against IFAs. In NDN (or ICN in
general), CoMon also can be used as an infrastructure for collecting network
statistics. It can be also adapted (without substantial changes) to defend against
cache pollution attacks. In this case, a new defence mechanism can benefit from
the aggregated (or even network-wide) information that is available with CoMon
to improve on former defence mechanisms such as CacheShield [XWW12] and
[CGT13].
Last but not least, apart from ICN, the main idea of CoMon – relying on a
small fraction of well positioned nodes to monitor and coordinate via a centralized
controller – can help to solve several monitoring problems in today’s Internet. In
particular, accurate online monitoring is essential for determining traffic properties
as well as for detecting anomalies and attacks in the Internet. However, with
today’s high bandwidth links and consequently massive traffic volumes, online
monitoring is hard to perform. With CoMon, the monitoring nodes can be used
to collect and reprocess detailed flow records (without repetitions) and send the
output to the controller. The controller, in turn, aggregates the information that
it receives from the monitoring nodes and after that commands the monitoring
nodes to perform proper actions (e.g. dropping part of the traffic coming from
malicious sources).
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AppendixA
Search Keywords Used in KAD
Measurements
Table A.1: Search keywords and prefixes of their MD4 hashes (selected from [SCB10])
00 ice 09 cosmic 13 park 1c lingerie 26 queen
00 girls 0a feathers 13 carlisle 1d singer 26 monster
01 things 0a cage 14 toms 1d americas 27 cool
01 mess 0b henrys 14 cinema 1e jitters 27 financially
02 analog 0b trouble 15 days 1e interception 28 racing
02 tons 0c contraband 15 licking 1f boy 28 olympics
03 volume 0c terrible 16 jubilee 1f well 29 north
03 daze 0d hats 16 melody 20 sacrifice 29 wooden
04 pup 0d came 17 timeshift 20 escape 2a financing
04 loving 0e true 17 wart 21 timebomb 2a charlie
05 chicks 0e cave 18 backstage 21 thousand 2b gottfried
05 megaforce 0f old 18 stielow 22 tabby 2b luck
06 babes 0f fine 19 paulina 22 yesterdays 2c bei
06 verdict 10 megan 19 questions 23 trial 2c soldiers
07 mellos 10 behind 1a behave 23 daddy 2d romantic
07 beyond 11 did 1a fast 24 island 2d chicken
08 melodious 11 mine 1b believer 24 finest 2d legal
08 diner 12 bela 1b anonymous 25 voices 2e rolling
09 here 12 druggists 1c venture 25 guys 2f finale
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2f killing 40 sayin 50 your 61 cut 71 helens
30 people 41 nutty 51 yellowstone 61 sombras 72 rainbow
30 one 42 xix 51 citizen 62 stroke 72 smooth
31 summer 42 tinnitus 52 tunnels 62 struggles 73 years
31 witch 42 dont 52 future 63 presents 75 goon
32 timemaster 42 muscle 53 are 63 tushyland 75 dogumentary
32 christa 43 yentl 53 godiva 64 yearbook 75 age
33 cab 43 yesyears 54 ghost 64 yellowneck 75 welcome
33 wife 44 yeti 54 particular 65 presidential 75 beijing
34 gobblers 44 gone 55 belladonna 65 parade 76 wrapped
34 yellowcard 45 guide 55 skelter 66 step 76 trail
35 meine 45 bears 56 stalker 66 bondage 77 solitary
36 favorite 46 great 56 dogs 67 touching 77 women
36 fever 46 kid 57 beer 67 machine 78 einstein
36 pierces 47 scarecrow 57 megadeth 68 punkins 78 dot
37 lickin 47 etiquette 58 hour 68 thru 79 moments
37 songs 48 gold 58 deluxe 69 hoppy 79 plays
38 regiment 48 timeless 59 gang 69 bell 7a hand
38 lariat 49 naval 59 tommy 6a solutions 7a megiddo
39 scott 49 baﬄes 5a bellamy 6a megalodon 7b soldier
39 eye 4a dicks 5a claudine 6b ever 7b who
3a has 4a bellas 5b its 6b prohibited 7c hop
3a bel 4b brown 5b come 6c dancing 7c youth
3b timesaver 4b kahan 5c boyd 6c buff 7d melodies
3b timequest 4c eyes 5c police 6d magnum 7d highway
3c international 4c russia 5d crooks 6d leagues 7e mates
3c chickens 4d heroes 5d dust 6e powder 7e lean
3d solitudes 4d standard 5e ram 6e hermann 7f doctor
3d settlement 4e some 5e swordfish 6f refinement 7f hunters
3e orgasm 4e tower 5f chaser 6f then 80 bryon
3e seven 4f strong 5f wally 70 geniuses 80 solve
3f art 4f justice 60 makes 70 follies 81 percent
3f blast 50 find 60 typhoon 71 chocolate 81 gay
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82 badge 92 paul a3 path b3 believe c4 family
82 genius 93 yearling a3 revue b4 betty c4 grace
83 nurse 93 skin a4 trackers b4 timothy c5 melodrama
83 wind 94 contortionist a4 swallowed b5 eleazar c5 eleven
84 bettys 95 being a5 american b5 mejor c6 square
84 private 95 solitaire a5 cupid b6 tinas c6 table
85 reward 95 toy a6 timing b7 voyage c7 story
85 door 96 shriner a6 man b7 doings c7 prints
86 too 96 timothys a7 bridges b7 lift c8 sisters
86 nate 97 etheridge a7 crevasse b8 lights c8 double
87 million 97 taker a8 point b8 sombrerhos c9 rock
87 party 98 collectors a8 wolf b9 soloist c9 take
88 train 98 timesweep a9 making ba fantasies ca romeo
88 touch 99 lily a9 divine ba symphony ca dream
89 tail 99 sus aa solomon ba safe cb mein
89 grey 9a boyfriend aa rare bb trans cb and
8a mekong 9a unleashed ab show bc tina cc spy
8a nickleby 9b they ab xmas bc hoss cc lane
8b romance 9b summers ac bellclair bc edge cd bath
8b gila 9c miss ac wallpaper bd isle cd cup
8c freaks 9c anatomy ad society bd ozzy ce men
8c screen 9d mazie ad warrior be air ce dobbs
8d chile 9d yes ae strutters be hero cf awards
8d have 9e midnight ae beethoven bf picnic cf from
8e belle 9e times af timecode bf home d0 solution
8e believers 9f crime af blues c0 bronc d0 valentine
8f help 9f streak b0 wounds c0 victory d1 mama
8f date a0 admiral b0 food c1 timepiece d1 exposure
90 confession a1 damnd b1 timmys c1 mitchell d2 ordinary
90 print a1 maine b1 meeting 22 stage d2 yee
91 nightfire a2 pours b2 detective c2 bubby d3 excursionists
91 obsession a2 executives b2 desires c3 fire d3 roller
92 bellboy a2 vengeance b3 folks c3 blackhand d4 fingered
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d4 bridegroom dd killer e6 madame ef beimo f9 timelock
d5 pigs de melinda e7 proposito f0 went f9 solitaires
d5 quack de jack e7 you f0 belated f9 something
d6 smitty df carter e8 pawn f1 vendetta fa triangle
d6 wish df finally e8 licken f1 sex fa vincent
d7 mel e0 meet e9 news f2 finiculee fb hammer
d7 turns e0 clits e9 feeding f2 drink fb melanzane
d8 number e1 liar ea cheers f3 barn fc fat
d8 nudity e1 rescue ea manhandled f3 two fc magdalene
d9 call e2 body eb forever f4 crimes fd mother
d9 elopement e2 daughter ec adversary f4 sombra fd panic
da mix e3 taboo ec tinkercrank f5 kal fe bernsteins
da somay e3 financial ec star f5 belly fe vision
db donald e4 cumpany ed republic f6 habaneras ff amateur
db for e4 elephant ed michigan f6 dynamite ff picture
dc belinda e5 finicula ee pride f7 timecollapse
dc psychotic e5 cruise ee self f7 pan
dd consents e6 solus ef sinema f8 steamer
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AppendixB
Acronyms
AS Autonomous System
AC AS Controller
BA Barabási-Albert
BC Betweenness Centrality
CAR Cache-Aware Routing
CCN Content-Centric Networking
CDF Cumulative Distribution Function
CDN Content Delivery Network
CI Confidence Interval
CS Cache Store
(D)DoS (Distributed) Denial-of-Service
DHT Distributed Hash Table
DONA Data Oriented Network Architecture
ER Erdös-Rényi
FIA Future Internet Architecture
FIB Forwarding Information Base
FoC Feasibility of Changing
FTBM Forward-Till-Be-Monitored
GBC Group Betweenness Centrality
GTNA Graph-Theoretic Network Analyzer
ICN Information-Centric Networking
IFA Interest Flooding Attack
LCD Leave Copy Down
LFU Least Frequently Used
LRU Least Recently Used
MAR Monitor-Aware Routing
MCD Move Copy Down
MDHT Mainline DHT
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140 B. ACRONYMS
MN Monitoring Node
MZipf Mandelbrot-Zipf
NAT Network Address Translation
NDN Named-Data Networking
NetInf Network of Information
NN NDN Node
NSF National Science Foundation
P2P Peer-to-Peer
PIT Pending Interest Table
PRCS Placement based on covered Routes and Closeness to Sources
PSIRP Publish/Subscribe Internet Routing Paradigm
pub/sub publish/subscribe
QoE Quality of Experience
RCF Routing-with-Content-Filtering
RTT Round Trip Time
SHR Server Hit Ratio
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